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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST nIDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
The ESTAJE of BENJAMIN HOLLAND, 




METROPOLITAN PROPERTY and 
CASUAL TY INSURANCE COMP ANY, and 
METLIFE AUTO & HOME, 
Defendants. 
) 
) Case No. CV 10-0677 
) 











COMES NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney of record, and hereby move this 
Court, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B), to reconsider its memorandum opinion and order dated 
July 20, 2010. 
This motion is made on the basis that the Court's order dismissing Plaintiffs' claim to 
statutory attorney's fees focused on the 'reasonable opportunity' analysis to be used when there is 
no definition of proof of loss set forth in the insurance policy at issue, instead of focusing on the 
language of the insurance policy setting forth the proof of loss required and on the substantive 
., .. --:~'· '.· 
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infonnation passed from Plaintiffs to Defendants as required under LC. § 41-1839 and the case 
law interpreting the statute. 
Plaintiffs would further respectfully offer that at least some of the issues raised by the 
Court are irrelevant to the analysis under the applicable statute in that some issues are not raised 
by the plain wording of the statute. Plaintiffs would also respectfully ask the Court to reconsider 
the Court's interpretation ofits March 3, 2010 order and to rule on Plaintiffs' argument that 
Defendants did not timely answer the motion for attorney's fees. 
'This motion is supported by memorandum filed contemporaneously herewith and the 
affidavits along with supporting material filed in this case . 
..l- . 
Respectfully submitted this L day of August, 2010. • H 
-K--,i,i:-zo_HJ. . . .Mih-.-ar___J_a --=::.........::'.':__~=-----
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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IN TIIB DISTRICT COURT OF nm FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
The ESTATE of BENJAMIN HOLLAND, 




METROPOLITAN PROPERTY and 
CASUAL TY INSURANCE COMP ANY, and 
METLIFE AUTO & HOME, 
Defendants. 
) 
) Case No. CV 10-0677 
) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
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COMES NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney of record and hereby offer 
the Court this memorandum oflaw in support of their motion for reconsideration. This motion is 
supported by the affidavits submitted previously as well as contemporaneously herewith. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This Court has noted that there has been extensive briefing on this matter, and for 
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sake of brevity, Plaintiffs incorporate the various undisputed facts contained in the various 
background sections of the previous submissions already before the Court. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592, 21 P .3d 908,914 (2001). A motion for 
reconsideration of a.71 interlocutory order of the t.rial court may be made at any time before entry 
of a final judgment, but not later than fourteen days after entry of a final judgment. I.R.C.P. 
11 (a)(2)(B). A party making a motion for reconsideration is permitted to present new evidence, 
but is not required to do so. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 486,472,147 P.3d 100, 104 (Ct. 
App. 2006). The moving party has the burden of brining new facts bearing on the correctness of 
the interlocutory order. Devil Creek Ranch, Inc. v. Cedar Mesa Reservoir & Canal Co., 126 
Idaho 202,205 879 P.2d 1135, 1138 (1994). If no new facts are presented, the party moving for 
reconsideration must demonstrate errors oflaw or fact in the initial decision. Johnson v. 
Lambros, 143 Idaho 486, 472-73, 147 P.3d 100, 104-105. 
If there is no genuine issue of material fact - only a question of law remains; appellate 
Courts exercise free review. Indian Springs LLCv. Indian Springs Land Inv., 147 Idaho 737, 
746,215 P.3d 457,466 (2009) (quoting Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 
307, 160 P.3d 743, 746 (2007)). An appellate court, likewise, freely reviews the construction of a 
statute. Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746, 751, 133 P.3d 1211, 1216 (2006). The Supreme 
Court exercises free review over the district court's conclusions oflaw and may substitute its 
view for that of the district court on a legal issue. Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
137 Idaho 173, 176, 45 P.3d 829, 832 (Idaho 2002). 
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ID. ARGUMENT 
A. UNDER BRINKMAN AND GREENOUGH, THE COURT DID NOT MAKE 
THE REQUIRED FINDING THAT THE POLICY WAS SILENT AS TO WHAT 
CONSTITUTED ADEQUATE PROOF OF LOSS THUS SHOULD NOT IMPOSE 
THE 'REASONABLE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION' STANDARD 
ANNOUNCED BY THOSE CASES 
The issue in this case is whether this Court should impose a 'reasonableness' standard as 
discussed by Brinkman and Greenough upon Plaintiffs absent a finding t.liat the policies of 
insurance between the parties were silent as to what constituted adequate proof of loss. 
The applicable rule ofldaho law is that an insured must submit proof ofloss as required 
under the insurance contract between the insured and the insurer. I.C. § 41-1831(1) ("after proof 
ofloss has been furnished as provided in such policy") (emphasis added). If the insurance policy 
is silent on what proof of loss is required, then and only then does Idaho law place the 
requirement of proof of loss "sufficient. .. to provide the insurer with enough information to 
allow the insurer a reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine its liability." Greenough 
v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589,593, 130 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2006); citing 
Brinkman v. AID Ins. Co. 115 Idaho 346, 349-50, 766 P.2d 1227, 1230-31 (1988). 
Plaintiffs would respectfully ask the Court to review the plain wording of the statute, and 
to appreciate that both Greenough and Brinkman analyses began with the Supreme Court of 
Idaho looking directly to the language of the insurance policies between the parties prior to 
imposing the 'reasonable amount' of information requirement upon a plaintiff. I.C. § 41-1831 (1) 
("after proof ofloss has been furnished as provided in such policy") (emphasis added). Indeed, in 
Greenough, the Court found the mere submission of a pamphlet sufficient. Greenough v. Farm 
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 593, 130 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2006) ("However, 
Frum Bureau's insurance policy did not require its insured to complete and return any particular 
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form.")citingBrinkmanv.AIDlns. Co. 115Idaho346,349-50, 766P.2d 1227, 1230-31 (1988) 
(Neither LC. § 41-1831 nor AID's insurance policy define "proof ofloss.")(emphasis added). 
Thus, in order to find that Plaintiffs have not met their burden of proof, this Court would have to 
find that Plaintiffs did not provide proof of loss as provided in their policies. To date, this Court 
has made no such finding. 
Indeed, the Supreme Cm11-t of Idaho has given guidance to the distiict courts when 
interpreting LC.§ 41-1831: 
A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that where a statute is plain, clear and 
unambiguous, courts are constrained to follow that plain meaning, and neither add 
to the statute or take away by judicial construction. 
Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 746, 152 P.3d 614,617 (2007) (citing 
Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244,247, 61 P.3d 601,604 (2002)). Thus, 
courts must look to the plain wording of the statute. In this case, the statute's requirements are: 
"after proof ofloss has been furnished as provided in such policy ... " LC. § 41-1831. Thus, it is 
the policy of insurance between Plaintiffs and Defendants that controls the definition of 'proof of 
loss' and when the same is adequate under Idaho law. 
The relevant contract provisions between the parties regarding the requirements of proof 
of loss under all three policies in this case are exactly the same, as all the policies contain the 
same insurance policy form (Policy MPL 6010-000) and read as follows: 
IF AN ACCIDENT OR LOSS OCCURS 
You or someone on your behalf must notify us as soon as possible of any accident 
or loss. The notification should include as many details as possible, including 
names and addresses of drivers, injured persons and witnesses, and the time, 
place, and circumstances of the accident or loss. We may require it in writing. 
If any legal action is begun before we make payment under any coverage, a copy 
of the summons and complaint or other process must be forwarded to us 
immediately. · 
· -PLAJNTIFFS' MEMORANDUM 
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See Aff. K. Mihara (July), Exs. "1" (p.19 of 24) and "2." (emphasis added). The policies 
continue under a heading of "MEDICAL REPORTS; PROOF AND PAYMENT OF CLAIM:" 
Any person making a claim must, as soon as possible: 
a. give us details about the death ... and other information we need to determine 
the amount payable. We have the right to make or obtain a review of medical 
expenses and services to determine if they are reasonable and necessary for the 
bodily inju.ry sustained. Forms for providing t.'ris information may be provided by 
us. 
b. consent to be examined by physicians chosen and paid by us when, and as often 
as, we reasonably may require. 
c. execute authorizations to permit us to obtain medical reports and records. If the 
person is dead or unable to act, such authorizations must be executed by his or her 
legal representative. 
d. submit to and provide all details concerning loss information through written or 
recorded statements or examinations under oath as often as we may reasonably 
reqmre. 
Id. Ex. 1 (p.20 of 24). 
Thus, the requirement that a copy of the summons and complaint be immediately 
forwarded to the insurer is·predicated upon a total lack of payment under any coverage. Id. The 
facts of this case show that payment was made by MetLife under med-pay and funeral coverage 
on December 29, 2009, thus the requirement of an immediate forwarding of the complaint and 
summons was not placed upon Plaintiffs by the contract. Id., Ex. "3." 
It is undisputed that Plaintiffs' attorney made an oral proof ofloss to Plaintiffs' agents on 
or about November 8, 2009. See A:ff. Davis, ,r 3. This was approximately two weeks after Ben 
Holland's death and immediately after MetLife's insureds retained counsel to aid and assist them 
in insurance claims. Further, it is undisputed that upon receiving the oral proof ofloss, 
Defendants' adjustor, Daneice Davis, sent a letter on or about November 10, 2009 requesting 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDl.l]\'I 
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further information. See Aff. Davis; see also Aff. K. Mihara (May), Exs. 3, 4, and 19 (RF A no. 
1). The request included forms for the insureds to fill out. Id. Defendants do not dispute that on 
or about November 17, 2009, they received a packet of information from Plaintiffs. See Aff. 
Mihara (May), Ex. 19 (RF A no. 2). This packet of information included a police report. Id. This 
police report included the name and address of the lone driver since it was a single motor vehicle 
accident, the nan1es of tlie injured persons and witnesses, the time, place, and circun1stfu1ce of ti1ie 
accident (death). Id. Notification was in writing. Id. Plaintiffs would make an offer of proof that 
the same information was given to Defendants on November 8, 2009 via the oral notification by 
counsel. It is undisputed that prior to December 1, 2009, Plaintiffs' counsel and Defendants 
adjustor, Daneice Davis had conversations regarding the payment of applicable 'policy limits.' 
See Aff. Mihara (May), Ex. 5. Plaintiffs' counsel sent Defendants' adjustor, Daneice Davis, a 
letter on or about December 1, 2009 demanding payment of 'policy limits.' Id. 
In this case, because all of the policies at issue required the exact same proof of loss, the 
controlling date beginning the thirty (30) days running of the statute should be the same. Aff. K. 
Mihara (July), Exs. "l" and "2." Thus, after claims were made on the Hollands' other policies. 
with MetLife on or about December 7th or 8th , 2009 under the policies with higher limits, 
Plaintiffs had already given proof of loss as required by the policies, and MetLife had had such 
information in its possession for almost thirty days - and for approximately twenty days in 
writing. Indeed, there is not even an allegation that MetLife had requested any further 
documentary information from Plaintiffs until January 27, 2010. 
In addition to the foregoing, Plaintiffs had alleged that they had complied with the terms 
of the insurance policy. See Complaint; see also Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion 
to Determine Attorney's Fees, p. 6 ("It is apparent from the facts of this case that MetLife has 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM 
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failed for a period of thirty (30) days after Plaintiffs submitted adequate proof of loss as provided 
by the policy to tender the amount 'justly due" under the policy of insurance See Aff. K. Mihara, 
Exs. "A" to "C." ( emphasis added). 
If arguendo, Defendants forward the argument that they did allege that Plaintiffs failed 
to provide proof of loss as provided under the policy of insurance as Defendants state, "[t]hat the 
statutory requirements for a."1 award of attorney's fees under I.C. § 41-1839 have not been 
met, ... " (Answer, p. 3; Affirmative Defense, ,r 2), Plaintiffs would counter that such an 
allegation dismisses the requirements of the civil rules in that Defendants put Plaintiffs on notice, 
generally, of which requirement is lacking. I.R.C.P. 8(b) ("When a pleader intends in good faith 
to deny only a part or a qualification of an averment, the pleader shall specify so much of it is 
true and material and shall deny only the remainder.") At the time Defendants answered the 
complaint in this case, they had had months to research the claims and to prepare defenses 
therefore. See Answer. Indeed, Defendants would have the burden of proving their affirmative 
defense. Hawley v. Green, 117 Idaho 498, 788 P.2ds 1321 (1990) It would simply be 
unreasonable for Defendants to force Plaintiffs and this Court to prognosticate as to which 
statutory requirement was lacking under a statute with many statutory requirements. I.R.C.P. 
8(b); see also Perry v. Reynolds, 63 Idaho 457, 122 P.2d 508 (1942) Defendants absolutely did 
not allege that the policy of insurance was silent as to what constituted 'proof of loss' within the 
meaning of the policy's terms. See Answer. Indeed, Defendants did not allege that Plaintiffs have 
failed to provide proof of loss as provided under the policy of insurance. Id 
Again, arguendo, Defendants may argue that they raised the issue of adequacy of proof 
of loss concerning coverage in their filings. See Defs Response to Plfs Motion for Attys Fees, p. 
16. 1bis argument, however, is only supported by a single sentence contained within the broader 
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scope of an argument entitled "Plainitffs Granted Defendants' Requested Extension Rendering 
Parties Settlement Timely." Id. The topic of adequacy of proof of loss was limited to legal 
argument focusing on the fact that the cases provided and/or material sent to attorney Paukert 
were apropos to the issue at hand. 1 Defendants never direct their argument to the adequacy of the 
information provided to MetLife before Ms. Paukert became involved in the case. Thus, 
Plaintiffs were never on notice that the element of sufficiency of proof of ioss they provided to 
Defendants in regards to the initial proof of loss was at issue. 
In conclusion, the foregoing facts show that Plaintiffs had, indeed, c6mplied with the 
proof of loss terms of their insurance policy thus satisfying the requirements of the applicable 
statute. Due to the foregoing, Plaintiffs would submit that they have met their burden of brining 
new facts and demonstrating errors of law bearing on the correctness of the interlocutory order 
and request the Court reconsider the same. At the minimum, the issue of whether Plaintiffs had 
submitted an adequate proof of loss should have been an issue of material fact to be resolved 
during trial of the matter. 
B. IDAHO LAW PROHIBITS THIS COURT FROM IMPOSING ANY OTHER 
RECOVERY REQUIREMENT UPON PLAINTIFFS OTHER THAN WHAT ARE 
CONTAINED IN THE APPLICABLE STATUTE 
The next issue for this Court to consider is whether the issues raised by the evidence in 
this case, as reflected in the Court's memorandum decision and order, are relevant to the facts 
necessary for adjudication of this matter. 
The applicable statute reads: 
Any insurer issuing any policy ... which shall fail for a period of thirty (30) days 
after proof of loss has been furnished as provided in such policy ... to pay to the 
person entitled thereto the amount justly due under such policy ... shall in any 
There was even a footnote (FN 7) attached to the sentence regarding this matter and the footnote delineated that 
the allegation regarding proof of loss was limited to legal argument only on the 'additional claims' and not to the 
proof ofloss of the underlying claims. 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM· 
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action thereafter brought against the insurer in any court in this state ... for 
recovery under the terms of the policy ... pay such further amount as the court 
shall adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees in such action ... 
LC. § 41-1839. Thus there are seven requirements a plaintiff must prove in order to recover 
under the statute: (1) there must be an insurer, (2) there must be a policy, (3) there must be a loss, 
(4) there must be a proof ofloss furnished as provided in such policy, (5) there must be a failure 
to I@:'. for thirty days after proof of loss had been provided under t.1ie terms of the policy, (6) 
there must be an action brought for recovery under the terms of the policy, (7) the action against 
the insurer must be brought in any court in this state. Id. At issue in this case are the fourth and 
fifth aforementioned elements. 
As stated above: 
A cardinal ruJe of statutory construction is that where a statute is plain, clear and 
unambiguous, courts are constrained to follow that plain meaning, and neither add 
to the statute or take away by judicial construction. 
Parsonsv. Mutual a/Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743,746, 152 P.3d 614,617 (2007) (citing 
Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244,247, 61 P.3d 601,604 (2002)) 
In this case,.tbe Court made several observations as to what it considered issues of 
material fact in this case. See Memorandum Decision and Order, pp. 10 (whether initial refusal to 
pay was unreasonable), 11 (whether Defendants' had knowledge of the lawsuit prior to making 
the offer to settle), 15 (whether MetLife bad sufficient information and/or time to investigate and 
determine its liability), 18 (what day did the 30 days begin to run), 25 (whether there was 
sufficient meeting of the minds to form an express agreement), and 28-30 (whether it was 
attorney Mihara or Paukert to come to the theory of recovery). 
Plaintiffs have reviewed this Court's view of the issues and would politely suggest that 
the only issue left for adjudication is: whether the parties' attorneys' emails constituted a 
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sufficient meeting of the minds. The other issues (refusal to pay reasonable, knowledge of 
lawsuit, which attorney came up with the theory ofrecovery), are not contained within the 
statute, and are therefore irrelevant to the analysis of whether the statute mandates the award of 
attorney's fees. The required facts as to the timing of the proof of loss are not disputed by the 
parties and are discussed below. 
( 1) Whether the initiai refusal to pay was unreasonabfo? 
The issue raised by the Court after viewing the evidence was whether MetLife initially 
refused to pay, and/or whether that refusal to pay was reasonable. See Memorandum Decision 
and Order, p. 10. 
In Parsons, the Supreme Court ofldaho upheld its previous dismissal of the requirement 
that "there must be evidence that an insurer had acted unreasonably or unjustly before a court 
may award attorney's fees under J.C. § 41-1831." id. This is the very requirement apparently 
imposed upon Plaintiffs by this Court. See Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 10 ( citing 
Dawson v. Olson, 94 Idaho 636,641,496 P.2d 97, 102 (1972) (Dawson cited Carter v. Cascade 
Ins. Co., 92 Idaho 136, 140, 438 P .2d 566 570 (196f) for the same proposition) Carter was over-
ruled by Associates Discount Corp. of Idaho v. Yosemite Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 249,257,526 P.2d 
854, 862 (1973). Thus, at the time this Court placed the impediment ofrequiring a showing that 
the insurance company bad acted unreasonably upon Plaintiffs, that very impediment had been 
removed from a plaintiffs path by the Supreme Court of Idaho for over 25 years and affirmed as 
recently as three years ago in Parsons. 
Indeed, in Martin, the Supreme Court discussed that there had been another requirement 
that had been placed before a plaintiff by Anderson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 130 Idaho 755, 759, 947 
P.2d 1003, 1007 (1997) (attorneys fees may be awarded to an insured under J.C.§ 41-1831 only 
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when the insured had no other option but to file suit against his or her insurer in order to recover 
the loss) Penrose, at 617. The Supreme Court observed that: 
Martin also made it clear that any argument regarding the requirements for 
obtaining an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 41-1831 ( 1) must be based 
upon the wording of the statute. 
Id. at 618. Thus, any requirement for obtaining attorney fees must be based upon the wording of 
Idaho Code§ 41-1831(1).Jd. 
In analyzing a case including the Anderson requirement, the Supreme Court of Idaho 
noted the purpose of the statute: 
I.C. § 41-1839 provides an incentive to an insurer to settle just claims made under 
a policy held by the insured; its aim is to prevent litigation and the high costs 
associated with it. Once an insured has presented a claim against the insurer and 
provided proof of his insured loss, he should not have to resort to litigation to 
collect on his insurance policy. lfhe is forced to do so, the economic risk of the 
litigation process is that of the insurer, not the insured. The language of this 
section is clear and unambiguous. An insured is entitled to an award of attorney 
fees only if (1) he has provided proof ofloss as required by the insurance policy: 
(2) the insurance company fails to pay an amount justly due under the policy 
within thirty days of such proof ofloss ... 
Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 671, 735 P.2d 974, 982 (Idaho 1987) 
(emphasis added). 
Indeed, Plaintiffs would ask this Court to note that the statute requires payment of the 
amount justly due -not just an offer to pay. J.C. § 41-1839. Indeed, Idaho law states that only a 
written offer is equivalent to a tender. LC. § 9-1501. In this case, there is no allegation that 
Defendants made any written offer. Further, it is undisputed that Defendants did not tender, nor 
offer to tender, $200,000.00 to Plaintiffs at any time prior to February 2, 2010. See Aff. K. 
Mihara (May), Ex. 19, (RF A No. 9). Depending on the date that this Court finds that Plaintiffs 
submitted proof ofloss as required by their policies, it is undisputed as to the date that payment 
was tendered. 
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This Court should not rule in the face of established precedent and resurrect an 
impediment that had been removed from a plaintiff's path to recovery by the Supreme Court of 
Idaho over a quarter century ago. 
(2) Whether MetLife had knowledge of the lawsuit prior to making the offer to 
settle? 
The applicable general rule of Idaho law is well established that notice to an agent is 
notice to the principle. Williams v. Continental Life & Accident Co., 100 Idaho 71, 72-73, 593 
P.2d 708, 709-10 (1978) (citing Harding v. Home Investment etc. Co., 49 ldaho 64,286 P. 920 
(1930); also citing Claris v. Oregon Short Line R.R. Co., 56 Idaho 169, 51 P.2d 217 (1936), cert. 
denied, 297 U.S. 714, 56 S.Ct. 590, 80 L.Ed. 1000)) Likewise, knowledge acquired during the 
course of the agency relationship, and while the agent is not acting in an interest adverse to that 
of the principle, is imputed to the principle. Id. ( citing Carroll v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 28 Idaho 
466, 154 P. 985 (1916)). 
Further, a party should not be able to cite a document for the purpose of supporting a 
favorable argument, and then be permitted to disclaim the same document when it supports an 
adverse argument. 
The plain words of the statute do not place a requirement that a defendant have notice of 
the lawsuit before the statute is applicable. LC.§ 41-1839. Indeed, the policies at issue in this 
case contemplate litigation and only require that a copy of the complaint and summons be served 
upon MetLife ift.here had been no payment under any applicable coverage. See Aff. Mihara 
(July), Ex. 1 ("If any legal action is begun before we make payment under any coverage, a copy 
of the summons and complaint or other process must be forwarded to us immediately.") 
(emphasis added) It is undisputed that the Complaint in this case was filed on January 26,2010. 
See Complaint. It is undisputed that MetLife made payment under applicable coverage on 
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December 29, 2010 of $1000.00. See Af£ K. Mihara (July), Ex. 3. Thus, MetLife had made 
payment under coverage before the legal action had begun negating the requirement that it be 
served immediately. 
In addition, in this case, it is undisputed, and even offered by Defendants that their agent, 
Joe Fodeyece, told MetLife adjustor Daneice Davis. that the lawsuit had been filed. See Aff. 
Davis, if 8. Ms. Davis states: 
on January 29, 2010, I called MetLife agent, Joe Fodeyece, and inquired about 
what Benjamin Holland had told him concerning who was going to be listed on 
the motorcycle title. During that conversation, Mr. Fodeyece told me that he saw 
in the COEUR D'ALENE PRESS that the Estate of Benjamin Holland had filed 
suit against MetLife. I then called Ms. Paukert's office and asked that they check 
to see if a lawsuit had been filed. I heard back that Ms. Paukert's assistant had 
checked and she was unable to find such a lawsuit. 
Id. (emphasis added) 
Thus, even if Daneice Davis and attorney Paukert claim ignorance of the fact that the 
lawsuit had been filed, it is undisputed and even offered by MetLife that "MetLife agent, Joe 
Fodeyece" had knowledge of the filing of the lawsuit - and it is even undisputed that Mr. 
Fodeyece communicated his knoweldge to adjustor, Daneice Davis. Id. It is undisputed that 
based on this knowledge, adjustor, Daneice Davis engaged the services of an attorney to 
investigate the matter. Id. 
Further, Defendants cite the letter Plaintiffs sent to MetLife on January 27,2010. See 
Defendants Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees, p.17 («Moreover, during the 
. process in which Mr. Mihara and Ms. Paukert conversed and proffered theories back and forth in 
an effort to find coverage, such research and theories necessitated additional proof of loss 
documentation, including up to the date of January 27, 2010." citing Aff. K. Mihara, Exhibit C, 
Letter dated January 27,2010) (emphasis added). It is undisputed that the letter of January 27, 
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2010 advised MetLife that Plaintiffs had filed suit, and gave MetLife the case number and the 
court in which the lawsuit was filed. Id. 
In conclusion, before the Court is the undisputed fact that MetLife agent, Joe Fodeyece, 
had knowledge of the lawsuit on January 29, 2010, that Mr. Fodeyece communicated that 
knowledge to MetLife adjustor Daneice Davis on the same day. Idaho agency law simply 
precludes adjudication of the issue of whet.i¾er MetLife had knowledge prior to the February 2, 
2010 offer, because based on the undisputed facts Idaho law imputes that knowledge to MetLife. 
Further, Plaintiffs letter to Defendants on January 27, 2010 advised Defendants that a 
lawsuit had been filed. Defendants should not be able to cite that letter to support a favorable 
argument, and then disclaim the letter in attempt to put proof of knowledge at issue. 
(3) Whether MetLife had sufficient information and/or time to investigate and 
determine its liability? 
Plaintiffs would submit that this issue is not contained within the terms of the statute that 
allows for recovery. Plaintiffs would argue that the sufficjency of the information is determined 
by the insurance policy as discussed above, and the timeframe for an insurer to determine its 
liability is set forth via the statute; 30 days. 
(4) On what date did the 30 days begin to run? 
In this case, it is unrusputed that all claims under Plaintiffs' policies of insurance arose 
under the same set of facts. As noted above, it is undisputed that the information required by all 
relevant policies of insurance was given to MetLife orally on November 8, 2009- as soon as 
possible under the circumstances, and again, in writing, on November 17, 2009. lbis information 
passed from Plaintiffs to Defendants clearly included the name and address of the driver, the 
names and contact information of injured persons and witnesses, and the time, place, and 
circumstances of the loss. See Aff. Mihara (May), 16. It is undisputed that based on the oral 
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information passed on November 8, 2009, MetLife sought to obtain that information in writing 
on November 12, 2009. See Aff. D. Davis. It is undisputed that the documentary information was 
sent, in writing, on November 17, 2009. Id. It is further undisputed that MetLife did not ask for 
any other documentary evidence at least until February 27, 2010. See Aff. Paukert; Aff. Davis. 
As Judge Jim Papas observed, to allow an insurance company determine one of the 
elements of a statutory cause of action against them, would render the applicable IdHho Code 
provision a toothless statutory tiger. In re Jones, 401 B.R. 456, 466 (Br. Dist. Idaho 2009) 
(interpreting Idaho law on the amount justly due). Again, as observed in In re Jones, like an 
insurer could simply decline to agree with its insured about the amount justly due, and then argue 
that lacking such an agreement, the statutory payment deadline did not operate; in this case the 
insurer took the teeth out of the statute by s:imply arguing that it did not have enough information 
for its attorney to come to a coverage decision ... and by asking for more information thus 
arguing that the statutory payment deadline did not operate. Id. Defendants have still not 
expounded upon which information was lacking and how it was relevant to their coverage 
decision. Such a result goes against the very purpose of the statute requiring swift decisions by 
insurers regarding coverage. 
This Court should not impose a greater burden upon Plaintiffs other than what was 
required by virtue of the contractual terms of the policies of insurance. Indeed, this Court should 
not bestow upon Defendants any greater benefit or advantage or impose any burdens upon 
Plaintiffs other than what the contract between the parties sets forth. 
Thus, as the facts are not disputed by the parties, this Court should reconsider its previous 
memorandum opinion and order and find that the date that the 30 days begins to run is either 
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November 8, 2009 or November 17, 2009-the dates it is undisputed that Plaintiffs gave 
Defendants all the information required under their policies of insurance. 
(5) Whether the emails constituted a sufficient meeting of the minds? 
This Court has noted that there is an issue of fact to be determined as to whether 
there was a sufficient meeting of the minds to form an express agreement in regards to the early 
Febmai-y, 2010 exchai,ge of emails betvveen attorneys Paukert m1d Mihara. See Memorandum 
Decision and Order, p.25. 
As this Court correctly notes, the question of whether there is a sufficient meeting of the 
minds to form an express agreement is to be determined by the trier of fact. See Memorandum 
Decision and Order, p. 25 (citing Corder v. Idaho Farmway, Inc., 133 Idaho 353, 359, 986 P.2d 
1019 (Ct. App. 1999). 
This appears to be a question of fact to be determined by this Court. Plaintiffs would 
stand by their arguments contained in their previous filings; such arguments are incorporated 
herein by reference. Plaintiffs specifically deny that their February 3, 2010 acceptance was 
intended to waive, or otherwise to be inclusive of, their entitlement to statutory attorney's fees. 
(6) Whether it was attorney Paukert or Mihara that came up with the applicable 
theory of recovery? 
The issue posed is whether it was Plaintiffs' or Defendants' attorney that came up with 
the applicable theory of recovery under the policy. 
Plaintiffs would offer that the issue of which attorney came up with the theory of 
recovery is irrelevant under the applicable statutory analysis, but would at the same time will 
endeavor to answer this Court's rhetorical question: if Paukert ori behalf of MetLife, found the 
theory that would provide a larger recovery for the Hollands, and Mihara on behalf of Hollands 
accepts the higher amounts based on the theory that MetLife' s attorney created, how can 
P.LAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM· 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
RE§~JM-TION -16 Page 535 of 709 
Hollands' claim at this time that MetLife was provided, "a reasonable opportunity to investigate 
and determine its liability?" Indeed, Plaintiffs did not have this information in their possession 
during the time the attorneys were discussing coverage, and indeed, did not have in their 
possession until after the lawsuit had been filed and the parties were in the discovery process. 
Aff. K. Mihara (July),, 6. Plaintiffs' counsel could not be expected to come up with the same 
theories of recovery as Defendants' attorneys as he did not have the san1e information in },is 
possession to base his theories on. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Plaintiffs would offer that their attorney did come up with 
the applicable theory of recovery. See Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. 6, p.13 ("MetLife took money 
from Ben's account, and cashed checks from Mr. and Mrs. Gregory Holland after Benjamin had 
passed away.") (emphasis in original). Plaintiffs would offer that Ben Holland was not only a 
covered insured, but it was Ben Holland who applied for, paid for, and owned the motorcycle 
policy in his own right as he was the individual who signed the application, elected the amount 
of coverage under the under-insured form offering coverage, and it was his account that MetLife 
withdrew premium for payment of the policy. See Aff. K. Mihara (July), Ex. 6. Plaintiffs would 
submit that the most likely theory that MetLife paid under was that irrefutable evidence would 
come to light that it was Ben Holland, and not his parents, who owned the motorcycle policy and 
thus payment under that policy would be proper. 
In conclusion, the issue of which attorney came up with the theory of recovery is 
irrelevant under the applicable statutory analysis. Even if it were relevant, Plaintiffs should not 
be forced to come up with theories of recovery based on information that they did not have in 
their possession - and Defendants did not notice Plaintiffs of until after a lawsuit had been filed. 
Plaintiffs would also point this Court to the fact that Plaintiffs had apprised MetLife of the fact 
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that MetLife was taking money from Ben Holland's account, after his death, for premium 
payment on the motorcycle policy on which MetLife eventually based the February 2, 2010 
offer. 
C. THE PLAIN WORDING OF THIS COURT'S ORDER DID NOT DISMISS 
ALL OF THE A VERMENTS OF THE COMPLAINT, ONLY THE 'CLAIMS' 
The issue is whether the Court's March 3, 2010 order dismissed all of the factual 
averments upon which Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees under LC. § 41-1839 is based. 
The closest applicable rule that Plaintiffs could find to c_ite to this Court is that it is 
incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation which will not render it a nullity. State 
v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641,646, 22 P.3d 116 (Ct. App. 1991). 
It is that a plaintiff must allege enough facts in bis complaint to support the legal claims 
contained therein. I.R.C.P. 12(b )(6). Indeed, a plaintiff who does not allege sufficient facts in his 
complaint subjects his complaint to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12. Jd; see also Bissett v. 
State, 111 Idaho 865, 727 P.2d 1293 (Ct. App. 1986). 
Plaintiffs would suggest that it is axiomatic that the Court should interpret its order in 
such a way that it will not render the specifically reserved Plaintiffs' claim contained within that 
same order a nullity. If the Court's interpretation of its order is given literal effect, then the 
remaining claim for attorney's fees must also be dismissed as there would be no factual 
allegations left in the complaint to support the claim. Further, upon review of the stipulation 
upon which the Court's order is predicated, it is acutely apparent that it was not the intent of the 
parties to dismiss the claim for attorney's fees. See Joint Motion and Stipulated Order. There is 
no provision in either the stipulation or this Court's order that addresses any of the 'factual 
allegations' contained within the complaint. 
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Given the foregoing law and argument, Plaintiffs would ask the Court to reconsider its 
previous order. 
D. THIS COURTS PREVIOUS MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DID 
NOT DISPOSE OF PLAINTIFFS' ARGUMENT THAT DEFENDANTS FAILED 
TO TIMELY OBJECT TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Plaintiffs would respectfully ask this Court to review the previous filings in this case and 
to rule on Plaintiffs' argument that Defendants failed to thnely object to Plaintiffs' previous 
motion for attorney's fees. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, given the foregoing, this Court should reconsider its previous order and 
issue an order granting Plaintiffs' earlier motion and/or setting this matter for trial. 
~ 
Respectfully submitted this L day of August, 2010. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
'J ... J. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this-----=~'---_ day of August, 2010, I caused a true, 
accurate, and correct copy of the foregoing document to be served on the Defendants attorney via 
the method indicated below: 
William J. Schroeder 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
70 I Front A venue, Suite 101 
P. O.BoxE 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328 
Telephone: (208-664-8115 
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338 
Mailing Address: 
717 West Sprague Avenue, Suite 1200 
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
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In re Darice JONES, Debtor. 
Darice Jones on behalf of herself and the Estate of Darice Jones, Plaintiff, 
v. 
state Farm MubJal Auto Insurance Company, Defendant. 
Bankruptcy No. 07-01203-JDP. 
Adversary No. 08-6050. 
United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Idaho. 
February 10, 2009 
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Kurt Holzer, Holzer Edwards, Chartered, Boise, ID, for Plaintiff. 
Julianne S. Hall, Gjording & Fouser, Boise, ID, for Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
JIM D. PAPPAS, Bankruptcy Judge. 
Introduction 
Before the Court for disposition is Plaintiff Darice Jones' Motion for Summary Judgment. Adv. Docket 
No. 9. r11 After briefing by the parties, the Court conducted a hearing concerning this motion on November 18, 
2008, and took the issues under advisement. Having fully considered the record and arguments of the parties, 
this Memorandum will constitute the Court's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9033. t2J 
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Legal Standard for Resolution of Summary Judgment Motions 
Summary judgment may be granted if, when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the 
non-moving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), incorporated by Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7056; Leimbach v. Lane (In re Lane), 302 
B.R. 75, 81 (Bankr.D.ldaho 2003) (citing Far Out Prods., Inc. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 992 (9th Cir.2001)). 
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The Court does not weigh evidence in resolving such motions, but rather determines only whether a 
material factual dispute remains for trial. Leimbach, 302 B.R. at 81 (citing Covey v. Hollydale Mobi/ehome 
-Estates, 116 F.3d 830, 834 (9th Cir.1997)). A dispute is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable 
fact finder to hold in favor of the non-moving party. A fact is" material" if it might affect the outcome of the case. 
Id. (citing Far Out Prods., 247 F.3d at 992). 
The initial burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact rests on the moving party. 
Esposito v. Noyes (In re Lake Country /nvs.), 255 B.R. 588, 597 (Bankr.D.ldaho 2000) (citing Margolis v. Ryan, 
140 F. 3d 850, 852 (9th Cir.1998)). If the non-moving party bears the ultimate burden of proof on an element at 
trial, that party must make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of that element in order to survive a 
motion for summary judgment. Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 
L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). 
Proposed Findings of Fact 
The following facts, appearing from the record, are either undisputed or, as required by the case law 
discussed above, viewed in a light most favorable to the Defendant, the non-moving party. 
On March 3, 2004, Plaintiff Darice Jones was involved in an automobile accident with Goldie L. 
Patterson. Ms. Patterson was at fault. 
Plaintiff retained counsel, and on February 28, 2006, she sued Ms. Patterson in state court. Ms. 
Patterson was insured by Allstate Insurance Company(" Allstate"). Ms. Patterson's insurance policy limited 
Allstate's liability for her negligence to $25,000 per incident. Plaintiff incurred approximately $60,000 in medical 
expenses as a result of injuries suffered in the accident. [3l 
Plaintiff filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on August 2, 2007. !4l BK Docket No. 1. Gary L. 
Rainsdon was app9inted to serve as chapter 7 trustee. On November 14, 2007, the Court approved the 
trustee's employment of Plaintiff's state court counsel, Mr. Holzer, to serve as special courisel to represent both 
Plaintiff and the trustee to pursue collection of damages arising from Plaintiff's personal injury. BK Docket No. 
26. 
Plaintiff was insured under a policy issued by Defendant (the" Policy"). Adv. Docket No. 26, Ex. 9. 
The Policy provided underinsured motorist(" UIM") coverage benefits for Plaintiff in the amount of $25,000, as 
well as medical payments benefits 
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in the amount of $10,000. Adv. Docket Nos. 11, Ex. A, and 26, Ex. 3. 
On March 27, 2008, [5l Plaintiff's lawyer sent Defendant's representative a letter containing various 
documents to support a claim for UIM benefits under the Policy, including discovery responses from the state 
court action, and medical records and bills. 161 Adv. Docket No. 26, Ex. 10. Although the record does not indicate 
a specific date, at some point, Defendant paid $10,000 directly to Plaintiffs medical providers. Adv. Docket No. 
26, Ex. 8. That amount was later reimbursed to Defendant by Allstate. 
On June 11, 2008, Allstate offered to pay the remaining funds available under the liability coverage of 
the Patterson policy to Plaintiff. [7J BK Docket No. 33, Ex. A Plaintiffs attorney informed Defendant about the 
Allstate offer in a letter dated June 12, 2008. Adv. Docket No. 26, Ex. 4. In that letter, counsel sought 
Defendant's permission to accept Allstate's policy limits offer. The letter also demanded that Defendant pay 
Plaintiff the $10,000 in medical payments benefits, together with the $25,000 LIIM benefits, as provided by the 
Policy. When Defendant did not pay, on July 15, 2008, Plaintiff, acting individually and on behalf of her 
bankruptcy estate, commenced this adversary proceeding against Defendant. Adv. Docket No. 1. In the 
Complaint, Plaintiff sought judgment against Defendant for the $25,000 UIM benefits, the $10,000 medical 
benefits, plus prejudgment interest, and attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code§ 41-1839. Id. 
On July 25, 2008, forty-two days after the June 12, 2008 letter, and ten days after this adversary 
proceeding was commenced, Defendant paid Plaintiff $35,000. Adv. Docket No. 26, Ex. 7. 
On August 4, 2008, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in this action. In light of Defendant's 
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payment, it sought only prejudgment interest in the amount of $483.42, as well as reimbursement of Plaintiffs 
attorney fees and costs in the amount of $11,827.80. Adv. Docket No. 5. Defendant responded on September 4, 
2008 with a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for other relief. Adv. Docket No. 8. Plaintiff then filed the 
instant motion for summary judgment. Adv. Docket No. 9. In a companion decision and order entered this same 
date, the Court has denied Defendant's motion to dismiss. See Memorandum Decision dated February 10, 2009, 
Adv. Docket No. 29. 
Proposed Disposition of Issues and Conclusions of Law 
In this action, Plaintiff seeks to recover from Defendant the prejudgment interest accruing on her 
claim under the Policy, and reimbursement of her attorneys fees 
Page 462 
and costs, all pursuant to Idaho Code§ 41-1839. That statute provides: 
Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or contract of insurance, surety, guaranty or indemnity 
of any kind or nature whatsoever, which shall fail for a period of thirty (30) days after proof of 
loss has been furnished as provided in such policy, certificate or contract, to pay to the person 
entitled thereto the amount justly due under such policy, certificate or contract, shall in any 
action thereafter brought against the insurer in any court in this state for recovery under the 
terms of the policy, certificate or contract, pay such further amount as the court shall adjudge 
reasonable as attorney's fees in such action. 
Idaho Code§ 41-1839(1). 
In Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244, 61 P.3d 601,604 (2002), the Idaho 
Supreme Court explained that the purpose of Idaho Code§ 41-1839 is: 
to provide an incentive for insurers to settle just claims in order to reduce the amount of 
litigation and the high costs associated with litigation. Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
112 Idaho 663, 735 P.2d 974, 982 (1987). This Court has held that the statutory attorney fee is 
not a penalty but is an additional sum rendered as compensation when the insured is entitled to 
recover under the insurance policy, " to prevent the sum therein provided from being diminished 
by expenditures for the services of an attorney .... " Halliday v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 89 Idaho 
293, 404 P.2d 634, 637 (1965). 
Martin, 61 P.3d at 604. 
For Plaintiff to recover from Defendant under this statute, she must demonstrate that: (1) she 
provided a proof of loss to Defendant as required by the insurance policy; and (2) Defendant failed to pay an 
amount justly due under that policy within thirty days of such proof of loss. Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. 
Co., 143 Idaho 743, 152 P.3d 614, 617-18 (2007); Martin, 138 Idaho 244, 61 P.3d 601, 604 (2002).[SJ 
Plaintiff contends that all elements of the statute have been met with respect to her claim against 
Defendant. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs proof of loss was deficient in several respects, and therefore, its 
payment to Plaintiff was not late under the statute. 
1 . Proof of Loss. 
Plaintiff must show she provided an adequate proof of loss to Defendant as required under the 
terms of the Policy. Plaintiff maintains that she did so with the information provided in her attorney's letter to 
Defendant's representative dated March 27, 2008, as supplemented by his letter sent on June 12, 2008. 
Defendant contends Plaintiff's proof of loss was deficient because she failed to provide Defendant a 
copy of various documents from Plaintiff's bankruptcy file. According to Defendant, this failure contravenes three 
provisions of the Policy. The first policy provision cited by Defendant requires that Plaintiff " cooperate with 
[Defendant], and when asked, assist [Defendant] 
Page 463 
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in: (b) securing and giving evidence". Adv. Docket No. 26, Ex. 9 p. 5. Second, Defendant notes that Plaintiff 
must "give [Defendant] all the details about the death, injury, treatment and other information we need to 
determine the amount payable." Id. Finally, Defendant points out that the Policy required Plaintiff to" send 
[Defendant] at once a copy of all suit papers if the person sues the party liable for the accident for damages." 
Id. (emphasis in original; designates a defined term within the Policy). Id. 
There is no question that Defendant asked for the bankruptcy papers, and Plaintiff declined to 
provide them. In his June 12, 2008 response to the letters from Plaintiffs attorney, Defendant's claims 
representative requested that Plaintiffs attorney provide Defendant copies of the petition, schedules and other 
filings made by Plaintiff ~n the bankruptcy court. Adv. Docket No. 26, Ex. 5. Defendant's agent sent another letter 
to Plaintiffs attorney, dated July 3, 2008, explaining that, in his words, Plaintiffs case represented " unique 
circumstances" and that the bankruptcy court filings were" critical to being able to understand our insured's 
claim" and once again requesting that Plaintiff provide the bankruptcy documentation. Adv. Docket No. 26, Ex 
12. 
Plaintiffs attorney responded with a letter dated July 8, 2008 which, among other things, reminded 
Defendant's agent that (1) the information from Plaintiffs bankruptcy file Defendant had requested was readily 
available to the public (and to Defendant) through this Court's internet website, (2) that the thirty-day clock was 
running on Defendant's obligation to make payment to Plaintiff on her claim under the Idaho statutes, and (3) that 
he intended to sue Defendant if payment was not timely made. Adv. Docket No. 26, Ex 6. 
Defendant then sent a July 14, 2008 letter to Plaintiff's attorney, this time from a different 
representative, indicating that he " was not aware the needed bankruptcy information is available to State Farm 
on-line" and that while he had attempted to access the bankruptcy court's electronic files, he had been 
unsuccessful in finding "anything to do with the court proceedings on Mr. [sic] Jones or the bankruptcy estate." 
Adv. Docket No. 26, Ex. 13. The representative chided Plaintiffs attorney, noting that" I can't believe that as the 
legal representative for the estate you don't have the requested information readily available to provide to us." 
The representative then sought " directions for obtaining the information on-line .... " Id. 
Plaintiff never provided the requested documents, and Defendant eventually made payment to 
Plaintiff on July 25. Defendant argues that it needed documents from Plaintiffs bankruptcy file in order to 
evaluate Plaintiffs claim under the policy, and contends that Plaintiff failed to provide them in violation of her 
duties under the Policy. Therefore, Defendant argues Plaintiff never submitted an adequate proof of loss to 
Defendant. 
The Policy does not define what constitutes a proper" proof of loss," nor is that term defined by 
statute.191 But the case law is clear about the purpose served by a proof of loss. In Brinkman v. Aid Ins. Co., 
115 Idaho 346, 766 P.2d 1227 (1988) ( overruled in part .by Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 
142 Idaho 589, 130 P.3d 1127 (2006)), where 
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the relevant insurance policy likewise included no definition of" proof of loss," the court stated: 
The purpose of a provision for notice and proofs of loss is to allow the insurer to form an 
intelligent estimate of its rights and liabilities, to afford it an opportunity for investigation, and to 
prevent fraud and imposition upon it. 
Brinkman, 766 P.2d at 1230-31 (citing 44 Am.Jur.2d, "Insurance,"§ 1323, p. 250). The Brinkman court later 
reiterated that " [t]he purpose of proof of loss statements, in general, is to furnish the insurer with the 
particulars of the loss and all data necessary to determine its liability and the amount thereof, if any." Id. at 
1231 (citing 3 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice,§ 1471, p. 147 (revised edition 1967)). Finally, after 
considering the foregoing statements, the Brinkman court concluded: 
From these purposes, we draw the following conclusions. The insured, when required to do so 
under his policy, should provide the information reasonably available to him regarding his injury 
and the circumstances of the accident. 
The amount of information provided should be proportional to the amount reasonably available 
to the insured. If the information provided is insufficient to give the insurer an opportunity to 
investigate and determine its liability, the insurer may deny coverage. Otherwise, the insurer 
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must investigate and/or determine its rights and liabilities. The documentation is the" proof." 
The explanation of physical and/or financial injury is the" loss." 
Brinkman, 766 P.2d at 1231. 
The Court will assume that Defendant was justified in requesting information about Plaintiffs 
bankruptcy filing in responding to her claim under the Policy. Perhaps Defendant was concerned about whether 
Plaintiff or the trustee should properly be paid any benefits. But even so, it must also be kept in mind that the 
Policy clearly provides that" [b]ankruptcy or insolvency of the insured or his or her estate shall not relieve us of 
our obligations." Adv. Docket No. 26, Ex. 9 p. 22 (emphasis in original; designates a defined term within the 
Policy). While perhaps bearing on to whom to pay the benefits under the Policy, Defendant cannot argue that its 
duty to pay in the first instance was impacted by Plaintiffs bankruptcy filing. 
As a matter of convenience, perhaps even professional courtesy, Plaintiffs attorney likely should 
have provided the bankruptcy filings to Defendant's claims representatives. Still, all the documentation requested 
by Defendant's agents from Plaintiff's attorney are to be found in this Court's electronic files, freely available to 
the public by computer via its internet website. In terms of promoting an expeditious resolution of Plaintiffs claim, 
her attorney was not unjustified in asking Defendant to consult the Court's file, rather than undertaking to print 
and provide hard copies of the bankruptcy filings. That Defendant's professional claims agents were " unaware" 
of the existence of the free public electronic court records, or that they lacked the ability to use the website or 
needed " directions" on how to access those records, if true, reflect business decisions made by Defendant, not 
matters that should be allowed to prejudice Plaintiffs right to prompt payment of her claims. Put another way, 
while Defendant's need for information from Plaintiffs bankruptcy file may have been reasonable, Defendant's 
representatives' insistence that Plaintiffs attorney provide them hard-copy documents, coupled with their 
apparent failure to simply access the public records themselves, was not reasonable. Accordingly, 
Page465 
Plaintiffs failure to provide bankruptcy court documents did not amount to a violation of any of the 
provisions of the Policy, nor render Plaintiffs proof of loss deficient under the Idaho statute. Under these 
circumstances, the Court declines to bless Defendant's failure to pay Plaintiff promptly solely because of its 
agents' preference for paper copies of readily available electronic public records. 
2. Commencement of the Thirty Days. 
Defendant raises an additional argument about the adequacy of Plaintiffs proof of loss. Plaintiff 
contends that she submitted information to Defendant that constituted a proper proof of loss, and thus activated 
the thirty-day clock for payment of her claim, at the time her counsel sent his June 12, 2008 letter to Defendant's 
claims representative. Defendant contends that its duty to make payment of LIi M benefits did not arise at that 
time because Allstate had not as yet tendered its full liability policy limits. The Court disagrees with Defendant. 
It is true that the Policy provides that Defendant's obligation to pay the UIM benefits to Plaintiff did 
not arise until Allstate, the adverse driver's insurer, paid the limits of its policy. t101 However, under the statute, 
the time limit for payment is not based upon satisfaction of this condition. Instead, Idaho Code§ 41-1839(1) 
provides that the thirty-day clock began to run when Plaintiff submitted a proper proof of loss to Defendant. That 
Allstate had offered to pay its policy limits, but had not actually given Plaintiff a check, did not affect the date of 
Plaintiffs submission of her proof of loss. Recall, the Idaho courts have held that " [i]f the information provided 
[by the insured to the insurer] is insufficient to give the insurer an opportunity to investigate and determine its 
liability, the insurer may deny coverage. Otherwise, the insurer must investigate and/or determine its rights and 
liabilities." Brinkman, 766 P.2d at 1231 (emphasis supplied). 
In the March 27, 2008 letter, Plaintiff had already submitted information to Defendant concerning the 
details of the accident, as well data and documentation concerning her medical bills. Defendant never disputed 
that Plaintiffs total damages would exceed the liability limits in Patterson's Allstate policy. Then, in the June 12, 
2008 letter, Plaintiffs attorney confirmed to Defendant that Allstate had indeed made a policy limits offer to 
Plaintiff. At that point, had it elected to do so, Defendant had all the information available it needed to " 
investigate and determine its rights and liabilities" to Plaintiff. Presumably, a simple phone call from Defendant to 
Allstate would have allowed Defendant to confirm that a policy limits payment was being made by Allstate. In 
short, the letter to Defendant of June 12, 2008 was the final piece of information necessary to enable Defendant 
to effectively investigate and determine its liability. 
In sum, the Court concludes that, as a matter of law, t11J Plaintiff submitted an 




adequate proof of loss to Defendant on June 12, 2008, and that Defendant had thirty days from that date 
to pay Plaintiff her benefits under the Policy. 
3. Amount Justly Due. 
To recover under Idaho Code§ 41-1839(1 ), Plaintiff must show that Defendant failed to pay her the 
amount justly due under the Policy within thirty days after the date she furnished a proper proof of loss to 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff contends that the $25,000 limit of her UIM benefits under the Policy, plus the $10,000 in 
medical payments benefits, constituted the amount justly due to her in this case, since her medical bills alone 
exceeded those amounts. Defendant, on the other hand, insists that it never agreed with Plaintiff about what 
amount was justly due to Plaintiff under the Policy, that Defendant voluntarily paid Plaintiff the $35,000, and thus, 
the clock in Idaho Code§ 41-1839 never began to run. 
Accepting Defendant's interpretation would basically render Idaho Code § 41-1839( 1) a toothless 
statutory tiger. Under Defendant's view, an insurer could simply decline to agree with its insured about the 
amount justly due, and then argue that lacking such an agreement, the statutory payment deadline did not 
operate. The Court declines to presume this sort of result was intended by the Idaho legislature in adopting 
Idaho Code§ 41-1839(1). 
Defendant further contends that, absent an agreement, a jury or arbitrator necessarily must 
determine what amount is "justly due." It argues that, in this case, a genuine question existed about whether 
Plaintiff was entitled-to $35,000, because only $25,000 of that amount was UIM coverage. The remaining 
$10,000 paid by Defendant to Plaintiff represented medical payments coverage, which is generally intended to 
be paid directly to medical providers, and which is what occurred in this case. Defendant argues that the fact 
that it later received reimbursement from Allstate for those medical benefits payments did not mean that 
Defendant should have to pay those medical benefits to Plaintiff directly. [121 Therefore, Defendant contends, a 
jury or arbitrator's determination was necessary to arrive at the amount justly due. 
Defendant's position is surely untenable. For purposes of the statute, the amount that is" justly due" 
is determined either presently, when an insured accepts the amount offered by the insurance company, or 
retrospectively, after a jury or arbitrator determines the amount. See, Martin, 61 P.3d at 605; Walton v. Hartford 
Ins. Co., 120 Idaho 616,818 P.2d 320 (1991); Brinkman, 766 P.2tl at 1231. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
stated that the question of " what amount is 'just' only arises when the plaintiff and the insurance company 
cannot agree." Brinkman, 766 P.2d at 1231. On the other hand, if" the insurance company tenders an amount 
that is agreeable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff will accept and that will be the end of it." Id. Put another way, 
If the amount tendered by the insurer is unconditionally accepted by the insured, then it will 
represent the" amount justly due" and the case ends .... But if the insurance company makes no 
tender within thirty days, or makes a tender that is substantially less than the arbitrators' 
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eventual award, the insurance company is liable for a reasonable amount of the insured's 
attorney fees, as compensation to make the insured whole. 
Martin, 61 P.3d at 605. 
Here, Defendant tendered $35,000 to Plaintiff, which she accepted as the amount justly due to her 
for benefits under the Policy. Indeed, this was the amount she sought to collect from Defendant from the 
beginning. The fact that Defendant may have had internal misgivings about what amount was due to Plaintiff 
under the Policy is of no consequence under these circumstances. l13l The statute and case law do not require 
an agreement by insured and insurer in advance of the payment. If the insurer tenders an amount that is 
accepted by the insured, the amount justly due is decided at that moment Such was the case here. Thus, the 
Court concludes that the amount justly due was $35,000 the amount paid by Defendant and accepted by 
Plaintiff. 
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4. Attorneys Fees. 
The statute provides that in the event an insurer fails to pay the amount justly due within thirty days 
after proof of loss has been furnished by the insured, the insurer: 
shall in any action thereafter brought against the insurer in any court in this state for recovery 
under the tenns of the policy, certificate or contract, pay such further amount as the court shall 
adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees in such action. 
Idaho Code§ 41-1839(1). As the Court has determined that, as a matter of law, Defendant failed to pay 
the amount justly due to her within thirty days of her submission to Defendant of a proper proof of loss, Plaintiff 
is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys fees from Defendant. 
Plaintiff contends that because this Court previously granted the trustee's motion to employ Mr. 
Holzer as special counsel for the bankruptcy estate, and because the Court approved a one-third contingency 
fee for his services, then a fee equal to one-third of the amounts she recovered from Defendant in this action is" 
presumptively reasonable" here. Adv. Docket No. 9. 
Not so. In obedience to the Idaho statute, the Court must II adjudge," not II presume," the 
reasonableness of Plaintiffs requested attorneys fees. To adjudge is not to presume. 
In this respect, the Court agrees with Defendant that it must evaluate the reasonableness of 
Plaintiff's attorney fees utilizing the factors listed in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54. That rule provides for an 
award of reasonable attorney fees "when provided for by any statute or contract." Id. The rule further provides: 
(3) Amount of Attorney Fees. In the event the court grants attorney fees to a party or parties in 
a civil action-it shall consider the follewing factors in detennining the amount of such fees: 
(A) The time and labor required. 
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions. 
(C) The skill requisite to perfonn the legal service properly and the experience and ability of the 
attorney in the particular field of law. · 
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(D) The prevailing charges for like work. 
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case. 
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained. 
(H) The undesirability of the case. 
(I) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. 
(J) Awards in similar cases. 
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted Legal Research), if the 
court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a party's case. 
(L) Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular case. 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(3) (emphasis supplied). 
Moreover, as the Court reads Idaho Code§ 41-1839(1), Plaintiff is entitled to recover from 
Defendant only those reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred for counsel's services in recovering from this 
Defendant. Defendant is not responsible to Plaintiff for payment of counsel fees or costs in connection with 
Plaintiffs pursuit of Patterson or Allstate. 
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Unfortunately, Plaintiff has afforded the Court no meaningful information to enable it to determine the 
amount of a reasonable attorney fee award in this context. Thus, this remains a disputed issue of fact. 
Accordingly, while the Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorneys fees and costs 
from Defendant under Idaho Code§ 41-1839(1), the amount of such fees and costs must yet be determined 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3). 
5. Prejudgment Interest 
Idaho Code§ 41-1839 does not provide for recovery of prejudgment by an insured based upon an 
insurer's untimely payment of benefits under a policy. However, the Idaho cases have recognized an insured is 
entitled to an award of prejudgment interest in this context pursuant to Idaho Code§ 28-22-104, which provides 
in pertinent part: 
(1) When there is no express contract in writing fixing a different rate of interest, interest is 
a 11"Wed at- t-he '"at0 nf hwel"° C0 nts (12¢ ' on tho h, 1nrlrerl h" th,:,. "e::ir on· JIU \. LI I \a.. VI \. V'- '- .L j I•- 1 n,,1 •-• M -, ~ •- J ...,, •• 
1. Money due by express contract. 
Idaho Code§ 28-22-104(1); Greenough, 130 P.3d at 1130. 
In this instance, Plaintiff is entitled to recover prejudgment interest from Defendant, calculated from 
the date Defendant became obligated to pay benefits to Plaintiff. Greenough, 130 P.3d at 1131 (" In insurance 
cases money becomes due as provided under the express terms of the insurance contract"). Here, the Policy 
provided that Defendant was not obligated to pay UIM benefits until Allstate had paid its policy limits. As a result, 
Plaintiffs award of prejudgment interest must be calculated beginning from the date that Allstate paid the 
balance of its liability coverage to Plaintiff. 
Unfortunately, that date is not established in the record. While an image of Allstate's check, dated 
June 13, 2008, has been reproduced in Plaintiffs reply brief, that reproduction is not properly authenticated, and 
cannot be considered evidence of this fact. While the Court concludes that Plaintiff may, as a matter of law, 
recover prejudgment interest from Defendant, 
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the precise amount of that interest remains a material issue of fact. r14J 
Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth above, based upon the undisputed material facts, the Court concludes that 
Plaintiff is entitled to a summary judgment for recovery of attorneys fees, costs and prejudgment interest from 
Defendant. Defendant's payment of the $35,000 in policy benefits to Plaintiff on ~luly 25, 2008 was not timely 
under the thirty-day window provided by Idaho Code § 41-1 839( 1). 
To determine if the Court can recommend that Plaintiff be awarded a final judgment by the district 
court, Plaintiff shall be afforded twenty-one (21) days from the date of this Memorandum in which to make 
additional submissions of affidavits in support of its request for an award of attorneys fees, costs and 
prejudgment interest. If it desires to do so, Defendant shall have fourteen (14) days thereafter to respond to 
Plaintiffs submissions. Plaintiff shall have seven (7) days thereafter to reply. No further hearing or argument shall 
be allowed, and after the submissions are complete, any remaining issues shall be deemed under advisement 
for decision. [15l 
Notes: 
11 l For the sake of clarity, when the Court refers to the docket in the adversary proceeding, it will denote the docket as" Adv. Docket". 
When referring to the underlying bankruptcy docket, the Court will use the designation" BK Docket". 
[ZJ In a separate decision, the Court has concluded that this action is, for jurisdictional purposes, a non-core" related to" proceeding. 
Since Defendant has not consented to entry of a final judgment by the bankruptcy court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(c), this Court must submit 
its proposed findings offact, conclusions of law, and recommendation to the district court for entry ofa judgment. Fed. R. Bankr.P. 7052; 9033. 
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At the appropriate time, upon resolution of remaining issues discussed below, the Court will make its submission to the district court. 
131 Although Defendant formally disputes this fact, see Adv. Docket No. 24, '!I'll 11, 14, its agent stated in a letter to Plaintiffs counsel that" 
we believe that the value of Ms. Jones' claim is at least $60,000." Adv. Docket Nos. 11, Ex.Band 26, Ex. 12. Moreover, as discussed below, 
the precise amount of Plaintiffs medical expenses is not material to resolution of the issues raised by Plaintiffs motion. 
141 Case No. 07-01203-JDP. 
(SJ The Amended Complaint alleges that this letter was sent on March 27, 2007. Adv. Docket No. 5, 1115. 
151 For unexplained reasons, in this action, Defendant disputes that this letter and submission of documents constitutes a" primary proof 
of loss". Adv. Docket No. 24, '11119-10. In his letter to Defendant accompanying the documents, Plaintiffs counsel states" [t]hese are the primary 
proof of loss for Ms. Jones." Adv. Docket Nos. 26, Ex. 10, and 11, Ex. D. This characterization was reiterated in a July 1, 2008 letter to 
Defendant. Adv. Docket No. 26, Ex. 11. The record contains no evidence to show that Defendant disputed that the submission constituted a 
primary proof of toss at the time. In any event, whether the term "primary proof of loss" is disputed or not is immaterial here. As discussed 
below, while the term " proof of loss" is found in the applicable statute, it is not necessarily found in the provisions of the Policy. 
[7] The Court approved this settlement between the trustee, through his special counsel, and AHstate. BK Docket No. 43. 
(BJ While other requirements have at times been read into the statute, the Idaho Supreme Court has rejected those additions. Martin, 138 
Idaho at 247, 61 P.3d 601 (rejecting requirement that the insurer's failure to pay must compel the insured to bring suit against the insurer in 
order to recover for the loss); Assoc. Discount Corp. of Idaho v. Yosemite Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 249, 526 P.2d 854 (Idaho 1973) (rejecting 
requirement of evidence that insurer has acted unreasonably or unjustly). 
191 Idaho Code § 41-1831 provides that an insurer" shall furnish, upon written request of any person claiming to have a loss under an 
insurance contract issued by such insurer, forms of proof of loss for completion by such person ... " There is no indication that Plaintiff ever 
requested such forms, or that Defendant ever provided them. 
11 OJ Plaintiff's UIM policy provides that" THERE IS NO COVERAGE UNTIL THE LIMrrs OF LIABILITY OF ALL BODILY INJURY 
LV>.BILfTYBONDS AND POLICIES THAT APPLY HA VE BEEN USED UP BY PAYMENT OF JUDGMENTS OR SETTLEMENTS." Adv. 
Docket No. 26, Ex. 9 p. 12 (capitalization in originaQ. 
1111 The question of when a proof of loss is sufficient is ordinarily a question offact. Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut Ins. Co. of Idaho, 
142 Idaho 589, 130 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2006). However," if the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, what remains is a question 
of law .... " Cordova v. Bonneville County Joint School Dist. No. 93, 144 Idaho 637, 167 P.3d 774, 777 (2007) (quoting Robison v. 
Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 76 P.3d 951, 953 (2003)). 
r12J Defendant takes this position despite the fact that the reimbursement ii received from Allstate was deducted from the $25,000 
liability coverage Allstate later paid to Plaintiff. 
1131 Indeed, Martin held that the thirty days" is not delayed or extended while the insurer invokes the right to arbitration under the 
insurance contract." Martin, 61 P .3d at 605. Thus, ii clearly would not be extended here while Defendant decided upon what amount to tender to 
Plaintiff. 
1141 Defendant contends that only the $25,000 UIM benefit was due under the express terms of the contract, and thus that figure should 
provide the base amount for the calculation of prejudgment interest. The Court concludes, as a matter of law, that the Policy obligated 
Defendant to pay a total of $35,000 in this instance. As such, $35,000 is the base amount for the prejudgment interest calculation. 
r15l By this provision, the Court is not inviting the parties to make any further arguments or submissions concerning the issues resolved by 
this Memorandum. All further submissions should only address the amount of attorneys fees, costs and prejudgment interest Plaintiff may 
recover. Of course, in the alternative, the need for further proceedings can be obviated by the submission of a stipulated order approved by 
counsel for the parties resoMng the issues in this action, or at least resoMng the amount of Plaintiff's reasonable attorneys fees, costs, and 
recoverable prejudgment interest. 
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DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM 1N 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTTON 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
J. INTRODUCTION 
Ou July 20, 2010, after extens~ve briefing and full consideration of Lhe record, this Cou1t 
entered an Order: (I) denying Pla.indffs' Motion fnT Auomey's Fees under l.C. § 41-1839: (2) 
denying Plaintiffs' Mocion for Summary Judgment; and (3) granting MetLife':,; Motion tu Enforce 
the Selllement Agreement. (See, tvfcmorandum l)ecision. and Order: 1) Denying Plaintiffs' 
38157-2010 
DJ::H:-1::NDA.NTS' MEMORANDUM TN 
Page 549 of 709 
/"\Dt,nC!T'l"tr1M -rn 'Cit ,, Tl\TTn::,:-~· MnTTf"IN' '. 
ent By: PAINE HAMBLEN; 5098380007; Sep-20 :47PM; Page 3 
Motion for Summary Judgment; 2) Dehying PlainLiffs' Motion for Attorney fees; and 3) Grc1.nting 
Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Di.srniss the Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Actorncy Fees, filed July 20, 2010 ("Order")) 
PlainLifrs now request that this\Court reconsider its decision. For the 1~a.o;;ons discussed in 
Defendanc~· previous briefing to thC: Court, together with tho.si: dist:u:m:d he low, Plaintiffs' 
claims of error urc um;uppc.>rtccl. by the e\'idence and contrary to Idaho law. Accordingly, this 
Court should deny PlainLiffs' MntiOJI for Reconi.ideration and enter judgment in favor of 
Defendants Metropolitan Pm1,crty arid Casualty Insurance Company and MecLifc Auto and 
Home (co1lectivcly "MetLife"). 
11. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND FINDINGS 
A. Plaintiffs' Claims -
On October 25, 2009. Benjamin Charles Hotland passed away as a result of a motor 
v~hicle occidt:ul. (Set:, Cjvil Complaint ("Comp1aiot"), filed January 26, 201 O) On 
November 10, 2009, Gregory and .K.arhleen Holland, on behalf of the F..111ate of Benjamin 
Holland ("Pla.intitls"), :mbmittcd thcii i11itiuJ chum uguinst u MetLife insur11ncc policy (''!nltiHI 
Claim"). On December 7, 2009, MetLife insurance adju~ter Daneice Davi~ contacted Plaintiffs' 
attorney IGnzo Mihara Lo inform hi~ tJuit the mauer could be settled with MetLife paying the 
policy limits of $50,000 for the Initial Claim. However, at that time. Mr. Mihara informed Ms. 
Davis that the Plaintiffs would be making a claim agafost Lwo addiciona1 MetLife policies in 
which Mr. Holland's parents were Lhe named insureds ("Addicional Clruntc;"). (See, Affidavit of 
Daneice Davis (Submitted in Oppo~ition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees) ('' Aff. of 
Davis''), filed May 7, 2010) 
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B. Coverage Opinion and s~ule!nent 
On January 8, 2010, MetLife retained auomey Kathleen Paukerl LO provide a coverage 
opinion regarding the Additional Claims. (See, Affidavit of Kathleen H. Paukert (Submitted in 
Opposition Lo Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees) ("Aff. of Paukert"). filed April 13, 2010) 
On February 2, 2010, after several weeks in which Ms. Paukert and Mr. Mihara discussed 
theoiics Lhat would allow covernge ~ndcr the Additional Claims, M~. Paukert informed Mr_ 
Mihara that. based on her research, there was no coverage under the theories set forth by Mr. 
Mihara, hut chat there was potential c~verage on the molorcyd~ policy under a theory researched 
by MetLife. (See, Aff. of Paukett) That 1'(ame day, Ms. Paukert, on behalf of Metl .ife, nffereci 
Plaintiffs $200,000.00, provided that the Plaintiffs signed a full release. (lbid.) 
On February 3, 2010, Mr. Mihara informed Ms. Paukert that PlainLiffs accepted the 
$200,000.00 settlement offer and wo~ld sign a full release, bul would he making a claim tor 
attorney's tees under Idaho Code § 41:-1839(1 ). (Thid.) In aduirion, Mr. Mihnra indjcated that a 
lawsuit had been filed againsl MeLLife on January 26, 2010. (Ibid.) The ComplainL alleged that 
MetLife failed LO render amounts justly due within thiny (30) days after receiving proof of loss, 
and that, pursuanl to I.C. § 41-1839(1), Plaintiffs were entitJed to an award of reasonable 
anorney's fee~. (See, Complaint) 
c. Motions and Pleadinis 
On February 9, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a MuLion for ALtomcy's Fees on the grounds t.hat 
M~LLi fo failed to pay Plaintiffs the ~ount justly due under the insurance contracts within thirty 
(30) days after receiving prnor of lor,;~. (See, Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to 
r .C. § 41-1 &39 ("Plaintiffs' Motion foi Attorney's Fees")) 
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·, 
On March 3, 2010, Lht:1 partfus filed a joinL motion to d.ismiss all claims, save for 
Plaintiffi::' disputed claim for anomefs fees pursuant Lo 1.C. ~ 41-1839. (Se.e., .lnint Mot.inn and 
Stipulated Order to Dismiss all Claiins Except for Lhe Pending Motion for Auoruey's Fees) 
MetLife answered Plaintiffs' claim for attorney's fees under I.C. ~ 41-1839 on April 12, 2010. 
(See. Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses ("Answer")) 
On April 28, 2010, MetLlf~ filed a "Motion to Compel Perfonmmce Under the 
Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Artomcy's Fees." (See. ·M(llion to Compel 
Perfom1ance Under the SetllemenL and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion ror ALLom~y's Fees) 
On May 17. 2010, Plaintiffs' filed a Motion for Summary JudgmenL on rhe grounds that, 
because MetlLife's Answer addre!iscd:only the attorney's fee dispute, all claims in the Complain, 
should be deemed admitted. (See, Pla!ntiffs' MoLion for Sunurutry Judgment) 
Given this hisLory, three Motions were set before tb.e Court for determination: (I) 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Auorney'.s Fees Pursuant co I.C. * 41-1839; (2) Plaintiffs' MoLion for 
Summary Judgment; and (3) MetLife's Motion to Enforce the Settlement AgreemenL The Court 
heard oral argument from the Panies an June 2, 2010, ti:>llowing which it took the Motions under 
advii;;ernent. 
0. The Court's ,f uly 20, 2010 Order 
On JuJy 20, 2010, after exLensive hriefing and full consideration of the record, this Court 
entered a Memorandum Decision and Order: (1) denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees 
under l.C. § 41-1839; (2) tltmying PlainLiffs' MoLion for Summary Judgment; and (3) granLing 
Metl.ife's MoLioo to Enforce, the Settlement Agreement. (See, Order, at. pp. 14. 20 and 32). 
Dct'~~8i!,Ms0MF.M<lRANDUM TN Page 552 of 709 
nPr,nc;:rnnl\T -rn Pr A TNTTi:;-i=_,;:· MnTinN · 
3ent By: .PAINE HAMBLEN; 5090300007; Sep-20 3:40PM; Page 6 
In grancing Metl.ife's Mocion tb Enforce Lhc Settlement Agreement, the Court detennined 
that Plaintiffs' had failed to meet their burden of proving they provided MetLife with sufficient 
proof of loss to allow MetLife "a ~easonable opportunity to investigate aml determine its 
liability," as required under Idaho law; (See, Order, at pp. 28-32); see, also, Greenough v, Farm 
.. 
Bureau Mut. Ins. Cq_: ... of ldaho, 142 14.aho 589, 593, 130 P.3d 1 l27 (2006), citing, Dcinkman v. 
AID Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 349-50, 766 P.2d 1227 (1988). In doing so, this Courc emphasized 
the following pt~rtirient fact\i: 
• MetLife was prepared to tender che policy limits on the Tnicia1 Claim, $50,000.00. 
However. upon infonning Mr.: Mihara of the :same, Mr. Mihal"a advised MetLife 
of Plaintiffs' Addicional Claims. 
• There was no tender on the initial Claim on December 7, 2009. 
• The Additional Claims were :assigned separate claim numbers from tbe lnitial 
Claim. · 
• The Additional Claims were not contemplaLcd wiLbin che $50,000.00 tender offer 
on the InitiaJ Claim. 
• Upou bejng jnformed of th¢ AddiLional Claims, MecLife insurance adjuster, 
Daneice Vavis, infonned Mr. Mihara chat she wa-; going on a three-week vacation 
and would not relum until Ja~uary 6, 2010, at whkh time she wou.hl review the 
Additional Claims. 
• Mr. Mjhara intonned Ms_ Davis that the delay was acceptable. 
• On Januc1ry 8, 2010, Ms. Dav.is cold Mr. Mihara that MetLife could noc deccrminc 
whether coverage wa'i availabie under the Additional Claims. and Lhat a coverage 
opinion would be sought. 
• 011 January 8, 2010, MecLif~ retained attorney Kathleen Pauk~rc to provide a 
coverage opinion on the AdditlonaJ Claims. 
• MeLLife directed Ms. Paukert to be creative in fine.ling eoverage for Plaintiffs' 
Additional Claims. : 
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• The theories of coverage for tbe Additional Claims profforcd by Mr. Mihara were 
detem1ined by MetLife to be without merit. 
• On January 13, 2010, Ms. Pauk~rl contacted Mr. Mihara and requested an 
extension for her coverage opinion on the Additional Claims, LO which an 
ex.tens.ion wa11 granted to January 22, 2010. 
• On January 22, 20'! 0, Ms. Paukert requested an additional extension for her 
coverage opinion, which Mr. :Mihara denied. At that Lime, coverage wa~ not 
available under Mr. Mihara'~ theories, but MetLife was stm trying to find 
coverage under their own theor,ies. 
• On January 26, 2010, Mr. Mihiru filed a Complaint on behalf of the Plaintiffs. 
• From January 13~ 20to throu~ February 2, 2010, Ms. Paukert had regular conta~t 
with Mr. Mihara to discu~s potential rhcories of coverage for the Additiona] 
Claims. 
• On February 2, 2010, Ms. P:auken informed Mr. Mihara that, based on her 
research, then:~ was no coverage under the theorjes set forth by Mr. Mihara, hue 
that there was pos~ihle coverage on the motorcycle po1icy under a Lheory 
researched be. MetLife. 
• That same day, Ms. Paukert, on behalf of MetLife, offered P1aintiffs $200,000.00, 
provided that Plaintiffs signed a full release. A settlement was reached for that 
amount.· 
• Thus. there were separate offers made on the Initial Cl:tim and Addhional Claims, 
at separate times and under separate po1icies. 
(See, Order, at pp. 28-32) 
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Based on the foregoing facts, this Coun found that Plainliffs had failed to provide 
MetLife with sufficient proof' nr lossto allow MetLife "a rea.o;;onahlc oppo11unity t.u investigate 
and determine iL.;; liability." (See, Order, at p. 30) In t.luing so, the Cou11 made the following 
findings: 
• First, that 1he panics were subject to a "moving target" in discussing separate 
offers made at separate times on separate policies. (See, Order, at pp. 30-31) 
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• Seci.md, that there Wa8 no basis. for Plaintiffs' argum~nt that "time pe1iods on these 
separate offers made at separate times on separate policies should be aggregated." 
SpecificaJly, the Court found no authority for the argument. that. the period from 
Noven1ber 10, 2009 to December 7, 2009 could be added to the period from 
Janllary 7, 2010 LO January 26:, 2010 in order co meet the thirty (30) day tender 
requirement aft.er proof of loss is provided. As the Court. correcL)y obsevered, 
"[d]uc to the fact thut these are: separate offers made at separate times on separate 
policies, there_ certain.ly is no factual basis to aggregate these two discrelc t.ime 
periods." (See. Order. alp. 31) 
• Third, that it is difficult for the Plaintiffs to argue Lhc1l MetLife was provided "a 
reasonably opportunity to investigate and deLennine its liability," where the theory 
providing the larger tender to the Plaintiffs was discovered hy Ms. Paukcl't, and 
Plaintiffs accepted that highef amount ba'icd on Ms. Paukert'.-:; theory. (See, 
Order, alp. 3 l) 
Page 8 
Given the___ above, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs had failed to rnee~ their burden, 
pursuant to Grcenot1gb and Brin.km.an, o.f demonstrating chat ''they submitted proof of Joss wit.h 
sufficient information to allow the MetLife a reasonable opportunity Lo investigate and determine 
its liabil.ity, when it was MetLife that came up with the creative theory for additional coverage." 
(See, Order, at pp. Jl-32) Consequently, the Court granted MctLifc's Motion lO Compt:I 
Performance Under the Settlement Agreement, denied Plaintitis' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
and held that Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to l.C. § 41-1839- (See, Order, 
alp. 32) 
Ill. A RGUMEN'f 
A. Standard or Rtvitw 
A party that disagrees with an order of the court mHy file a motion for reconsideration 
under Idaho Civil l'roct:dure Rule ·11 (a)(2)(B) before entry of final judgment. Eby v. State, 148 
Idaho 731,228 P.3d 998, 1002 (2010), citing, Donaldson v. Buckner, 66 Jdaho 183. 157 P.2d 84 
( 1945)). The court is pennilted Lo review new facts, with the burden on the moving party to 
l>Et:J~lj~g. MF.MORA NDUM JN 
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bring such new facts LO the court's attention. Coeur D'Alene Min. Co. v. First Nat. Bank, l 18 
Idaho 812. 823, 800 P.2d 1026 (1990). 
A rnoLiun fur reconsideration is addressed co che sound discreLiun of the trial coun, and 
will noL be overLumed absent a showing the trial court abused its discreLion. Johnson v. 
Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 473. 147 P.3d 100 (2006), citing, Watson v. Navistar lnt'l Transp. 
Corp .. 121 Idaho 643, 654, 827 P.2d 656 (1992); SJaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 705, 
707, 979 P.2d 107 (1999)) A crial court does not abuse its discretion where it: 11(1) correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discreLion; (2) acteu wiLhin Lht:! out.er boundaries uf LhaL discretion; 
and (3) reached it.o, decision by an exercise of reason." Van v_ Portneuf Med_ Center, 147 Idaho 
552,560,212 P.3d 982 (2009), ciring, Commercial Vcnmres, Inc. v. Rex M. & Lynn Lea Family: 
I!.Yfil, 145 Idaho 208, 212, 177 P.3d 955 (2008). 
Here, the Court's enforcement of the SeltlemenL Agreement on the grounds that Plaintiffs 
fajJcd to .meet their burden of proving they provided MetLife with sufficjent proof of loss to 
ullow MetLife ''a reasonable opportunity to investigate and deLermine its liability" was entireJy 
appmpriaLe. PlainLiffs' ciLaLi<Jn lo variuus ponions of the insurance policies at issue in this case, 
which do not define proof of loss, doe!S not impact the Court's decision, nor does Plaintiffs' 
auernpl co manipulate the pertinent facls relied upon by this Court in reaching the same. 
Likewise, Plaintiffs' argument that thi,'> Court acted outside the statute is unfounded. 
Accordingly, MetLife requests chaL Plaintiffs' MoLion for Reconsideration be denied. 
B. This Court Properly Concluded that Plaintiffs Failed to Meet Their Burden Under 
Gr11enougl1 and Brinkman 
Plaintiffs correctly contend that the "proof of loss" standard described in Greenough and 
Brinkman is applicable where, as here, Lhe insurance policy dues not define pruof uf loss. (See., 
l>ti.f'EFiB~Y.W M.£.MORANDUM JN Page 556 of 709 
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Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration ("Plajntjffs' Memo re: 
Reconsideration"), alp. 3) 
The Greenough and Brinkman sLandard was recently discussed in 1n re Jones, 401 B.R. 
456 (Bkrtcy. D. Idaho 2009). 1n thac ca"e, the Court, while discussing the insurance policy ac 
issue, stated the following: 
The Policy does not define what constiLuLes a proper "proof of loss," nor is Lhat 
term defined hy sLaLute. But the case law is clear about the purpose served by a 
proof of loss. Tn Bri11kman v. Aid ln.t. Co., 766 P.2d 1227 (Idaho 1988) (overruled 
in part by Greenough v. Farm Bureai, Mut. Ins. Co. of ldalw, 130 P.3d 1127 
(Idaho 2006), where the rel.evant insurance policy lik~wise included no definition 
of 'proof of loss,' the court slated: 
'Tbe purpose of a provision for notice and proofs of loss is to allow the 
insurer to form an jnrclligent eslimate of its rights and liabilities, to afford 
it an opportunity for investigation, anti to prevent fraud and imposition 
upon it-' 
Brinlarll.m, 766 P.2d at 1230-31 (citjng 44 Am.Jur_2d. "Insurance," § 1323, p. 
250). The Brink.man court later reiterated thar '[r)bf, purpose of proof of loss 
statements, in general, is to furnish the insurer with chc particulars of Lhc los.s and 
all dam necessary to determine its lfabiJity and the amount thereof, if any.' Id. ac 
1231 (citing 3 Appleman, Tnsurant:e Law and Practice, § 1471, p. l47 (revised 
edition 1967)) FinaJly, after considering the foregoing statements, the Brinkman 
court concluded: 
'From these purposes, we draw tbe tallowing condusions. The insured, 
when required to do so under his policy, should provide the information 
reasonably availclble to him rcgardjng his injury and Lhe circumstances of 
Lhe accident.. 
The arnounL of inrormation provided should be proportional Lo Lhf amounL 
reasonably available to the insured. If the infonnation provided is 
sumcicnt to give the in!\ur.er an opportunity to investigate and decennine 
its Hability, the insurer may deny coverage. Ocherwisc, the insurer musL 
investigate and/or determine its rights and liabilities. The documentation 
is the ''proof." the explanation of physicaJ and/or financiaJ injury is the 
"loss.'' 
Brinkman, 766 P.2d at 1231. 
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In re Jones, at 463-64; ~·ee, also, Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 
233 P.3d 1221 (2010) (jnsured must provjdc the insurer with enough informaLion to allow the 
.insurer a reasonable opportunity Lo investigate and determine its liability); Greenough, 142 Idaho 
ac 593; "Brinkman, 115 Idaho at 349-50. Notably, the standard set forth in Greenough and 
Brinkman - that "proof of loss is sufficient when the insured provides the insurer wiLh enough 
information to al low the insurer a reasonable opportunity Lo inv~stigate and determine its 
liability" - was relied upon by this CourL in its prior Order. 
Although Plainliffs acknowledge the applicability of the Greenough and Brinkman 
standard, they nonetheless misconstrue both its scope and its application. At the outset, Plaintiffs 
misconstrue the proof of loss supplied by the insured in Greenough, incorrectly stating that "in 
Greenough, the Court found the mere submission of a pamphleL sufficient." (See, Plaintiffs' 
Memo re: Reconsideration, ac p. 3) Contni.ry lo this assertion, the insured in Greenough supplled 
the insurance company with a multitude of infonmaLiun, including. among oLher Lhings, a letter 
exp1aining Lhe accident.. ~m ex:pla11ation from au accidenL re-construc.:tionisL. copies of the 
accidenL report, doctor's bills, an offer from a third-party insurance company, and affidavits from 
chree other people, including a witness at the scene. 1 Greenough, 142 Idaho aL 591. 
Likewise, .PJaintiffa misconsLrue Lhe scope of the proof of loss standard recognized jn 
Greenough and Brhoonan. ParLicularly, Plaintiffs enoneously claim that ''thjs Coun would have 
1 Plaintiffs were likely refening to Brinkman, rather than Greenough, in arguing lhaL a pamphlet 
wa,;; su fricienL proof of loss. Even then, the pamphlet at issue in BrinlamlJl containet.l extensive 
discussions of the plainliff~ injuries and theories of defendant's liabi1ity, along with biographica1 
information, medical bills, and physicians reports, among other documents. Brinkman, 115 
Idaho at 348. Thus, the iuformation provided by the insureds in Brjn.krmm was far more 
extensive than what was provided to MetLife in this ca.r.ie. 
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to find that Plaintiffs did not provide proof of loss as provided in their policies. To date, this 
Coun has maue no such findings." (See, Plaintiffs' Memo re: Reconsideration, at p. 4) However, 
as in In re Jones, Greenough and B1jnkman, because proof of loss is m.1L defined in the insurnnce 
policies at issue, Plaintiffs were required to provide a proof of loss with sufficient infom1ation to 
allow the insurer a reasonab.le opportunity lo investigate and determine its liability. See, e.g, Tn 
re Jones. 401 B.R. at 463-64; see, also, Greenough, 142 ldaho at 593; Brinkman, 115 Idaho at 
349-50. Acc;ordingly, the Court was not required to find a complete failure by Plaintiffs to 
provide a proof of loss. Rather. its conclusion that the proof of loss was insufficiem was all thal 
was required. 
Under this standard, this Cuurl properly concluded that the Plaintiffs had failed to meet 
thclr hurden pur.suanl Ln Greenough and Brinkman by failing to '1prove they submitted proof of 
Joss with suffidcnt infonnatil1n to allow the MetLife a reason~ble opportunity to investigate and 
determine its liability, when it was MetLife that came up with the creative theory for add.itional 
coverage." (See, Order, at pp. 3'1-32) Accordingly. the Cou11's decision is fully .supporLed by the 
facts and well grOlmded in Idaho law. Plaintiffs' request for reconsideration, therefore, shoul<l be 
denied. 
C. Plaintiffs' Citation to Various Sections of the Insurance Policies at Jssue Does Not 
Alter the Proof of Loss Requirement~ in Greeriougli and Brinkman 
· Plaintiffs also cite to varjous portfons of the insurance policies al issue for lhe m.1vel and 
unroundetl proposition tfo1t, although the policies; do not define "proof of loss," they nonctheJess 
control over the standard set fonh in Greenough and Brinkman. 'This assertion is contrary to the 
well-established Idaho case law and should not be l!'Ustained. 
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The various provisions noted by Plaintiffs ask for infomiacion, including, but not limited 
to: (a) details of the accident and/or injuries, or death, (b) names and addresses of drjvers, (c) 
injured persons and witnesses, and (d) circumstances or the accident. (See, Affidavit of Kinzo H. 
Miahar.:1 in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration ("Kinzu Affidavit re: 
Rcc,1nsideration"), fil~d August 2, 2010, Exhibit 1, ut pp. 19 and 20) Thus, Lhc: fon:going 
provisioni. a1,k for notice of the incident, preliminury documents, snd information. while at the 
same time reserving various rights,- including, but not limited to: (a) the righL Lo review medical 
records, reports and expenses, (b) the right to hav-c th~ insur~r·s physicians examine the insured. 
and importantly, (c) the right Lo require Plaintjffs to "submit to and provide alJ detaiJs concerning 
loss jnformntion through written or recorded statements or examination~ under oath as often ac; 
[Meti .. ifeJ reasonably may require." (Ibid.) 
Ultimately, the poJicy provisions cited by Plaintiffs provide for preliminary documenLs 
and information needed by rbc insurer, but at the same time recognize .lhaL further 
documcntution, inronm1tioo. and details may be necessary. A~ such, Pfaintiffs' suggestion that 
these p1·ov.isions defiile "proof or lo~s" fur purpot1es of triggering the 30-day time limitation 1::1 in 
error. Jf aHowed. Plaintiffs' approach would effectively rcw!'ic.c Plaintiff~' policy. would 
retroactively define a term that is noL incJuded in the definition section of che policy, and would 
dramaticaJJy alter the risks and obligations assumed by the parties under Lhe policy. Moreover. 
such an approach would severely pre.iudice MetLi[e's abi1i1y to fairly address cJaims under the 
policy, as it would prohibit h from requesting any preliminary detaiJs, documents or jnformacion 
ror tear thaL such a r~quest would constitute a binding "proof of loss" and thereby start the 30-
clay time limitation, even when il lacks sufficient int"ormaUon to rca'ionahly invesLigaLe and 
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determine its liability. Given the above, Plaintiffs' ctfort lo manufacture a definition of "proof of 
loss" in the policy m1d thereby avojd application of the Greenough and Brinkman standard is 
without merit and should be denied: Proof of loss is nor a defined term in Plaintiffs' policies and, 
as a consequence, the Greenough and Brinkman standard is controlling. As discussed above, this 
Court correctly concluded lhat Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof under that standard. 
Plaintiffs' Motjon for Reconsideration. therefore, should be denied. 
D. .This Court Properly Concluded that the Plaintiffs Failed to Meet Their Durden of 
Proving that They Provided MetLife with Sufficient Proof of Loss 
This Court's Order, finding that Plaintiffs failed co meet their bLtrden of proving that they 
provided MetLife with sutlicicnc proof of loss to allow MetLife a rca<1onablc opponunity to 
investigate and determ.ine its liability, was based, at least in part, on the following pertinent facts: 
• MetLife was prepared to render the policy JimiL'- on the Initial Claim, $50,000.00. 
However. upon infocming Mr. Mihara of the same, Mr. Mjhara advised MetLife 
of Plain Li rfs' Atltliticmal Claims. 
• There was no I.ender on the Initial Cfaim on December 7, 2009. 
• The Additional Claims were assigned separate claim numbers from the initial 
Claim. 
• The Additional Claims were not contemplated within the $50,000.00 tender offer 
on Lhe Initial Claim. 
• Upon being informed of the Additional Claims, Ms. Davis told Mr. Mjhara she 
was going on a three (3) week vacation and would not return until January 6, 
2010. al which time she would review the Additional Claims. 
• Mr. Mihan.1 informed Ms. Davis that the dehly was acceptable. 
• On January 8, 2010, Ms. Davis informed Mr. Mihara that MetLife could not 
determine whether covi::rage was available under the Additional Claims, and thal a 
coverage opinion would be soughl on Lhe same. 
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• On January 8, 2010, MetLife retained auomcy KaLhleen Paukert to provi<lc a 
coverage opiniun on the Additional Claims. 
• MetLife directed Ms. Paukert to be creative in finding coverage ror PlainLiff.s' 
Additional Claims. 
• The theories of coverage for the Additional Claims proffered by Mr. Mihara were 
detemuned by MetLife to be without merit. 
• On January 13, 2010, Ms. Paukert contacted Mr. Mihara and requesletl an 
extensjon for her coverage opinion ou the Additional Claims, to which an 
extension was granted to January 22, 2010 . 
. • On January 22, 2010, Ms. Paukert rcquesled an additional extension for her 
coven1ge op1nion, which Mr. Mihara denied. At that time, coverage wa~ not 
available under Mr. Mihara's theories, but MetLife was sti11 trying to tind 
coverage U!lder their own theories. 
• On January 26. 2010. Mr. Mihara fiJed a Complaint on bchaJf of the Plaintiffs. 
• From January 13, 2010 through February 2, 2010, Ms. Pauken had regular comact 
with Mr. Mihara to discuss potentfol theories of coverdge for the Additional 
Claims. 
• On February 2, 20 I 0, Ms. Paukert informed Mr. Mihara that., based on her 
research, there was no coverage under lhe theories set forth by Mr. Mihara, but 
that there was possible coverage on the motorcycle policy under a theory 
researched be MetLife. 
• Thal same day, Ms. Paukert, on heh.tlf uf MetLife, offered Plaintiffs $200,000.00, 
provided that Plaintiffs signed a full release. A settlement was reached in that 
amount. 
• Thus, there were separate offers made on the Jnjtfal Claim and Additional Claims, 
at separate times '1nd under separate policies. 
(See, Order, at pp. 28-32) 
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In the face of these findjngs, Plaintiffs now llttcmpt to manipulare the pertinent facts and 
introduce collateral evidence that has no bearing on this CourL's findings. For example. Plaintiffs 
now cJajm that (a) Mr. Mihara made an oral proof of loss ~n November 8, 2009; (b) additjomu 
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documentation was rcqueslcd by MetLife on November 10, 2009; (c) on November 17, 2009, 
MetLife rece.ived a packet of information from Plaintiffs; (d) MetLife discussed paying policy 
Hmit.s; and (e) Mr. Mihara u~mam.letl payrmml of pulil:y limits un D~t.:t:mbcr 1, 2009. (See, 
Plaintiffs' Memo re: Reconsideralion, al pp. 5-6) However, as noted by this Court, this 
information pertained to the Initial Claim, for which MctLjfc offered to tender applicable policy 
limits on December 7, 2009. Nonetheless, upon informing Plaintiffs of the same, Mr. Mihara 
advised MetLife of Plaintiffs' previously undisclosed Additional Claims. (See, Order. al pp. 28-
32) 
Along these lines, Plaint.iffi:; neglect to mention that Metl .ife insurance adjusler, Daneice 
Davis, received an extension umil January 6, 2010, at which time she would begin Jeview of the 
Additional Claims. (Jbid.) Moreover, Plaintiffs agajn attempt to aggregate the. information 
provided on the .initial Claim with the Additional Claims. As Lhis Court previOLL~ly noted, 
Plaintiffs bavc provided no authorhy for the.ir suggestion that "time periods on these separate 
offers made at separate times on separate polices should be aggregated." (See, Order, at p. 31) 
Finally, Plai11Liffs offer u cunrusing and misguided argument that because MetLife did not 
allege thaL Plaintiffs failed to provide proof of Joss under the insurance policie.o,; in iL-: Answer, 
Plainliff.,;; should now be considered to have properly done so. This comention ignores the 
pertinent facts. (See, Plaintiffs' Memo re: Reconsideration, at pp. 7-8) At the outstl, MeLLife's 
Answer specifically denied that Plaintiffs were are entitled to allorney's fees under J.C. § 41-
1 839. (See, Answer) Likewise, as noted by this Court, ''liln effect, all of the Complainl was 
dismissed with prejudice on February 3, 2010," leaving only Lhe .pending Motions before this 
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CourL.2 (See, Order, at p. 20) The attorney fee issue, together with Plaintiffs' failure co provide 
Lhe required proof of loss, was fully addressed in those Motions. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' eflorL 
LO manufacmre compliance with the proof of loss standard by misconstming the circumstances of 
MetLi f e's Answer is without mcl'it and should be denied. 
E. Plaintiffs' Argument That This Court Acted Outside the Statute is UnJ'ounded 
As the Plai.ntiffs note, the principaJ is.sue in this case is proof of loss. (Plaintiffs' Memo 
re: ReconsideraLioo. alp. 9) Particularly, this Court. in Grantjng MeLl..ife's Mmion co Enforce the 
Senlement Agreement, determined thac the Plaintiffs failed to meet their bmdcn of proving they 
provided MetLife with sufficient proof of loss to allow MetLife "a reasonable opportunity to 
investig,1t.e and del(rm.ine iLs HabHity," as required by Greenough, Brin.krmm, and LC.§ 41-1839. 
(See, Order, al pp. 28-32) Nonetheless, the Plaintiffs go on to argue that the Court incorrectly 
considered issues outside the scope of u,is dcrem,inarion. This contention is in error. 
As this Cou1t noted in its Order, the following three (3) reasons alone demonstrate chaL 
the Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden in Greenough and Brinkman: 
(1) MetLife was subject to a moving target with separate often; made at separate 
times on sepaTate policies. Specifica11y, that MetLife was prepared to pay the 
2 Plaintiffs make a similar argument in Section C of their Memorandum, arguing that "ltlhcre is 
no provision in either the stipulation or this Court's order chat addressed any of the 'factual 
allegations' contained within the complaint." (See, PJainciffa' Memo re: Reconsideration, at pp. 7-
8) However, as noted by this Court, "[tJhe pJain language of this Court's Order excepts only 
'PJaintiffs Mot.ion for Ar.t.orney Fees filed on February 9, 2010'; therefore, no averments jn the 
Complaint, even if deemed true, remain before tl1c Court.," - thus, Plaintiffs' argument is 
immaterial Likewise, Plaintiffs' argumenL, in Section D of their Memorandum, LhaL MetLife 
foiled to timeJy object LO Lheir motion for attorney's fee8 is without merit. As MeLLife noted in 
its Sur-Reply to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees, and a,; Mr. Mihara wa.t.i advised, such 
argument under I.R.C.P. 54 tlealL wiLh post-judgment proceedings. A~ evltl1mct:c.l by PlainLiffs 
bringlng chis current Motion for Reconsideration under T.R.C.P. 11 (a)(2)(B)-the rule permitting 
moLions for teconsideration ~ entry of final judgmenL (or within fourteen (14) days 
tbcrcaflcr)-Plaintitls' argument is in error. 
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p0Jicy limits on the Initjal Claim. Upon being informed or tl,c same, Mr. Mihara 
to)d MetLife that Plaintiffs were making Additional Claims. The Additional 
Claims were assigned separate claim numbers from lhe Initial Claim. The 
Additional Claims w1:1r~ nol contemplated within the tender offer on the Initial 
Claim. Upon being in formed of the Additional Claims, Ms. Davis told Mr. Mihara 
she was going on a three (3) week v11cation and would noL return until January 6, 
2010, at which time she would review the Additional Claims. MJ. Mihara 
informed Ms. Davis that the delay was acceptable. On January 8, 2010, MetLife 
retained Ms. Paukert to provide a coverage opinion on Lhe Additional CJaims. 
From January J 3, 2010, through February 2, 2010, Ms. Paukert had regular 
contact wich Mr. Mihara to di:s'-u~:\i potential thco,:ic::i of coverage for the 
Additional Claims. (Set!, Order, aL pp. 30-3 l) 
(2) Plaintiffs have provided no Jaw $UpJ)Ortine, their argument chat "time period,;; on 
thei::e separate offers made at separate times on separate policies shou Id be 
agsregated. 11 This CuurL round that there was no case law supporting the 
argument that the period from November J 0, 2009 tu December 7. 2009 can be 
added to lhe period from January 7. 2010 LO January 26, 2010, in order to meet the 
30-da.y tender reQuirement after proof of Joss is provided. As Lhe Court 
recognized, "ldlue to the fact that these are separate offers made at separate times 
cm .separate policies, there certainly is nn factual basis to aggregate these Lwo 
discrete time periods." (See, Order, at p. 31) 
(3) lt is diffic.:ult fur the Plaintiffs to argue that MetLife was provided "a reasonable 
opponunicy to invesrigatc and determine its liability." where the lhcory providing 
the larger tender to the .PJaintiffs was discover~d by Ms. Paukert, and Plaintiffs' 
accepted that higher amount based on M.s. Pauken's theory. (See, Order, at p. 31) 
Page 10/20 
Given th~1t these three rc:a:son:s alone:: provide a basi!:i for the Court's dctcrm.inatjon lhul 
PJ11intiffs failed to meet the.ir bu1·den of proving they pro..-ided M~tLiie with sufficient proof of 
loss," Plaintiffs' rererence to "irrelevant" fact~ is inunatcrial, and does not support 
reconsideration of the Court's dec;ision. 
ny way nf ~>larnple, Plaintiffs point to the Court's discussion of whether the failure of 
MetLlfe to initially pay wa.~ rea~onahle, contending that this "Coun placed che impediment of 
requiring a showing that the insurance company acted unreasonahly" in failing to initially pay. 
(PlainLiffa' Memo re: Reconsideration, at p. 10) Contrary to Plaintiffs' claim, however, the Court 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITTON TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR RECONS1DERATION. 17 
38157-2010 Page 565 of 709 
ent By: PAINE HAMBLEN; 5098380007; Sep-20-1 Page 19/28 
did noc make such a rim.ling. fosLcad, che Court found LhaL "there is a dispuLc of fact ns to 
knowledge, and the facLs surrounding the reasonableness of the initial refusal to pay the claim," 
rendering it unable Lo dcrcrminc the prevailing party ac this time. (See, Order, alp. 12) 
Likewise, Plaintiffs raise the fo!Jowing additional issues: (a) whether MetLife had 
knowledge of the lawsuit filed prior to the February 2, 2010 settlement offer; (b) whether 
MctJ.,..jfo httd :sufficient. information and/or time to invc:ttigatc and determine iti, liahility; (c) on 
what date the thirty (30) days begin lo run; (d) whether the emails conslituted a sufficient 
meeting of the minds; and (e) whether MetLife came t1p with the theory llr recovery. (See. 
Plaintiffs' Memo re: ReconsideraLion, al pp. 12-18) 
AL the outset, in raising these "jssues,'' Plaintiffs attempt to skin this Courc's ru1ing that 
Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving they provided MetLife wiLh sufficienc proof of 
toss to allow Meclife "a rea-mnable opportuniLy LO investigate and determine its Hability." ln 
particular, knowledge of Lhc lawsuit aml the emails. Ml,reover, with regard to MetLife's 
knowledge of the Ja.w:suit and the email~, this Court'~ ruJing simply noted that questions of fact 
1-emwn as to whether Met.Life had knowledge the Jawsujt and whether the emails amounted to un 
enforceable contract. (St!e, Order, at pp. 15 and 27) 
Wjth regard Lu I.he 30-day clock and whether MetLife had sufficienL opp(>nuniLy lo 
investigate and deLermine ils liability, this Court noted that MeLLife was subjecc to a moving 
target wilh separaLe offers made al separaLe Limes under separaLe p(llicies (even separaLe claims 
numbers were assignt:tl). Tu LhaL end, PJainLiffs hav~ sLill not offl!rt::tl any auLhoriLy supporLjng 
Lheir argumenc that the rime periods on scparace offers made at scparnre times on separate 
policies cim be aggregaLed. Moreover, as Lhis Court noLed, between January 13 and February 2, 
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2010
1 
Ms. Paukert had regular concacl with Mr. Mihara LO diiicuss poten6al theories of recovery 
for the Plaintiffs on the AddiLional Claims. In fact, it is difficult to conceive Lhat the 30-day 
clock began to run on November 8 or 17 of 2009, where (a) McrLife was unaware of the 
AdditionaJ Claims until December 7, 2009; (b) Ms. Davis was given a three-week extension on 
December 7. 2009 to begin rcvjewing the claims; and (c) the parties proffered theories of 
recovery baL:k-and-fonb until February 2, 2010. 
Finally, as to the appJicable theory of recovery, and as noted by this Court, Ms. Paukert. 
MctLifc's coverage c;;ounseJ, found coverage for the Additional Oaims based on her own 
rcscru·ch, and informed Mr. Mihara that coverage was not available under the theories he had 
offered. Further, Plaintiffs' claim that they could not .have proffered the theory or recovery 
discovered by MetLife because they Jacked possession of the same information is unfounded. 
(See, Plaintiffs' Memo re: Rec<.1nsideration, at pp. 16-18) Plainritl's fail ta a.iticulatc what 
infonm1tiun they lackc:::<l, nur why their research wa..'i somehow more limitt.:d than MerLjfo's. 
Ultimarely. this Courr, in granting Mer.Llte's Motion to Enforce the Scttkmcnc 
Agreement, determined that the Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proving they provided 
MetLife with sufficient proof of loss to allow MetLife 11a reasonable _opportunity lo investigate 
and determine ils liabi1ity," a.s required in Greenough, Brinkman. and LC. § 41-.1839. (See. 
Order, at pp. 28-32) Plaintiffs have not demon.struted a legal nr a factual ha.~is for rcvisiling that 
dc:tem1inaLion. Accordingly, their request ror reconsideration should be denied. 
IV. CONCLYSION 
Given tllc foregoing, as well as the evidence and aut.hority originaJly t-ubmitted tn thiN 
Court, the Court's Enforcement of the Settlemenl Agreement on the grounds thar Plaintiffs failed 
38157-2010 
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to meet their hurden of proving chcy pmvided MetLife with sutlicient proor of loss tu allow 
MeLLife "a reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine its liabilicy" .~hnuld he upheld. 
Accordingly, MetUfe respectfully requesL~ that this Court deny Plaintiffs' MoLion for 
Reconsideration and enter final judgment against the Plaintiffs. 
DA TED this 2 & day of September, 20'! 0. 
DEFEAA:,7[~~ MCiMORANDUM TN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTTON 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
WilJiam J. Sc e er, JSB No. 6674 
Patrick F.. jJler, !SB No. 1771 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THEREBY CERTIFY that on this ;=zo----"' day of September, 2010, T caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSTDERA'flON, to the foJtowing: 
f{jnzo H. Mihara 
Attorney at Law 
424 Sherman A venue, Suite 308 
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( 1·· 
WilJiam J. Schro~u~r, TSB No. 6674 
Patrick E. Miller, ISB No. l 771 
CLERf< DISTRICT COURT 
PA lNE HAMBLEN LLP 
.701 Front Avenue, SuiLc 101 
P.O. BoxE 
r.oeur d'A1e11e, Idaho 83816-0328 
Telephone: (208) 664-8115 
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338 
Mailing Address: 
717 West Sprague Avenue, Suite 1200 
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
Attorneys for Defendant.~ 
rlrffrK~lff---
IN TH~ DlSTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDfCIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
The ESTATE of BENJAMIN HOLLAND. 




METROPOLffAN PROPERTY and 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, and 
METLIFE AUTO & HOME, 
Defendants. 
TO: Tl.IE CLERK OF THE COURT; 
) 















NOTICE OF PR~SENTM!!:NT 
[JUDGMENT OF' DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE] 
September 29, 2010 at 9:00 A.M. 
TO: The ESTATE of BENJAMlN HOLLAL~O, and GREGORY & KATHLEEN HOLLAND; 
and 
TO: KINZO H. MlHARA, PlainLilT.';' Attorney. 
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PL.EASE TAKE NOTE Lhat Presentment has been scheduled for Defendants' 
JUDGMENT (W UISMISSAL WITH PRE.JUDICE (copy attached), before the Honorable 
.John T, ~1ilchell at the date and Lime below: 
HEARING DATE: Wednesday; September 29, 2010 at 9:00 A.M. 
NAT(JRE OF MOTION: Presentment of Defendants' Judgment C)f 
Dismissa] with Prejudice. 
DA'l'.ED th~ day of September, 2010. 
NOTi·.:::F- OF PRESENTMENT 
(JUDGMENT OF D!SMlSSAL WffH J'llliJUDJCEJ. 2 
38157-2010 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
Dy:.~~· 
WilliamJ.2J;. oeder, TSB No. 6674 
Patrick E. N.iiller, ISB No. 177 I 
Attorneys for DefemLcits 
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CERTJ111,CATE OF SJ;RVIC~ 
l HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~0+1... day of September, 2010, I caused to be 
served a true and com:cl copy of the foregoing NOTICE O.F PRESENTMENT, to the 
foJlowing: 
Kim.o H. Mihara 
Anomcy at l.aw 
424 Shcnmm A venue, Sulte 308 
CCCUI d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0969 
/ DELIVERED 
U.S. MAD ... 
OVERNlGHT MAIL 
·.1 HLECOPY (FACSIMILE) 
E-MAIL 
N(l'rl('.I!'. (lit l'U~;St-:NTMF::NT 
[H~a<fgl}~~fcfll=' nISM[S,-AL WJTH PR.RJi.'!1lCR}. ;, 
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William J; Schroeder, TSB No. 6674 
Patrick E. Miller, ISB No. 1771 
PAINE HA.~BLEN LLP 
701 Froru Avenue, Suite 101 
P.O. Box E 
Coeur d'Alene, Tdaho 83816-0328 
Telephone: (208) 664-8115 
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338 
Malling A~: 
717 Wt:sl Sprague Avenue, SuiLe 1200 
Spokane, Washingwn 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Fucsimiic: (509) 838-0007 
Attorney~: for Defendants 
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lN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FTRST JUDICIAL DlSTRICT OF 
THE ST ATE OF CDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAl 
The ESTATE of BENJAMlN HOLLAND, 
DECEASED. GREGORY HOLLAND, and 













JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE 
METROPOLITAN PROPERTY and 
CASUAL TY INSURANCE COMPANY, and ) 







This action was started on January 26, 2010, with Plaintiffs' filing of a Civil ComplajnL 
On February 9, 2010, Plaintiffs' filed a Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant tn I.C. § C}J-1839. 
Ot~ iv.larch 3. 2010, the partie,-;' filed a JoinL MoLion and Stipulated Order to Dismiss al I Claims 
Except for Lhe Pending Motion for Attorney Fees. On April 28, 2010, Defenu.anL1:;' riled a Motion 
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to Compel Perlunnancc Under the Setclement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees. 
On May 17, 2010, Plaintiffs' fiJed a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
On June 2, 2010, a hearing was held on such Motions: (l) Plaintiffs' Mo Lion for 
A·t I T" ' nu su"-t ·- ·r,.., § 41 1 031,, (2' p1a;nt'1ff'<•' l\Knt";O" fn.1· s11...-.m!\r-U lnngtTIPnt· •1n,I [ orneys reeS 1- f clJJ LI.I 1.1._,. , J-lO 7 1 ) J J t '" •V.ivs, u LV '"" uW.J .,..,._. u.,,.., 1 <1,,-
(3) Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under the Scttk:mcnt and Dismiss Pli:1intiffa' 
MoLion for Attorney'~ Fcc:.-;. Due Lo the CAtcnsivc briefing and nrgument, the Court took these 
MoLions under advi~ement. 
On Ju.ly 20, 2010, the Com1 entered an Order finding the following: (1) Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to LC. § 41-1839 is denied: (2) Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment is denied; and (3) granting Defendants' Motion to Compel Pedonmmc.:e Under th~ 
Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney1s Fees. On /\ugust 2, 2010, PlainLiffs' 
fiJcd a Motion [or Reconsideration of the Court's July 20. 2010 Order. 
This Motion for Reconsideration came on for ht:aring bcfon:~ tbe tionorable John T. 
Mitchell on Septeir1ber 29, 2010. The Plaintiffs we,e reprcscmccl by Kin1.o H. Mihara and the 
Defcndant5 were rcpresc:nted by William J. Schroeder. The, Court, huving heo.rd argumcm of 
counl'icl, hflving reviewed the pleadini;s, and having denied Plainliffo' Motion fo1' 
Rcconsider:.itjon of il,:: July 20, 2010 Order in it~ entirety: 
rr TS HEREBY ORDERED. ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
l. Plainliff:.,' Motion tor Reconsideration is denied .in iL1; entirety; and 
2. This matter is dismissed with prejudic.:e, without cosrs s.nd that judgmi;:nt is ht:!rt:!by 
entered for Defendants. 
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DATED this_ day of September, 2010. 
Honorable John T. Mitch~II. Di:;trict Judge 
PRRSfi:NTF.O HY: 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
By:~~~ 
W.llliamJ.S ~tler, TSB No. 6674 
Auorncy for Defendants 
APPROVED AS TO F'ORM: 
By:---------------
Kinzo H NHhr:1ra 
Aa,:irncy for Plaintiffs 
T:\Sf'OllOC:S\0019~\00 I j'.\\;'Lt:AUIMJ'J Io 
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K.inzo H. Mihara, ISB No. 7940 . 
A ttomey at Law 
424 Sherman Avenue, Suite 308 
P. 0. Box 969 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0969 
P (208) 667-5486 
F (208) 667-4695 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
The ESTATE of BENJAMIN HOLLAND, 




METROPOLITAN PROPERTY and 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, and 
lvlETLIFE AUTO & HOME, 
Defendants. 
) 
) Case No. CV 10-0677 
) 
) PLAINTIFFS'REPLY MEMORANDUM 








) ______________ _,) 
COMES NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney of record and hereby offer the 
Court this reply memorandum in support of their motion for reconsideration. This motion is 
supported by affidavits previously submitted as well as the one filed contemporaneously 
herewith. 
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Undisputed Facts and Procedural Background 
Standard of Review 
Arguments 
a. The Court's finding of a question of material regarding the Brinkman and 
Greenough standard precludes this Court from holding as a matter of law that 
Plaintiffs' proof of loss was inadequate to allow MetLife to fully investigate and 
determine its liability. [ 18] 
b. Under Brinkman the term 'proof of loss' is judicially defined, under the case of In 
re Death of Cole, the term 'proof of loss' is not an exact term, and finally under 
both Brinkman and Greenough, the Court should begin its analysis with the policy 
at issue to determine what constitutes 'proof of loss.' [ 19] 
c. The undisputed facts of this case show that application of the statute 1s 
appropriate, as a matter oflaw, for at least the "initial" claim. [27] 
d. The Idaho judicial rules of intetpretation require the Court to construe the Joint 
Motion and Stipulated Order against MetLife, the plain wording of the Court's 
Order did not dismiss either the factual allegations, nor any portion of the 
complaint; the LR.C.P. actually requires factually allegations to be plead in 
SUPP.Ort of a demand for relief. [33] 
e. The Court's memorandum decision and order did not dispose of Plaintiffs' 
timeliness argument regarding waiver by Defendants for failing to object to 
Plaintiffs' motion in a timely manner. [36] 
f. An alleged failure of Plaintiffs to submit an alleged deficient proof of loss has no 
impact upon a settlement agreement. [36] 
Conclusion [38] 
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I. UNDISPUTED FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The following are the undisputed facts and the procedure of this case: 
Benjamin Charles Holland passed away on October 25, 2009 as a result of a single motor 
vehicle accident on state highway 95 in Nez Perce County, Idaho when the vehicle he was a 
passenger in collided with a tree. Aff. Mihara (May), Ex. 4. In early November, 2009 Benjamin 
Charles Holland's parents and heirs at law approached attorney Kinzo Mihara for help in starting 
and administrating Benjamin's estate and for help dealing with insurance matters. Aff. Mihara 
(May), Exs. 1 and 2. Attorney Mihara offered to provide his services to the family pro-bona. Id. 
On or about November 10, 2009 attorney Mihara provided proof ofloss to MetLife. Aff. 
Davis, ,r 3. In response to attorney Mihara's submission on November 10, 2009, MetLife agent, 
Daneice Davis, responded in writing to attorney Mihara and requested several items of 
information and documentation. Id. Attorney Mihara responded on November 17, 2009 with all 
of the information that Ms. Davis had requested in her November 10, 2009 letter. Aff. Mihara 
(May), Ex. 4. 
Attorney Mihara supplemented his submittal of information to MetLife on December 1, 
2009. Id., Ex. 5. On December 7, 2009, MetLife agent, Daneice Davis had a telephone 
conversation with attorney Mihara._ Aff. Davis, ,r 3. MetLife agent Davis told attorney Mihara 
that she believed that the parties could conclude the insureds claim ( claim no. FRD 373130) with 
MetLife paying the limits. Id. Attorney Mihara told Agent Davis that he was making claims 
under two additional policies which he believed provided coverage for his clients' October 25, 
2009 loss. Id. MetLife received those claims on December 7, 2009. Id. MetLife agent Davis also 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY 
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advised attorney Mihara that she was going on vacation and would return to the office on 
January 6, 2010. Id. 
There is a dispute of fact between the parties as to the legal effect of agent Davis' 
vacation. Plaintiff~' understanding of the matter is that MetLife would provide a coverage 
answer on January 6, 2010. Aff. Mihara (May), Ex. 21. Defendants assert that they were not 
obligated to start a review of the "additional claims" until January 6, 2010. Aff. Davis,~ 3. 
Attorney Mihara's affidavit, along with his confirmatory memoranda dated January 6, 2010, and 
the facsimile confinnation, is contained in the record. Aff. Mihara (May), Ex. 21. MetLife agent 
Davis' recollection that she did not have to begin review of the matter until her return in January 
can be found in her affidavit. Aff. Davis,~ 3. Agent Davis admits that she did not send out 
confirmatory memoranda regarding her understanding despite that being her ordinary practice. 
Id. 
Important to note is that between December 7, 2009 and , January 6, 2010, MetLife 
personnel, including MetLife agent Davis, were working on.the claim file. 1 Aff. Mihara (Sept.), 
Ex. 7; bates 00126-00131. Documents from Defendants' claim file received in discovery show 
that claims were made, indeed, on December 7, 2009. Id, at bates 00126. On that day, MetLife's 
file shows that: "Allstate the car the NI [named insured] was a passenger in has a $50/100 limt" 
Id. at bates 00127. MetLife agent Davis continues: "I have requested the Policy-Need to read it 
as it appears Benjamin Holland may be a listed driver and not a named insured?" Id. On 
December 8, 2009, Ms. Davis requested a copy of the original application for the motorcycle 
policy (claim no. FRD 408370) and a certified copy of the policy with its endorsements. Id., at 
bates 00128. MetLife agent Davis makes a further entry on December 8, 2009: "Called 
1 This fact supports a finding contrary to Ms. Davis' assertion that she had an agreement with Plaintiffs' attorney whereby 
MetLife would not have to even begin working on determining whether coverage was applicable until January 6, 2010. 
PLAINTIFFS'REPLY 
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attorney's office and left message with Julie for LOR." Id. at bates 00129. Indeed, another 
MetLife employee/agent, M. Shick, makes an entry into the case file on December 9, 2009: 
"FRD 37313 ... we are about to tender ins policy limits when attorney submitted these 2 add'l 
claims looking for coverage under these polices ... " Id., at bates 00129 (emphasis added). M. 
Shick's entry continues: "Daneice is ordering certified copies of this policy and parents policy 
and all uw [ underwriting] notes and referring to defense counsel to review and assist in 
determining coverage." Id. Indeed, despite the notation that the case was being referred to 
defense counsel on December 12, 2009, there are no notations in the claim file until December 
30, 2009 when MetLife employee/agent D. Hardy authors the following entry for claim number 
FRD408370: "are we getting the requested materials, etc? we may have exposure under UIM 
[under-insured motorist] under this policy, but a complete review is needed." Id. MetLife 
employee/agent M. Shick makes a following entry under the motorcycle policy claim number on 
the same day, Wednesday, December 30, 2009: "Daneice, upon your return to the office on 1/4, 
could you please follow up on this file as priority ... please see my file note of 12/9 and Dave's 
file note of today, 12/30 ... any questions, please let me know. Thanks, Daneice." Id. (emphasis 
added) at bates 00130. Indeed, MetLife agent/employee, D. Hardy, notes the pertinent issues of 
coverage on Friday, January 8, 2010: 
I see two distinct but overly related issues as to whether the son was an "insured" 
under these other policies. 
1) Is he a "you" under the Motorcycle policy by virtue of being the sole driver and 
signing all the forms? It is true that he is not the named insured, but would the 
court use a broad evidence rule? 
2) is a "resident relative" of the parents' policies by virtue of having some factors 
related to a residence, e.g., a room, clothes, mail, time spent, etc? I believe he did 
buy his own place before the loss and we even insure it. 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY · . 
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Id., at bates 00130. (emphasis added) Indeed, on the same day, Friday, January 8,2010, MetLife 
agent Davis makes the following entry in the claim file W1der claim no. FRD408370: "I called 
Kathy Paukert at 509 232 7760-Defense CoW1Sel." Id. The remainder of the page is redacted 
under claim of attorney.client privilege. Id. Those were some of the very issues raised in attorney 
Mihara's submission to attorney Paukert on January 14,2010- along with a discussion 
explaining LC. 41-1839.Aff. K. Mihara(May),Ex. 6,pp. 7, 12, 13,and 17. 
On the next page of the claim file, however, on Tuesday, January 12,2010, MetLife 
agent Davis makes the following entry under claim no. FRD408370: 
There is a Idaho Protection against Uninsured/underinsured policy that appears to 
be signed by Benjamin on 9/25/2008 
The original application signed by Ben Holland on 9/25/08 
The ARS down payment signature is signed by Ben Holland on 9/25/09 (sic) 
Recurring credit card authorization signed by Benjamin Holland and appears to be 
rapid with Visa card - not sure where the card is coming from. 
I have forwarded a copy of the certified policy to Kathy Paukert to review. 
Aff. Mihara (Sept.), Ex. 7, at bates 00131. Thus, the claim file documents produced by MetLife 
in this matter show that MetLife and its attorney, Kathy Paukert, knew at least on January 12, 
2010 of the relationship between Ben Holland and the motorcycle policy at issue in this case. Id.; 
see also Aff. D. Davis,~ 6. The documents cited in the foregoing paragraphs are admissible 
documents produced by the Defendants on May 25, 2010 in discovery in this matter. Aff. Mihara 
(Sept.), Exs. 4, p.2 (RPD no. 2) and 7. 
On Thursday, January 7,2010, MetLife agent, Davis, received the January 6,2010 letter 
from attorney Mihara Aff. Davis, ~ 4. The letter suggested that MetLife should have a response 
to the two new claims by the end of the week. Id., ljj 4. On Friday, January 8, 2010, attorney 
Kathleen Paukert was contacted by MetLife agent Davis. Id., ~ 5. Agent Davis told attorney 
Paukert that MetLife would send Ms. Paukert material for a coverage opinion. Id. It was not 
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until Tuesday, January 12, 2010 when MetLife sent attorney Paukert the policies at issue. Id., ,i 
6. The auto policy for Gregory and Kathleen Holland was assigned claim no. 408440, and the 
motorcycle policy was assigned claim no. 408370. Id. On January 12,2010, MetLife agent 
Daneice Davis gave attorney Pauk~rt attorney Mihara's contact information. Id., ,i 5. 
Attorney Paukert did not contact attorney Mihara on Tuesday, January 12, 2010. A:ff. 
Paukert, ,i 3-4. Indeed, it was Attorney Mihara who made contact with attorney Paukert on 
Wednesday, January 13, 2010 via telephone and the two attorneys had a cordial conversation 
during which attorney Paukert complimented attorney Mihara for handling the case pro-bono. Id. 
The two attorneys had another conversation on Thursday, January 14, 2010 during which the 
attorneys discussed the various claims against the various policies. Id. Attorney Paukert told 
attorney Mihara that !f he sent her his research, she would review it. Id., ,i 5. Attorney Mihara 
responded later that same day with a 17 page letter outlining his theories. Id. A copy of the letter 
was sent to attorney Paukert via email, and a copy was sent to MetLife agent Daneice Davis via 
facsimile. Aff. Mihara (May), Ex. 6. The cover facsimile sheet, along with the body of the letter, 
identified J.C.§ 41-1839, demanded payment of uncontested amounts, and requested payment of 
an hourly attorney fee. Id. The email to attorney Paukert requested the same. Id. Portions of the 
letter dealt with the theories identified in that Benjamin Holland had, or should have, coverage 
under either one or both the motorcycle policy and/or his parents' automobile policy. Id. Again, 
important to note, during the January 14, 2010 telephone call, attorney Paukert requested that 
attorney Mihara not take any action against MetLife until Friday, January 22, 2010. Id. Attorney 
Mihara granted attorney Paukert's request. Id. 
On ~r about January 21,2010, the two attorneys had at least two telephone conversations 
during which attorney Paukert explained to attorney Mihara that she thought that he had 
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significant problems with his legal arguments and disagreed with them. Aff. Paukert, 1 6. In 
response, attorney Mihara sent attorney Paukert further research via email. Id. It was on January 
21, 2010 that MetLife agent Daneice Davis sent attorney Mihara a certified copy of the insurance 
policy for claim no. FRD 373130. Aff. Mihara (Aug.), Ex. 1. 
On Friday, January 22, 2010, the two attorneys had at least three telephone conversations. 
Aff. Paukert,~ 7. Attorney Paukert explained to attorney Mihara that, in her opinion, she had 
interpreted Idaho law as not providing for coverage for Benjamin Holland under either of the 
other two insurance policies. Id. It was on this day, the day that her requested extension was 
' 
expiring, that attorney Paukert claims that she told attorney Mihara that MetLife had given her 
"authority and encouragement" to see if there was coverage under other different legal theories. 
Id. Again, importantly, attorney Paukert requested yet another extension from attorney Mihara in 
order to complete her research. Aff. Mihara (Feb.), 111. This time, attorney Mihara declined to 
grant her request. Id. 
On Monday, January 25, 2010, Attorney Paukert was researching the "assigned driver 
theory." Id., 18. Ms. Paukert, in her affidavit, specifically does not recall with certainty who 
came up with the idea to research the "assigned driver theory." Id. Important to note, she does 
not claim to have ever come up with the idea herself. Id. It was on this day that attorney Mihara 
called attorney Paukert to ascertain whether attorney Paukert had come to a final coverage 
opinion. Id. Attorney Paukert told attorney Mihara that she had not, but that MetLife was making 
significant efforts to see if a higher limit would apply ( other than the limit discussed by attorney 
Mihara and agent Davis on December 7, 2009). Id. It was during a telephone call on this day that 
attorney Paukert asserts that she told attorney Mihara that it was her "final opinion" that the 
majority of states would not find coverage. Id. 
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On January 26,2010, attorney Mihara instigated the case at bar by filing a complaint for 
damages against MetLife on behalf of his clients. See Complaint. Attorney Mihara claims that he 
called attorney Paukert to inform her of the fact of the lawsuit. Aff. Mihara (May), 129, Ex. 22. 
Attorney Mihara further claims that he sent attorney Paukert an email to the same effect. Id.. 1 
11, Ex. 7. Attorney Paukert denies receiving neither a telephone call nor any email dated January 
26, 2010 from attorney Mihara. Supp. Aff. Paukert, 123. Attorney Mihara's affidavit, along with 
his telephone record for January 26, 2010 as well as an email he claims he sent, are all in the 
Court's record. Aff. Mihara (May), 1110-11, Exs. 6 and 22. Attorney Paukert's denial can be 
found in her supplemental affidavit. Supp. Aff. Paukert, 123. 
Despite the apparent difficulty in researching and finding coverage under any of the 
policies, attorney Paukert finalized her coverage opinion on Wednesday, January 27, 2010. Supp. 
Aff. Paukert, 124. She forwarded her coverage opinion to MetLife that same day. Id. 
Events continued to unfold on January 27, 2010 when MetLife agent, Daneice Davis 
contacted attorney Mihara to inquire as to who held legal title to the motorcycle covered by the 
motorcycle policy. Aff. Davis, 17. Agent Davis 1hen formally requested the title, in writing, via 
facsimile letter. Id.; see also Aff. Mihara (May), Ex. 9. Attorney Mihara received agent Davis' 
request and, on the same day, asserts that he sent her a letter complaining about the time it was 
taking MetLife to come to a coverage decision, advising her of the instant lawsuit, and 
transmitting a copy of the motorcycle title requested by agent Davis' correspondence. Aff. 
Mihara, 1 Ex. 10. On Thursday, January 28, 2010, MetLife agent Davis sent attorney Mihara 
another letter responding to attorney Mihara's January 27. 2010 submission. Aff. Mihara, Ex. 11. 
Note, MetLife and agent Davis deny that they ever received a letter containing notification of the 
lawsuit prior February 8, 2010. Aff. Davis, 1 8 and 1 O; see also Aff. Mihara (May), Exs. 9-11. 
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Attorney Mihara's affidavit along with a copy of the letter and a copy of the motorcycle title 
requested by agent Davis is contained in this Court's record preceded by a facsimile 
confirmation page showing successful transmission of those documents. Aff. Mihara (May),~ 
Exs. 9-11; see also Aff. Mihara (Feb.), Ex. C. MetLife agent Davis' denial of knowledge is 
contained in her affidavit. Aff. Davis, ,i- I 0. 
Despite denying receipt of a letter, on Thursday, January 28, 2010, agent Davis sent 
attorney Mihara another letter via facsimile. Aff. Mihara, Ex. 11. The January 28, 2010 letter 
acknowledged receipt of the motorcycle title - albeit illegible - requested on January 27, 2010 
and responded to the very concerns raised by attorney Mihara's January 27,2010 letter regarding 
the delay in a coverage decision by MetLife. Id. Ms. Davis' January 28, 20 IO letter thanked 
attorney Mihara for his patience and cooperation. Id. Attorney Mihara responded by sending 
another copy of the motorcycle title electronically to agent Davis. Aff. Mihara (Sept), Ex. I. 
On January 29, 2010, despite having attorney Paukert's formal coverage opinion in her 
hands for two days, MetLife agent Daneice Davis called MetLife agent Joe Foredyce to inquire 
about what Benjamin Holland had told him concerning who was going to be listed on the 
motorcycle title. Aff. Davis,~ 8. It was during that conversation that MetLife agent Joe Foredyce 
told MetLife agent Daneice Davis that he had seen publication notice in the CDA Press that the 
Estate of Benjamin Holland had filed a lawsuit against MetLife. Id. MetLife agent Daneice Davis 
thereafter called attorney Paukert to ask for her to check and see if a lawsuit had been filed. Id. 
Despite the concerning news that the parties could well be engaged in active litigation, attorney 
Paukert did not inquire herself, but had her assistant check with the Court. Id. She was then 
apparently advised that there was no record of such a filing. Aff. Davis,~ 8; Supp. Aff. Paukert, 
,i- 25. Curiously, neither MetLife agent Daneice Davis, nor attorney Paukert claim that they called 
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attorney Mihara to follow up on the information received from MetLife agent Joe Foredyce on 
Thursday, January 29, 2010 to ask him if he had, indeed, filed a lawsuit against MetLife on 
behalf of the Estate of Benjamin Holland. Id.; see also Memorandum Decision and Order, p.15. 
Five days later, on Tuesday, February 2, 2010, MetLife agent Daneice Davis authorized 
attorney Paukert to convey a settlement offer. Aff. Davis, ,r 9. On that same day attorney Paukert 
sent attorney Mihara an email requesting that he call her as she had an offer from MetLife. Aff. 
Paukert, ,r 9. Attorney Mihara called attorney Paukert, and because of previous representations 
by attorney Paukert and the developments of the case, attorney Mihara demanded that any offer 
attorney Paukert made on behalf of MetLife be in writing. Af£ Mihara (Sept), Ex. 2. 
It was during the phone call on February 2. 2010 between the attorneys that attorney 
Mihara advised attorney Paukert that he was no longer pro-bono and he had recently entered into 
a contingency agreement with his clients. Aff. Paukert, ,r 9. The contingency agreement was on a 
sliding scale and also offered the client the opportunity to choose an hourly rate. Aff. Mihara 
(May), Ex. 2. The client chose the contingency fee. Id. The fee agreement called for attorney 
Mihara to be compensated to the tune of 30% of any recovery obtained from MetLife prior to 
trial of the matter, 35% should the matter be tried, and 40% of any recovery if there was recovery 
should the matter be appealed. Id. After the two attorneys spoke, attorney Mihara sent attorney 
Paukert an email memorializing that he was requesting a written offer. Aff. Mihara (Sept.), Ex. 
2. Despite the knowledge of the recent telephone call that Plaintiffs had entered into a 
contingency fee agreement with their attorney and would be seeking fees, attorney Paukert's 
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Attorney Mihara conferred with his clients, and on February 3, 2010 sent an acceptance 
email to attorney Paukert accepting the MetLife offer dated February 2, 2010. Aff Paukert, Ex. 
1. A copy of both the February 2nd and 3rd emails are before the Court in the record. Id. 
Upon acceptance of the offer noted above, attorneys Paukert and Mihara immediately 
began the dispute over whether Idaho law provided for attorney's fees under the facts and 
circumstances of the case. Aff. Mihara (May), Exs. 12 to 13. On February 5, 2010, attorney 
Paukert acknowledges the parties' dispute over entitlement to attorney's fees, but reiterates the 
fact that regardless of the dispute, MetLife wished to tender the settlement amount agreed upon. 
Id. at Ex. 12. Attorney Paukert represented that she would accept service of process of the 
Complaint on Friday, February 5, 2010, and shortly thereafter on Tuesday, February 9, 2010 
attorney Mihara served MetLife via its attorney with the complaint, the summons, and the 
motion for attorney's fees with supporting documentation. Id.; see also Ex. 13. 
On February 11, 2010, attorney Mihara was contacted by attorney Schroeder who 
represented that he was taking over representation of MetLife in the lawsuit. The two attorneys 
quickly established that the only issue left in this case was the issue of attorney's fees. Aff. 
Mihara (May), Ex. 16. Attorney Mihara expressed willingness to work through the issue short of 
the Court's involvement. Id. Attorney Schroeder requested documents from attorney Mihara, in 
response to which attorney Mihara forwarded the documents requested to attorney Schroeder. Id. 
On February 12, 2010, a runner from attorney Schroeder's office delivered an envelope 
to attorney Mihara's office. Id. The envelope contained two checks: check number 002599483 
dated February 9, 2010 in the amount of $150,000 with the notation for claim no. FRD 408370, 
the second check's number was 002599482 dated February 9, 2010 in the amount of $50,000 
with the notation for claim no. FRD 373130. Aff. Mihara (May), 121, Ex. 15. 
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On February 16, 2010, attorney Schroeder requested on behalf of MetLife that Plaintiffs 
refrain from negotiating the settlement checks until the parties' attorneys had an opportunity to 
work out a mutually-acceptable release. Aff. Mihara (May), Ex. 20. On the same day, and on 
behalf of Plaintiffs, attorney Mihara agreed in writing via confirmatory memoranda that the 
Hollands would refrain from negotiating the checks received by attorney Mihara until the 
attorneys had an opportunity to see if they would be able to draft some mutually-agreeable 
release language. Id. The attorneys were able to do so, and on February 23, 2010, Attorney 
Schroeder gave written authorization to attorney Mihara to distribute the settlement checks on 
behalf of MetLife once the Hollands signed the release. Id., Ex. 17. The Hollands signed the 
release on February 24,2010 then received and deposited the settlement checks thereafter. 
On February 22, 2010, attorney Schroeder drafted the Joint Motion and Stipulated Order 
and transmitted the same to attorney Mihara. Aff. Mihara (Sept.), Ex. 3. Attorney Mihara signed 
the Joint Motion and Stipulated Order on January 26, 2010 and returned it to attorney Schroeder 
via facsimile. See Joint Motion and Stipulated Order. 
Attorney Schroeder filed a notice of appearance in this Court on March 2, 2010 and filed 
the facsimile copy with the Court on the same day. See Notice of Appearance. This Court entered 
the order to dismiss all claims except for Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's fees on March 3, 
2010. See Joint Motion and Order. Attorney Mihara scheduled hearing on the motion on March 
17, 2010 and upon request from attorney Schroeder, attorney Mihara rescheduled the hearing to 
June 2, 2010. Between early March 2010 and June 2, 2010, the parties engaged in discovery. Aff. 
Mihara (May), Ex. 19. On April 12, 2010, attorney Schroeder filed an answer on behalf of 
MetLife. See Answer. MetLife's answer did not deny any of the factual allegations contained in 
Plaintiffs' complaint. Id.; c.f Complaint, §§ I-IV, c.f Joint Motion and Order. 
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On April 28, 2010, Defendants filed their Motion to Compel and/or Dismiss along with 
accompanying briefing. On May 10, 2010, Defendants filed their response to Plaintiffs' motion 
for attorney's fees along with accompanying briefing and affidavits setting forth their position to 
Plaintiffs' legal position. On May 17, 2010, Plaintiffs filed their motion for summary judgment. 
An extremely large amount of briefing was filed in the time period shortly thereafter and almost 
continuously up until shortly before this Court heard oral argument on the various motions on 
June 2, 2010. This Court issued its memorandum decision and order on July 20, 2010. See 
Memorandum Decision and Order. 
In its memorandum decision and order, this Court found that there were active disputes of 
material fact as to: (1) whether Plaintiffs prevailed Wlder the meaning of the statute, based upon 
the fact that (la) there was no 'unreasonable' initial refusal of MetLife to pay the. claim, and also 
due to the question of (I b) whether MetLife had knowledge of the lawsuit prior to the February 
2, 2010 offer, (2) whether in light of the research and theories discussed by Holland's counsel 
Mihara, and MetLife's counsel Paukert, including a request by MetLife for a legible copy of a 
motorcycle title on January 27, 2010, even after the January 22, 2010 deadline imposed by the 
Hollands, MetLife had sufficient information to investigate and determine its liability, (3) what 
date began the running of the thirty (30) day timeline under the statute, ( 4) whether there was an 
extension of time within which MetLife could respond, and (5) whether there was an adequate 
meeting of the minds to support an enforceable contract in that (Sa) whether the parties mutually 
understood and agreed what the term 'full release' was to mean and (Sb) whether counsel for 
both parties contemplated that the 'settlement' would settle all claims including any fees at the 
time the settlement agreement was entered into. Id. 
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The Court held that neither party was estopped from talcing their relative positions. Id., p. 
17. The Court also held that Defendants' failure to deny the factual allegations in Plaintiffs' 
complaint were not tantamount to admissions under the I.R.C.P. due to the joint motion and 
stipulated order signed by the parties and entered by the Court. Id., p. 20. The Court held that the 
case of Straub was dispositive of Defendants' argument that the 'settlement agreement' was 
inclusive of attorney's fees or otherwise precluded Plaintiffs' from prosecuting a claim for the 
same. Id., p.23. 
The Court's final ruling and order held that the alleged 'settlement agreement' between 
the parties would have to be enforced on the basis that while Plaintiffs had provided a 'proof of 
loss,' Plaintiffs failed to provide MetLife a proper 'proof of loss,' as a matter of law, under the 
standard set forth by the Supreme Court of Idaho in the cases of Brinkman and Greenough. Id., 
pp. 28-32. 
The Court cited three factual reasons for its ruling. Id. First, this case was a 'moving 
target' for all parties involving multiple claims, under multiple policies, covering multiple time 
periods. Id. Second there was no factual basis, and no legal citation, to Plaintiffs' contention that 
even if the 30 day time period did not run consecutively from November 10 or 17, 2009, the time 
periods of 11 /1 O- l 7 /2009 to l 2/7/2009 and then from 1/6/20 IO to 2/2/2010 should be aggregated. 
Id. Third and finally, the Court posted a rhetorical question; that if it was attorney Paukert who 
had, indeed, come up with the applicable theory of coverage that provided Plaintiffs' recovery of 
policy limits under a policy of insurance with the larger limits than was originally discussed how 
could Plaintiffs recover against Defendants? Id. The Court then ordered the 'settlement 
agreement' to be enforced, and Plaintiffs' remaining entitlement to relief dismissed. Id. 
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Plaintiffs timely filed the motion for reconsideration respectfully asking this Court to 
reconsider its July 20, 2010 decision and order. See Plfs. Mot. for Reconsideration. 
Those are the facts of this case, and those facts are undisputed. 
Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial court's ·decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586,592, 21 P.3d 908,914 (2001). A motion for 
reconsideration of an interlocutory order of the trial court may be made at any time before entry 
of a final judgment, but not later than fourteen days after entry of a final judgment. I.R.C.P. 
1 l(a)(2)(B). A party making a motion for reconsideration is permitted to present new evidence, 
but is not required to do so. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 486,472, 147 P.3d 100, 104 (Ct. 
App. 2006). The moving party has the burden of bringing new facts bearing on the correctness of 
the interlocutory order. Devil Creek Ranch, Inc. v. Cedar Mesa Reservoir & Canal Co., 126 
Idaho 202, 205 879 P.2d 1135, 1138 (1994 ). If no new facts are presented, the party moving for 
reconsideration must demonstrate errors of law or fact in the initial decision. Johnson v. 
Lambros, 143 Idaho 486, 472-73, 147 P.3d 100, 10~-105. 
If there is no genuine issue of material fact - only a question of law remains; appellate 
courts exercise free review. Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., 147 Idaho 737, 746, 
215 P.3d 457,466 (2009) (quoting Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 307, 
160 PJd 743, 746 (2007)). An appellate court, likewise, will freely review the construction of a 
statute. Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746, 751, 133 P.3d 1211, 1216 (2006). The Supreme 
Court exercises free review over the district court's conclusions oflaw and may substitute its 
view for that of the district court on a legal issue. Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
137 Idaho 173, 176, 45 P.3d 829, 832 (Idaho 2002). 
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ill. ARGUMENTS 
A The Court's finding of a question of material regarding the Brinkman and 
Greenough standard precludes this Court from holding as a matter of law that 
Plaintiffs' proof of loss was inadequate to allow MetLife to fully investigate and 
determine its liability. 
Plaintiffs would like to respectfully ask this Court to reconsider its decision based upon 
the fact that holdings and ruling contained in this Court's memorandum and order are apparently 
at direct odds with one another. 
Specifically, this Court's memorandum opinion and order found explicitly that there was 
a question of material fact on the question of the Brinkman and Greenough standard. The Court's 
memorandum decision and order reads: 
A material question of fact remains for this Court as to whether in light of the 
research and theories discussed by Holland's counsel Mihara, and MetLife's 
counsel Paukert, including a request by MetLife for a legible copy of a 
motorcycle title on January 27, 2010, even after the January 22, 2010 deadline 
imposed by Hollands, MetLife had sufficient information to investigate and 
determine its liability. 
See Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 15 (emphasis added). The holding above is directly at 
odds with the reason this Court enforces the alleged "agreement" between the parties and 
dismisses Plaintiffs' remaining entitlement to relief. The Court's memorandum and opinion 
concludes: 
This Court is simply unable to fmd that Hollands have met their burden under 
Greenough and Brinkman, because Hollands "submitted proof of loss" but not a 
proof of loss which was sufficient ... to provide the insurer with enough 
information to allow the insurer a reasonable opportunity to investigate and 
determine its liability. 
See Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 28 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court's opinion is 
apparently in direct conflict with itself. 
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The Supreme Court of Idaho, in Brinkman, expounds upon the information that an 
insured has a duty to provide to the insurer: "[t]he amount of information provided should be 
proportional to the amount reasonably available to the insured." Brinkman, infra, at 1231 and 
350. 
The Court's memorandum and order does not attempt to define what further information 
MetLife would require in order to afford it a reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine 
its liability nor does it attempt to say how such information was reasonably available to the 
insureds - a requirement under Brinkman. Indeed, the undisputed facts in the record show - and 
Defendants do not dispute - that not only did Plaintiffs provide MetLife with all of the 
information that was required by the insurance policy, but that Plaintiffs also provided MetLife 
with all of the information that MetLife specifically requested via their agent, Davis, through her 
November 10, 2009 request to Plaintiffs. Aff. Mihara (May), Exs. 3 and 4. Further, Plaintiffs 
allowed Defendants at least three documented extensions after the thirty (30) day time period 
under the statute had elapsed. 2 Indeed, MetLife' s adjustor, paneice Davis, specifically thanked 
attorney Mihara for his patience and cooperation. Id., Ex. 11. 
In short, Plaintiffs would respectfully point this Court to the inherent inconsistencies of 
the Court's memorandum and order and beg this Court to reconsider its decision to dismiss this 
case. 
B. Under Brinkman the term 'proof of loss' is judicially defined, under the case of In 
re Death of Cole, the term 'proof of loss' is not an exact term, and imally under both 
Brinkman and Greenough, the Court should begin its analysis with the policy at 
issue to determine what constitutes 'proof of loss.' 
2 Indeed, if Defendants contend that the thirty (30) day time period was not running, then why did they seek 'extensions' from 
Plaintiffs' attorney and requesting him to refrain from taking action against MetLife- explicitly after Plaintiffs' attorney had 
advised them ofl.C. 41-1839(1) and its implications? Aff. Mihara, Exs, 6 and 21; Aff. Davis, 13. 
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As noted by Defendants' opposition, the primary issue before the Court in the motion for 
reconsideration is whether the Brinkman and Greenough standard should apply. Defendants 
argue in response that the exact term "proof of loss" was not itself specifically defined; therefore 
the statutory standard of Brinkman and Greenough should apply. Plaintiffs would offer that the 
terms of the required proof of loss were found in the policy of insurance. 
Plaintiffs, in this reply, will note that the standard of 'proof of loss' is set forth in the 
policy and point out that the term 'proof of loss' was judicially defined in Brinkman. Plaintiffs 
would also refer this Court to the case of In re Cole, infra, cited by Brinkman. The Court of 
Appeals of Idaho sets forth the very proposition that the term 'proof of loss' is not always 
explicit and that a trial court may look to the policy for other standards or requirements to satisfy 
the term as defined in the applicable statute. In re Cole, infra, at 737, 101. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Brinkman judicially defined what proof of loss meant. The 
Court set forth the definition in quotations: 
The documentation is the "proof." The explanation of physical and/or financial 
injury is the "loss." "Loss" must be distinguished from liability. The insurer will 
determine its liability with the knowledge that it must be fair and accurate or 
suffer the consequences. 
Brinkman, 766 P .2d at 1231. (quotations in original) ( emphasis added). Thus, via the Brinkman 
case, the Idaho Supreme Court judicially defines the statutory term "proof of loss" as the 
'documentation and explanation of physical and/or financial injury' requested by the policy. 
Indeed, In re Death of Cole, a case cited and relied upon by Brinkman, the Court of 
Appeals of Idaho looked directly to any "standards or requirements" contained within the policy 
itself. In re Death o/Cole, 113 Idaho 98, 101, 741 P.2d 734, 737 (Idaho App. 1987). The Court 
of Appeals stated: 
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Idaho statutes do not contain a definition of or a standard for "proof of loss." No 
Idaho cases have been cited to us, nor has our research disclosed any, which 
provide guidance here. The policy itself sets out no standard or requirements. 
Accordingly, we choose to follow the cases cited for the proposition that "proof of 
loss" requirements cannot be greater than the requirements for establishing a 
prima facia case of death in a court of this state. 
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, in In re Cole, the Court of Appeals ofldaho provides guidance to 
trial courts in that the tenn, "proof of loss," need not be explicitly defined but a court may simply 
look to the policy itself to ascertain the standard or requirement of a proper proof of loss. 
Regardless, Plaintiffs would ask this Court to appreciate that in every reported case under 
this statute, the Idaho appellate courts first look to the policy itself in an attempt to determine 
~hat the statute required in the way of "proof ofloss" and what standard to apply. 
Indeed, Judge Pappas, interpreting Idaho law, in a federal court, in Idaho, held that as a 
.-
matter of law in the UIM case before him: 
In the March 27, 2008 letter, Plaintiff had already submitted information to 
Defendant concerning the details of the accident, as well data and documentation 
concerning her medical bills. Defendant never disputed that Plaintiffs total 
damages would exceed the liability limits in Patterson's Allstate policy. Then, in 
the June 12, 2008 letter, Plaintiffs attorney confirmed to Defendant that Allstate 
had indeed made a policy limits offer to Plaintiff. At that point, had it elected to 
do so, Defendant had all the information available it needed to" investigate and 
determine its rights and liabilities" to Plaintiff. Presumably, a simple phone call 
from Defendant to Allstate would have allowed Defendant to confirm that a 
policy limits payment was being made by Allstate. In short, the letter to 
Defendant of June 12, 2008 was the final piece of information necessary to enable 
Defendant to effectively investigate and determine its liability. 
In sum, the Court concludes that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff submitted an 
adequate proof ofloss to Defendant on June 122 2008, and that Defendant had 
thirty days from that date to pay Plaintiff her benefits under the Policy. 
In re Jones, 401 B.R. 456, 465-66 (2009) (emphasis added). 
The statute at issue was designed by the Idaho legislature to require insurers to promptly 
pay persons suffering a loss, the money that they were entitled to, under their policies in order to 
cut down on litigation. See In re Jones, 401 B.R. 456,462 (Bkrtcy.D.Idaho 2009) (citing Martin 
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v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244,247, 61 P.3d 601,604 (2002)). The statute 
itself sets forth 30 days as the 'reasonable' time that an insurer may withhold payment while it 
requests information and investigates the claim. 
Idaho law simply does not give an insurer time to conduct an open-ended investigation 
past 30 days without requiring that insurer to shoulder the potential liability for attorney's fees 
should suit be filed. See I.C. § 41-1839(1). Upon receiving notice of the accident and 
documentation and explanation of the loss, Idaho law gives an insurer thirty days to investigate, 
request any further documentation and details as may be necessary, to come to a coverage 
decision, and to either deny or pay the claim. Id. As stated by the Idaho Supreme Court, "The 
insurer will determine its liability with the knowledge that it must be fair and accurate or suffer 
the consequences." Brinkman, at 350. 
In fact, the very terms and language of the statute in question, I.C. § 41-1839(1), do not 
require an insured to make a "claim" under their policy. See LC.§ 41-1839(1). The statute 
simply requires the insured to provide a "proof of loss" as defined under the policy (or under the 
Greenough I Brinkman standard should the same be absent from the policy) to their insurer. Id. It 
is then incumbent upon the insurer to either (1) deny payment, (2) pay amounts justly due to the 
insured within thirty days, or (3) shoulder liability for attorney's fees should a lawsuit be filed 
against it after thirty days elapses from the date of the proof of loss. Id. 
In this case, the documentation and explanation of the physical injury requested by the 
insurer, MetLife, is noted in the policy under the provisions cited in Plaintiffs' memorandum of 
law in support of their motion for reconsideration. Aff. Mihara (Aug.), Ex. 1. In the policy, the 
insurer, MetLife, asked for notification of the accident or loss, stating that such notification, 
"should include as many details as possible, including the names-and addresses of the drivers, 
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injured persons and witnesses, and the time, place, and circumstances of the accident or loss." 
Id. at 19-20. MetLife had the right, which it exercised, to request this information - along with 
other further "pertinent" information, in writing. See Aff. Davis, ,i 3, see also Aff. Mihara (May), 
Ex. "3." Plaintiffs provided MetLife with all of that information they requested within a week. 
Aff. Mihara (May), Ex. "4." Further, attorney Mihara advised MetLife agent Davis in his 
November 17, 2009 letter that the adverse insurer would be soon be tendering limits, and once a 
formal tender had been made, attorney Mihara supplemented his documentary submission to 
MetLife on December 1, 2009. Aff. Mihara (May), Exs. 4 and 5. Thus, at least under Judge 
Pappas' reasoning above, MetLife had all the information it needed on November 17. 2009. 
After November 17, 2009, MetLife could have confirmed that Allstate, the adverse carrier in this 
case, was going to tender its remaining limits with a simple phone call. Id. 
Another point to be made, is that in this case, the only insured Plaintiff that knew of the 
circumstances and surroundings of the contract for the motorcycle policy, and who was present 
during the contract's fonnation, was the deceased, Ben Holland. Aff. Mihara (Aug.), Ex. 4; bates 
00084 to 00088. 
Plaintiffs' counsel noted in his memo to MetLife on January 14,2010-well in advance 
of when MetLife claims attorney Paukert "discovered" coverage: 
MetLife continued to draw premiums out of Benjamin Holland's bank account 
even post-death. Premium notices continue to come to the Holland Road address 
for the motorcycle policy - a policy on which Benjamin Holland is a named 
insured. 
Aff. Mihara (May), Ex. "6," p. 10. 
The evidence will show that MetLife further sent billings to the Holland Road 
address after Ben's death for the motorcycle policy listing Ben at the Holland 
Road address - after its agent had full knowledge of the facts and circumstances 
listed above. MetLife took money from Ben's account, and cashed checks from 
Mr. and Mrs. Gregory Holland after Benjamin had passed away. 
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Id., at 12 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs' counsel further notes in his January 14, 2010 memo: 
"Benjamin Holland is a named insured under his own policy, as well as the motorcycle policy he 
shares with his parents ... " Id., p. 15. The real issue discussed between counsel was whether Ben 
Holland could be covered under any of the policies held in his parents' names. Id., p. 11; see also 
Aff. Mihara (Sept.), Ex. 7. 
Attorney Paukert states that on January 25, 2010 she was "continuing to research whether 
there was coverage under the "assigned driver theory." Aff Paukert,~ 8. Attorney Paukert also 
represents that she told attorney Mihara that it was her "final opinion" that there would not be 
coverage on January 25, 2010. Id. Despite Defendant's claim that it was their attorney who came 
up with the coverage theory, Ms. Paukert is actually equivocal about who came up with the idea 
- specifically noting that she could not be 100% sure of who actually came up with the coverage 
theory. Id. It is interesting to note that she does not claim to have come up with the idea in her 
affidavit, despite admittedly proffering coverage ideas back and forth with Plaintiffs' counsel 
from January 14, 2010 to January 25, 2010, Ms. Paukert "thinks" it was the adjustor who came 
up with the coverage theory. Id. Indeed, it is interesting to note that when this lawsuit was filed 
on January 26, 2010, Plaintiffs alleged that Ben Holland was the "driver assigned" to the 
motorcycle policy. See Complaint, ~ 5. It is further interesting to note that the declarations page 
of the motorcycle policy lists only one "driver assigned" -Ben Holland. Aff. Mihara (Aug.), Ex. 
2. 
Apparently, not only was Ben Holland, himself, the sole "driver assigned" to the 
motorcycle policy - it was Ben Holland who held all of the accoutrements of ownership of the 
policy: Ben Holland signed all of the policy forms and application (indeed on some of the forms 
Ben Holland's name is the only name to appear under the term "applicant"), Ben Holland elected 
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the UIM coverage amounts, and most importantly Ben Holland was the one who paid the 
coverage premium out of his own individual account. Id. Plaintiffs' attorney notes that it was 
Ben Holland who was paying the premium on the motorcycle policy. Aff. Mihara (May), Ex. 
"6." It is no wonder, that, - EUREKA! - attorney Paukert "discovered" a theory of coverage 
whereby Ben Holland was covered under the Motorcycle policy on January 27, 2010.3 The facts 
before this Court show that while attorney Mihara had the policies and declaration pages, he was 
not in possession of the same claim file material as attorney Paukert during the same time that 
attorney Paukert allegedly "discovered" a theory of coverage all by herself - but that attorney 
Mihara only received such information after this lawsuit had been filed and when Plaintiffs were 
forced to resort to the discovery process to obtain the claim file. Aff. Mihara (Aug.), 16, Ex. "4." 
Defendants attempt to discount the terms of the policy by attempting to characterize the 
documentation and explanation ofloss contained in Plaintiffs' policies as "preliminary," that to 
take Plaintiffs' approach would effectively rewrite the policy, and that such an approach would 
severely prejudice MetLife's ability to fairly address claims for fear that by requesting 
"preliminary details, documents or information" the insurer would effectively trigger the 30 day 
time limit of the statute. See Def. Opp. at 12. 
The approach advocated by Defendants weighs against the very intent of the Idaho 
legislature, as interpreted by the Idaho courts, in that the statute requires swift decisions by 
3 Please note that this day is one day after Plaintiffs' counsel alleges that he gave notice to Ms. Paukert regarding the lawsuit filed 
on January 26, 2010. Also, according to Ms. Paukert's sworn testimony, please note that January 26, 2010 is one day after 
attorney Paukert advises Plaintiffs' counsel that, "It was my final opinion that the majority of states would not find coverage. 
However, Rhode Island would, and this case had some additional factors. I believe the adjustor asked Mr. Mihara for additional 
information. I believe she asked for a copy of the motorcycle registration." See Aff. Paukert,~ 8. cf. ii 24 ("On January 27, 2010, 
I completed my coverage opinion .•. ") As a side-note, MetLife is a Rhode Island Corporation. Thus, despite Ms. Paukert' s 
assertion that she completed her coverage opinion on January 27, 2010, she represented to Plaintiffs' counsel and this Court that 
on January 25, 2010 it was her "fmal opinion" that the majority of states would not find coverage ... however ... there were some 
"additional factors." Indeed, the "final opinion" on January 25, 2010 was reached without benefit of the "motorcycle registration" 
(in fact the request received from MetLife was for the "motorcycle title") requested by MetLife on January 27, 2010. Attorney 
Paukert does not even know that agent Davis requested the title, "I believe the adjustor asked Mr. Mihara for additional 
information. I believe she asked for a copy of the motorcycle registration." Aff. Paukert, ~ 8. One would think that the attorney 
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insurers regarding coverage. See Martin, infra at 247 (citing Hansen v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 735 P.2d 974, 982 (1987)). Plaintiffs' would respond that 
the Idaho legislature intended in 1951 to modify open-ended, ambiguous terms in insurance 
contracts related to proofs of loss allowing insurers to delay payment to their insureds. See 
Penrose v. Commercial Travelers Ins. Co., 75 Idaho 524,275 P.2d 969 (1954); see also Halliday 
v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 89 Idaho 293,404 P.2d 634 (1965). The statute at issue was designed to 
force insurance companies to pay their insureds in a timely manner in an attempt to guard against 
the very shenanigans that took place in this case. See l.C. § 41-1839; see also Penrose, supra, at 
539, 978 (1954) ("The particular statute relates to insurance business carried on in this state; such 
business is affected with the public interest and the private rights of contract in relation thereto 
must be and are subjected to the valid exercise of the police power by the legislature ... "). Thus, 
the Idaho legislature intended to alter such policy terms by flexing the muscle of the implied 
police power of the state ofldaho upon insurers. Id. For this Court to accept Defendants' 
approach and let such terms operate to defeat the thirty (30),day requirement of the statute would 
not only rewrite the policy, but would effectively rewrite Idaho law. 
Defendants' approach would also effectively foreclose recovery in cases by insureds 
whose loved one had died and where the deceased was the only one to know about the existence 
of another applicable insurance contract or policy that was unknown to the surviving heirs. 
Further, Defendants' argument is undermined by the fact that it was attorney Mihara that 
raised the issue of coverage in the first place - Defendants' attorney, Ms. Paukert, would never 
even have been retained by MetLife 'but for' Plaintiffs' counsel's actions of making the 
"additional" claims. 
that had just completed a coverage opinion, and whose theory might hinge on a critical piece of documentary information would 
be able to unequivocally identify what that piece of documentary information was required. 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY,, ·· ···· 
1Nflfij~1o()FMOTIONFOR 
RECONSIDERATION-26 
,... r' * \"' • , ~ -~ • ' I , ~ :... r • 
Page 601 of 709 
Defendants' argument is compromised even more by the statute's plain terms and the 
case law surrounding the statute that requires Defendant to be the one to "discover" whether 
there is coverage or not. ldaho case law informs us that: 
"Loss" must be distinguished from liability. The insurer will determine its liability 
with the knowledge that it must be fair and accurate or suffer the consequences." 
Brinkman, 766 P.2d at 1231. {emphasis added). 
Further, in response to the Court's second fact that it relies on to find that Plaintiffs' 
proof of loss was deficient, Plaintiffs would assert that their main argument was that the thirty 
(30) day time period on the "Additional Claims" should run from either November I 0-17, 2009 
or December 7, 2009 - the dates when Defendants had the documentation to the claim and the 
date Defendants had notice of the second claim. See Plaintiffs' Reply Memo in Support of 
Plaintiffs Motion for Attorney's Fees, p. 7-9. Plaintiffs' argument was as follows: 
In any event, such purported extension is irrelevant as it is undisputed that 
Defendants had the time from November 10, 2010 to December 7, 201 O; and then 
from January 7,2010 to January 26, 2010 to work on and process Plaintiffs' 
claims; claims that all arise from the same set of facts and proof - those 
timeframes are, again, well over thirty days. 
Id. (emphasis added). There is a footnote in the document, footnote 6, that goes on to clarify this 
argument: 
It should be noted that J.C. § 41-1839 does not require a 'proof of claim' -the 
statute in question only requires 'proof of loss.' Plaintiffs would argue that their 
original proof of loss submitted to Defendants constituted sufficient notice to 
begin the time running on the other claims as well. The statute does not contain 
language that is policy specific. 
Id. at FN 6 ( emphasis added). 
As U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Pappas observed in a case eerily similar to the one at bar, to 
allow an insurance company to determine one of the elements of the statutory cause of action 
against them would be to render the applicable ldaho Code provision a ''toothless statutory 
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tiger." In re Jones, 401 B.R. 456, 466 (Br. Dist. Idaho 2009) (inteipreting Idaho law on the issue 
of the "amount justly due"). 
In short, I.C. § 41-1839(1) was enacted to prevent the very shenanigans that occurred in 
this case. 
C. The undisputed facts of this case show that application of the statute is 
appropriate, as a matter of Jaw, for at least the "initia]" claim. 
Given Defendants opposition and the issues raised therein, the next issue for this Court to 
consider is whether the undisputed facts of this case, as noted by this Court and as argued and 
admitted by Defendants overcome the Court's concerns and warrant application of the statute. 
The applicable statute reads: 
Any insurer issuing any policy ... which shall fail for a period of thirty (30) days 
after pi:oof of loss has been furnished as provided in such policy ... to pay to the 
person entitled thereto the amount justly due under such policy ... shall in any 
action thereafter brought against the insurer in any court in this state ... for 
recovery under the terms of the policy ... oo such further amount as the court 
shall adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees in such action ... 
LC.§ 41-1839(1) (emphasis added). 
Defendants cite In re Jones for a lengthy discussion on Judge Pappas' analysis of 
Brinkman. As mentioned above, Defendants overlook the fact that Judge Pappas found, as a 
matter of law, that the UIM plaintiff had submitted adequate proof of insurance when she 
submitted the details of her accident, her medical bills, and that the adverse driver's insurance 
company was tendering its limits of liability coverage. In re Jones, supra, at 465-466. Those 
facts establish prima-facia elements of a cause of action for under-insured motorist coverage. 
Idaho law states that an insured cannot be forced by a policy to produce more than what would 
constitute a prima facia case for recovery. In re Death of Cole, supra at I 00-101; see also 
Brinkman, supra at 349 . 
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Again, as observed in In re Jones, if allowed, an insurer could simply decline to agree 
with its insured about the amowit justly due, or as in this case, quibble with their insureds over 
whether policy coverage is applicable, and then argue that lacking such an agreement, the 
statutory payment deadline did not operate. Id. 
In this case MetLife is attempting to take the teeth out of the statute by simply arguing 
that it did not have enough information for its attorney to come to a coverage decision ... and by 
virtue of their asking for more information aJ ~ later time, and after a complaint had been filed, 
the statutory payment deadline did not operate. 
In this case, Plaintiffs provided Defendants all the details of the accident, including the 
driver's and passengers' names, the fact of the death of the insured, the location of the accident, 
the adverse driver's insurance information, witness names and contact information verbally on or 
about November 10, 2009, and then again in writing on November 17, 2009. Aff K. Mihara 
(May), Exs. 3 and 4. In this case, like in Jones, Defendant never disputed that Plaintiff's total 
damages would exceed the liability limits of either the adverse driver's policy, or the named 
insured's Ben Holland's policy. See Aff. Davis; see also Aff. Paukert; see also Aff. Mihara. The 
only amounts of damages ever discussed between the parties were the policy limits of the 
applicable policies. Id. Indeed, it was the policy limits under the motorcycle policy, a policy with 
a higher limit that MetLife ended up offering to settle the case for. Aff. Paukert, Ex. I. 
In this case, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs had given Defendants enough information and 
"proof of loss" in their November I 0, 2009 and November I 7. 2009 submissions so that 
Defendants were able to come to a conclusion and feel comfortable to discuss offering policy 
limits of $50,000 on the "Initial Claim" to Plaintiffs. See Memorandum Decision and Order; see 
also Aff. K. Paukert; see also Aff. D. Davis, ,i 3. It is widisputed that the "Initial Claim" was 
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assigned a claim number of FRD 3731 O. Jd. It is undisputed that MetLife needed no further time, 
nor further information to discuss with attorney Mihara on December 7, 2009 about whether the 
matter could be concluded with MetLife paying applicable limits. Id. Thus, MetLife had ample 
time and information to -investigate at least the "initial" claim and determine its rights and 
obligations to the insured. 
It is undisputed that MetLife finally issued payment for claim number FRD 3 7310 in the 
amount of $50,000 on February 9, 2010. See Supp. Aff. Davis, Ex. "A," (bates 00137); see also 
Aff. Mihara (May), Ex. "15." It is further undisputed that MetLife did not tender the February 9, 
2010 check in payment of the $50,000 due under the "initial claim" until February 12, 2010. See 
Aff. Mihara (May), Ex. "14." Those are the facts of the record, and those facts have never been 
in dispute. 
Indeed, the best evidence of this comes from Defendants' adjustor Daneice Davis. Aff. 
Davis,~ 3. As of December 7, 2009, MetLife knew that it owed Plaintiffs at least $50,000 and 
had discussed the same with Plaintiffs' counsel. Id. The evidence in the record is reflected by 
Ms. Davis' statement: 
I initially worked on Claim No. FRD 3 7310, which was a claim under which 
Benjamin Holland was the named insured on an auto policy. Notice of this claim 
was submitted on or around November 10, 2009. I communicated with attorney, 
Kinzo Mihara, concerning the material I needed to process the claim. On 
December 7, 2009, I had a telephone conversation with Mr. Mihara. I told him 
that I believed we could concluded (sic) Claim No. FRD 37310 with MetLife 
payjng policy limits. After conveying this information, Mr. Mihara advised me 
that the matter could not be concluded because he had decided to make claims 
against two policies in which Mr. Holland's parents were the named insured ... 
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, obviously, by December 7, 2009, MetLife had enough "proof of 
loss" to be able to conclude the "initial claim." More importantly, despite the characterization of 
the conversation memorialized by Ms. Davis' affidavit, Defendants attempt to characterize the 
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December 7, 2009 telephonic exchange between their agent and attorney Mihara as an "offer" or 
a '"tender." The testimony contained in Ms. Davis' affidavit supports neither of those 
characterizations. The claim file document also does not support the fact that MetLife ever made 
a tender on December 7. 2009: " ... we are about to tender ins policy limits ... " Aff. Mihara 
(Sept.), Ex. 7 at bates 00129. Indeed, this Court's order found that to be a fact. See Memo 
Decision and Order, p. 11. ("As such, there was no tender on December 7, 2009"). Indeed, the 
undisputed facts of this case show that MetLife made neither an "offer" nor a "tender," and 
definitely not "payment" as required by I.C. § 41-1839(1) on December 7, 2009. 
At best, the evidence in the record reflects an acknowledgement by an agent of MetLife 
that the damages in the case were of at least $50,000 - and possibly more depending on the other 
two claims. 
Indeed, Plaintiffs requested payment from MetLife of uncontested amounts prior to filing 
the lawsuit. Aff. Mihara, Ex. "6," p. 1 ("Should MetLife contest a portion of coverage, please 
forward the amounts uncontested to my care at the address above with the checks made payable 
to: The Estate of Benjamin Holland."). 
Given the foregoing, the undisputed facts of this case show that (1) Plaintiffs submitted 
an adequate "proof of loss" on November 10 and 17, 2009 - enough so that the insurer was 
comfortable in discussing tendering limits under at least one policy on December 7, 2009,4 (2) at 
least thirty days elapsed from the time the "proof of loss" was given and the date that the money 
was paid - on February 12. 2010. Id. There was payment due under one proof of loss, for one 
claim, under one policy. Indeed, the plain language of the statute requires that the insurer "pay" 
4 
All three claims, under all three policies of insurance, were all governed by the terms of same form insurance policy. Aff. 
Mihara (Aug), Exs. I and 2. Thus, intuitively, proof of loss under one policy should be equal to the proof of loss required by the 
other policies . 
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the amount justly due - not just tender or offer to tender - the amount ''justly due'' must be paid. 
LC.§ 41-1839(1). 
This Court's concerns that (1) this case was a "moving target," (2) that Plaintiffs' did not 
cite law for the contention that multiple claims under multiple policies can be aggregated, and (3) 
that it was attorney Paukert that "discovered" the theory of recovery based solely on her own 
research appear to be directed solely at Plaintiffs' entitlement under the "additional claims." 
However, those concerns do not detract from the fact that Defendants failed to pay on the "initial 
claim" after receiving adequate "proof of loss" for a period of over thirty days. 
Actually, Defendants have still not expounded upon which information was lacking and 
how it was relevant to their coverage decision. The undisputed fact is that the only piece of 
additional documentation requested from MetLife was the title to Benjamin Holland's 
motorcycle - requested one day after the lawsuit had been filed. See Aff. Paukert, 18, p.3; see 
also Aff. Davis (May),~ 7, p. 4. 
Indeed, it is interesting to note that Ms. Paukert's sworn testimony is that she finalized 
her coverage decision on January 27, 2010. The undisputed facts further show that MetLife, 
through Ms. Davis, did not have a legible copy of the motorcycle title until January 28, 2010 -
thus proving that the additional "necessary" information requested had absolutely no impact 
upon counsel's "discovery" of the theory ofrecovery. See Aff.. Paukert,~ 24, p. 3; see also Aff. 
Davis (May), 1 11; see also Aff. Mihara (May), Exs. "11" and "12." The transmission stamp of 
the facsimile machine at the top of MetLife agent Davis' letter clearly shows that the letter was 
transmitted to Plaintiffs' attorney on January 28, 2010. Jd. Ms. Davis' letter memorializes the 
fact that the copy of the motorcycle title sent on January 27, 2010 was not legible and that 
MetLife was requesting a "legible" copy. Id. Ms. Davis' letter says nothing regarding the 
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legibility of the cover letter that accompanied the copy of the motorcycle title that she 
acknowledges receiving.5 Id., Ex. "11." Indeed, Defendants' adjustor acknowledges the concerns 
that Plaintiffs' attorney raises in his January 27, 2010 letter regarding MetLife's timing and even 
goes so far to thank Plaintiffs' counsel for his patience and cooperation. Id. ("In response to your 
concerns of the time in providing you with an answer regarding coverage, please be advised that 
we are diligently working to address any and all coverage issues as promptly as possible, and we 
will be in contact as soon as all issues have been addressed ... Thank you for your patience and 
cooperation in this matter.") 
Indeed, the undisputed evidence in the record and the evidence offered by Defendants 
shows that attorney Paukert's coverage opinion to MetLife was complete on January 27, 2010 
before MetLife was in receipt of the additional information requested on January 28. 2010. This 
undisputed fact, placed in the record by MetLife's attorney and agent-adjustor, cuts directly 
against Defendants' assertion that additional information was necessary. 
D. The Idaho judicial rules of interpretation require the Court to construe the Joint 
Motion and Stipulated Order against MetLife, the plain wording of the Court's 
Order did not dismiss either the factual allegations, nor any portion of the 
complaint, the I.R.C.P. actually requires factually allegations to be plead in support 
of a demand for relief. 
The issue is whether the Court's March 3, 2010 order dismissed all of the factual 
averments upon which Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees under LC. § 41-1839 is based. 
5 
Defendants are adamant that they did not receive notice of the lawsuit until after the February 2 and 3, 2010 email exchanges 
between counsel. Plaintiffs are adamant that their counsel sent notice to Defendants; telephonically to their attorney on January 
26, 2010, the day the lawsuit was filed, and in writing to their adjustor on January 27, 2010, one day thereafter. Plaintiffs have 
submitted a letter along with facsimile confinnation of delivery of the same of the facsimile sent by Plaintiffs attorney to 
Defendants' adjustor, Daneice Davis on January 27, 20 l 0. Aff. Mihara (May), Ex. l 0. Defendant's adjuster only complains that 
only the motorcycle title is illegible. Id., Ex. "11." Indeed, Defendants' adjustor acknowledges the Plaintiffs' complaint regarding 
MetLife's timing and thanks Plaintiffs' counsel for his patience and cooperation. Id. Plaintiffs have also submitted redacted 
versions of their attorney's telephone records showing three separate calls to Defendants' attorney's office on January 26, 2010 at 
2:05pm, 2:55pm, and 4:35pm on that day. Id., Ex. 22. The Complaint in this case was filed on January 26, 2010 at 12:41pm. See 
Complaint. 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY·-,·.·· · · ···· -- , 
IN ~Vf~-Q~ ~F MOTION FOR 
RE(:('.>Wsit>'E'.RATION-33 Page 608 of 709 
Upon further research and reflection in response to Defendants' opposition, Plaintiffs 
would cite the Court to Straub v. Smith - cited by this Court in its memorandum decision and 
order. In regards to the interpretation of stipulations, the Court in Straub set forth the applicable 
law: 
A stipulation is a contract, and we will apply contractual principles of 
interpretation when reviewing a stipulation. Maroun v. Wyreless Sys., Inc., 141 
Idaho 604,611, 114 P.3d 974,981 (2005); Win of Michigan, Inc. v. Yreka United, 
Inc., 137 Idaho 747, 750-51, 53 P.3d 330, 333-34 (2002). "The determination and 
legal effect of a contractual provision is a question of law." Maroun, 141 Idaho at 
611, 114 P.3d at 981. Our primary objective when interpreting a contract is to 
discover the mutual intent of the parties at the time the contract is made. 
Opportunity, L.L.C. v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602,607, 38 P.3d 1258, 1263 
(2002). "If possible, the intent of the parties should be ascertained from the 
language of the agreement as the best indication of their intent." Id. We construe 
the contract against the person who prepared the contract. Win of Michigan, Inc., 
137 Idaho at 751, 53 P.3d at 334. · 
See Straub v. Smith, 175 P.3d 754, 758 (2007). 
Indeed, in Opportunity cited by Straub, this Court was upheld by the Idaho Supreme 
Court. The Supreme Court ofldaho noted in Opportunity: 
The primary aim in interpretation of all contracts is to ascertain the mutual intent 
of the parties at the time the contract was made. Rutter v. McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 
292,612 P.2d 135 (1980). If possible, the intent of the parties should be 
ascertained from the language of the agreement as the best indication of their 
intent. E.g. Suchan v. Suchan, 106 Idaho 654,660, 682 P.2d 607, 613 (1984). 
Where the parties' intent cannot be understood from the language employed in the 
writing, intent becomes a question of fact to be determined in light of extrinsic 
evidence. Id. Further, when the purpose or objective of the parties is ascertainable, 
the trier of fact may accord it great weight. Id. 
Opportunity, L.L.C. v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 607, 38 P.3d 1258, 1263 (Idaho 2002). 
Indeed, Idaho law requires that causes of action plead by a party are supported by factual 
averment in that party's pleadings. See I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l); see also Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 
715 P.2d 993 (1986). The purpose of pleading is to give the adverse party notice of the claims 
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against it and an opportunity to defend the case. Villa Highlands, LLC v. Western Community 
Ins. Co., 148 Idaho 598,226 P.3d 540 (Idaho 2010). 
In this case, the language of the stipulation and order makes is crystal clear and explicit 
that the claim made in Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees under LC.§ 41-1839 survived the 
dismissal of the underlying claims. See Joint Stipulation and Order; see also Memorandum 
Decision and Order, p. 20. Please note that factual allegations in Plaintiffs' complaint were plead 
to support the factual requirements to entitlement to relief under LC.§ 41-1839(1). 
Further, in this case, it was Defendants' attorney that prepared the joint stipulation and 
order. See Aff. Mihara (Sept.), Ex. 3. The terms "averments" and "allegations" are conspicuously 
absent from both the stipuJation and order. See Joint Stipulation and Order. Further, the term 
"complaint" is_also conspicuously absent. Id. This Court's interpretation of the stipulation and 
order uses the term, "averments," and the phrase, "(i]n effect all of the Complaint was 
dismissed" to support this Court's ruling to dispose of Plaintiffs' arguments. See Memorandum 
Decision and Order, p. 20-21. ("[T]herefore, no averments in the Complaint, even if deemed 
true, remain before the Court. In effect, all of the complaint was dismissed with prejudice on 
February 3, 2010, and Hollands' are not entitled to judgment as a matter ofJaw on this issue.'1 
Plaintiffs would respectfully submit that it would be contrary to the rules of construction 
found in Idaho law for this Court to read specific words and phrases into a stipulation and order 
that were not contained in that document - especially if that document was prepared by the 
opposing party's counsel. Indeed, Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Attorney's 
Fees expressly cites to the complaint. 
Even under the relaxed standards of pleading, it is anti-intuitive whereby a Court would 
enter and order specifically reserving a claim, based on a stipulation that specifically reserved 
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that claim, while at the same time dismissing the factual allegations upon which that that claim is 
based- specifically if both the stipulation and order are silent to any terms such as "factual 
allegations" or "averments." 
E. The Court's memorandum decision and order did not dispose of Plaintiffs' 
timeliness argument regarding waiver by Defendants for failing to object to 
Plaintiffs' motion in a timely manner. 
For the sake of brevity, Plaintiffs incorporate their argument and the facts in support 
thereof from Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees 
Pursuant to LC.§ 41-1839, § ILG. "Defendants have waived any and all objection to Plaintiffs' 
entitlement to attorney's fees along with the amount claimed by failing to timely object." 
Plaintiffs would note thatl.R.C.P. 54(e)(6) requires any objection to the allowance of attorney's 
fees to be made within 14 days. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(6). The case law explaining this rule sets forth 
that the rule applies both pre and post-judgment therefore disposing of Defendants' lone 
argument that the applicable rule applies only post-judgment. See Crowley v. Lafayette Life Ins. 
Co., 106 Idaho 818 (1984). If not objected to, such objection is waived. Id. 
Plaintiffs noted this issue in their motion for reconsideration. See Mot. Reconsideration, 
p. 19. Defendants did not address this issue in their opposition. 
This is merely an attempt by Plaintiffs to make their record and this argument section is 
not expounded for the sake of brevity. 
F. An alleged failure of Plaintiffs to submit an alleged deficient proof of loss has no 
impact upon a settlement agreement. 
As this Court has noted, a settlement agreement is a new contract settling an old dispute. 
See Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 22 (citing Wilson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535,347 P.2d 
341 (1959). The Court goes on in a lengthy legal analysis of the law and the facts of this case 
regarding what is necessary to constitute an enforceable agreement between two parties and 
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whether such and agreement had been reached in this case. Id., pp. 22-28. The Court observed 
that the alleged contract could not be enforced under either a contract interpretation or waiver 
analysis. Id. at 26. Indeed, the Court concludes that there are questions of material fact 
surrounding the formation of the settlement agreement. Id. at 28. 
The Court, however, goes on to hold, that because of the three concerns that the Court 
had (moving target with multiple claims under multiple policies, failure of plaintiffs to cite law 
for timing argument, and attorney Paukert' s alleged discovery of the theory of recovery), 
Plaintiffs failed to submit a proper proof of loss under the Brinkman - Greenough standard. Id. at 
32. The Court goes on to expound that because of those three reasons, Plaintiffs did not submit 
an adequate proof of loss, as a matter of law, and thus did not satisfy that requirement under the 
applicable statute. Id. 
The Court's memorandum opinion does not explain how its three concerns, or even how 
the failure of a statutory condition is enough to overcome the formation issues or how such is 
even relevant to a contractual inquiry. 
Plaintiffs would respectfully request that this Court clarify how the failure of a statutory 
prerequisite is relevant to a contractual formation analysis. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, given the foregoing, this Court should dispose of Defendants' arguments 
by reconsidering its previous memorandum and order and for either granting Plaintiffs' requested 
relief, or for setting this matter for status conference so that the parties can begin discovery to 
work out any remaining questions of material fact that remain before this Court. 
Respectfully submitted this 2'i ~ay of September, 2010. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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State of Idaho ) 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
COMES NOW, Kinzo H. Mihara, after being duly sworn before an officer authorized to 
administer oaths, swears and declares as follows: 
1) My name is Kinzo H. Mihara. I am an attorney duly authorized to practice law in 
the state of Idaho. I am competent to testify to matters herein. 
2) I represent Plaintiffs' herein. 
3) On or about January 28, 2010 I received a letter from MetLife agent, Daneice 
Davis. Ms. Davis requested that I send her a legible copy of the motorcycle title I 
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sent to her on January 27, 2010. Due to the nature of the sensitive nature of the 
document, I attached a scanned copy to an email and sent the document via email 
to Daneice Davis. Attached hereto as Exhibit "1" is a true, accurate, and correct 
copy of the email I sent to Ms. Davis on January 28, 2010 reflecting the 
attachment and the text of the transmission. 
4) On February 2, 2010 I had a telephone conversation with attorney Kathleen 
Paukert. During this conversation I requested that Ms. Paukert send any offer she 
wished to convey on behalf of MetLife via email. I made my request because Ms. 
Paukert had previously represented to me that she did not have any authority to 
represent MetLife in settlement negotiations. Attached hereto as Exhibit "2" is a 
true, accurate, and correct copy of the email that I sent to attorney Paukert on 
February 2, 2010 following the telephone call identified in this paragraph. 
5) On or about February 22, 2010, attorney William Schroeder forwarded me a draft 
copy of the Joint Memorandum and Stipulated Order filed in this case. Mr. 
Schroeder was the attorney who prepared the document. I signed the document 
forwarded by Mr. Schroeder on January 26,2010 and returned the document to 
his office via facsimile the same day. A true, accurate, and correct copy of Mr. 
Schroeder's January 22, 2010 email transmitting the document to me is attached 
to this affidavit as Exhibit "3." 
6) On or about May 9, 2010, I received a copy of Defendants' supplemental 
discovery responses to Plaintiffs' discovery requests from Defendants' attorney, 
William Schroeder. Attached hereto as Exhibit "4" is a true, accurate, and correct 
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copy of the discovery responses that I received from Defendants' attorney on or 
about May 9, 2010. 
7) On or about May 25, 2010, I received a copy of Defendants' discovery responses 
to Plaintiffs' second discovery requests from Defendants' attorney, William 
Schroeder. Attached hereto as Exhibit "5" is a true, accurate, and correct copy of 
the discovery requests that I received from Defendants' attorney on or about May 
25, 2010. 
8) On or about May 25, 2010, I received a copy of Defendants' privilege log in 
relation to the documents that Defendants' had produced in response to Plaintiffs' 
discovery requests. Attached hereto as Exhibit "6" is a true, accurate, and correct 
copy of the privilege log that I received from Defendants' attorney, William 
Schroeder. 
9) On or about May 9, 2010 I received documents 00001 to 00363 from Defendants' 
attorney William Schroeder in response to Plaintiffs' request for production of 
Documents number two. Attached hereto as Exhibit "7" are true, accurate, and 
correct copies of documents, bates 00126 to 00131. 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. -ft 
Respectfully submitted this z,'{ day of Septemb~d.li 
Kii/zoH.Mi ara 
Subscribed and sworn before me thiso?~ay of September, 2010. 
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My commission expires: /..1,L ~ 
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Kinzo Mihara fkmihara@indian-law.org] 
Thursday, January 28, 2010 10:03AM 
'ddavis8@metlife.com' 
RE: Holland FRD37313 
Attachments: 100127.Title.Motorcycle.Holland Benjamin C.pdf 
Daneice: 
-~-----~----------~-------------------
Attached please see the title you referenced in your correspondence dated January 27, 2010. I will 
represent to you that I have received said correspondence on January 28, 2010. Attached please find an 
electronic copy of the same document faxed to you yesterday. I will represent to you that I hava a legal 
extern in my office from the University of Idaho College of Law that has viewed the attachment and can 
discern the writing thereon. I hope that this allays any concern regarding the legibility of the document. 
Should you continue to have legibility concerns, please advise and I will fmward a hard-copy to you via 
USPS. Your insureds await Metlife's decision to pay them amounts justly due under their policies. 
I thank you for your prompt attention to this malter. 
Regards, 
Kinzo H. Mihara 
From: ddavis8@metllfe.com [mallto:ddavis8@metilfe.com] 
Sent: Thursday, January 21, 2010 8:38 AM 
To: kmlhara@lndian-law.org 
Subject: Fw: Holland FRD37313 
Daneice Davis 
Senior Claims Representative 
80D-854-BD11 Ext. 6456 
Fax: 866-947-4204 
--- Forwarded by Oaneice Dav1e/MpdMell..i1e/US oo 01/21/2010 10:37 AM -
Danelce Davls/MpclMetUfelUS 
To kpaukert@~-lBW.co/Tl 
0112V1010 OB:55 AM 
Subjed Fw Holland FR03731J 
This is is the last of the certified policies. Holland -FRD37313 This is the Named lnsured's own policy. 
The one we were ready to pay on. Please confirm receipt of this. Thanks 
Daneice Davis 
Senior Claims Representative 
800-854-6D11 Ext. 6456 
Fax: 866-947-4204 
- FoN,a1ded by Daneice DavisJMpdMr:tLifBJ\JS on 01/21/2010 08:53 AM --
Kathy Rlcharda/Mpd'Metl..Jfll!/US 
01f21J2010 OB:45 AM 
Auto- 023-43-3898-0 
Insured- Benjamin Holland 
DOL· 10-25-09 
Attached is the cert dee and policy. 
Thanks, 
Kathy Richards 
To Daneice Dalli!l'M~atUfe/US@MetU1e 
SubjEd Holland FRD37J13 
This communication contains CONFIDENTIAL information and may be subject to legal privileges. It is 
intended only for the use of the named recipient above. Any use, distribution. or duplication Df the 
information contained herein by other than the intended recipient is strictly prohibited. If you have 
recieved lhis communication in error, please notify the sender immediately. 
The infonnation contained in this message may be CONFIDENTIAL and is for the i 
38157-2010 
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Kinzo Mihara 
From: Kinzo Mihara [kmihara@indian-law.org] 
Sent: Tuesday, February 02, 2010 12:33 PIVI 
To: 'Kathy Paukert' 
Subject: RE: Holland 
Please send me a written offer as discussed over the telephone. Regards, Kinzo 
From: Kathy Paukert [mailto:kpaukert@pt-law.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, February 02, 2010 12:07 PM 
To: Kinzo Mihara 
Subject: Holland 
Hi Kinzo: 
Could you please call me at your earliest convenience I have an offer. 
Kathleen H. Paukert 
Attorney at Law 
l:.1 PA :u f. t~ lJ TR O P P NJ:N_H"" 
t J •· y ·f J I 
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,_S,oo.i,u. n:.~ , ,_:uw .. :zJ_J..1~.!~i.C ..... ~-,..;~u·-~~,1:1~T.11,: ..... t,:m 
-----------·----·----
The information contained in this e-mail message is intended only for the personal and confidential use of 
the recipient(s) named above. This message may be an attorney-client communication and/or work 
product and as such is privileged and confidential. lf the reader of this message is not the intended 
recipient or an agent responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you 
have received this document in error and that any review, dissemination, distribution, or copying of this 
message is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error, please notify us 
immediately by e-mail, and delete the original message. 
38157-2010 
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William J. Schroeder [william.schroeder@painehamblen.com] 
Monday, February 22, 2010 3:02 PM 
Kinzo Mihara 
Subject: Holland Estate - Revised Draft Joint Motion 
Attachments: DISMISS - JOINT MOTION AND ORDER (00785315).DOC 
Kinzo -
Attached is a revised draft of the Joint Motion and Stipulated Order to Dismiss All Claims Except for the 
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William J. Schroeder, ISB No. 6674 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 
P. 0. BoxE 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328 
Telephone: (208-664-8115 
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338 
Mailing Address: 
717 West Sprague A venue, Suite 1200 
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
Attorney for Defendants 
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Defendants supplemental tJ1eir responses to Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories and Requests 
for Production of Documents to Defendants as follows: 
DEFENDANTS' FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL 
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST 
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS 
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCIBvIBNTS 
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IV. REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Request for Production of Documents No. 1: Please produce a true, accurate, and 
admissib]e complete, unredacted copy of correspondence between Plaintiffs and Defendants and 
between Defendants and any second or third parties in this matter. 
Response: Obiection: Correspondence between PJaintiffs and Defendants is in 
PJaintiffs' possession. Without waiving the objection, Defendants' 
c1aim file, redacted for attorney-client privilege, will be provided. 
Supp]ementa] Response: 
Defendants' claim fi]es (Bates Nos. 00001 - 00363) are attached. 
Attorney-dient priviJege information is not being provided. A 
Privi]ege Log wil1 be prepared and provided. 
Request for Production of Documents No. 2: Please produce a true, accurate, and 
admissible complete, unredacted copy of Defendants' claim file in this matter. 
Response: Objection: To the extent Plaintiffs seek attorney-client 
communications, an objection is hereby made. Without waiving the 
objection, Defendants' claim fiJe, with attorney-client communications 
redacted, wi11 be provided. 
Supplemental Response: 
Defendants' claim fiJes (Bates Nos. 00001 - 00363) are attached. 
Attorney-client privilege information is not being provided. A 
PriviJege Log wil1 be prepared and provided. 
DEFENDANTS' FIRST SUPPLElVlENT AL 
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST 
INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS 
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
TO DEFENDANTS - 2 
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I certify the responses in accordance with Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 26(f). 
DATED this _J.__ day of May, 2010. 
DEFENDANTS' FIRST SUPPLEMENT AL 
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST 
INTERROGATORlES AND REQUESTS 
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
TO DEFENDANTS - 3 
38157-2010 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
William J. cbroeder, ISB No. 6674 
PatrickE. Miner, ISB No.1771 
Attorney for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this )0-4,,1-. day of May, 2010, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL 
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR 
PRODUCTION OF DOCUlVIENTS TO DEFENDANTS to the following: 
Kinzo H. Mihara 
Attorney at Law 
424 Shennan A venue, Suite 308 








DEFENDANfS' FIRST SUPPLEMENTAL 
RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFFS' FIRST 
INTERROGATORJES AND REQUESTS 
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
TO DEFENDANTS - 4 
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Debbie Miller 
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William J. Schroeder, ISB No. 6674 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 
P. 0.BoxE 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328 
Telephone: (208-664-8115 
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338 
Mailing Address: 
717 West Sprague Avenue, Suite 1200 
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
Attorney for Defendants 
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TO: DEFENDANTS and their attorney of record, William J. Schroeder, Esq., Paine 
Hamblen, LLP 
Please answer these discovery requests in the time-frames aliowed under Idaho iaw. 
I. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS AND DEFINITIONS 
Please let the General Instructions and Definitions contained in Plaintiffs' First 
Request for Discovery to Defendants, such instructions and definitions are hereby 
incorporated herein to control these requests. 
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
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II. REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
Request for Admission No. 28: Please admit that attorney Kinzo H. Mihara called attorney 
Katherine Paukert, Esq. on January 26, 2010 to advise Ms. Paukert regarding the filing of the 
above captioned lawsuit. 
Response: Denied 
Request for Admission No. 29: Please admit that attorney Kinzo H. Mihara sent an email to 
attorney Katherine Paukert, Esq. on January 26, 2010 to advise Ms. Paukert regarding the 
filing on the above captioned lawsuit. 
Response: Denied. The e-mail Mr. Mihara produced does not state that a 
Jawsuit had been fi]ed. 
Request for Admission No. 30: Please admit that attorney Kinzo H. Mihara asked Katherine 
Paukert, Esq. whether she had authority to extend the offer made on February 2, 2010. 
Response: Defendants cannot admit nor deny as Ms. Paukert does not recall 
such a conversation. 
Request for Admission No. 31: Please admit that prior to February 2, 2010, Katherine 
Paukert, Esq. denied authority to act on behalf of Defendants. 
Response: Defendants cannot admit nor deny as Ms. Paukert does not recall 
such a conversation. 
Request for Admission No. 32: Please admit that counsel for Defendants, William J. 
Schroeder, Esq., authorized via email, Kinzo H. Mihara to distribute the settlement proceeds 
to Plaintiffs herein once Plaintiffs executed Attachment "A" to Defendants Answer in the 
above captioned matter. 
Response: Admit 
Request for Admission No. 33: Please admit that the settlement draft in this matter in the 
amount of $50,000 references claim number FRD373130. 
Response: Admit 
PlADITIFFS' SECOND REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
TO DEFENDANTS [AND RESPONSES THERETO] · 2 
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Request for Admission No. 34: Please admit that the settlement draft in this matter in the 
amount of $150,000 references claim number FRD40837D. 
Response: Admit 
III. INTERROGATORIES 
Interrogatory No. 8: Please state the method of transmittal of authority from Defendants to 
Katherine Paukert, Esq. to make the February 2, 2010 offer. 
Answer: A telephone call. 
Interrogatory No. 9: Please state the compensation arrangements between Defendants and 
attorneys who handle Defendants' subrogation cases. 
Answer: Objection: The documents are not relevant and wiU not lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence. 
Interrogatory No. 10: Please state the name of all witnesses that Defendants will call at the 
bearing on June 2, 2010. 
Answer: It is Defendants' understanding that the hearing on June 2, 2010 is 
based on Affidavits and arguments. The Affidavits have been 
provided. 
Interrogatory No. 11: Please state all LR.C.P. Rule 26 information in regards to any expert 
witness that Defendants may call to testify at the hearing set for June 2, 2010. 
Answer: No expert witness is being called. 
IV. REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Request for Production No. 8: Please produce the instrument purporting to give Katherine 
Paukert, Esq. the authority to make the February 2, 2010 offer. 
Response: No document exists. The authorization was by telephone. 
PLAINTIFFS' SECO:ND REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
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Request for Production No. 9: Please produce any written instruments purporting to be 
attorney fee agreements between Defendants and their attorneys. 
Response: Objection: The documents are not relevant and will not lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence. 
Request for Production No. 10: Plense produce all documents that Defendants intend to 
attempt to introduce into evidence at the hearing set for June 2, 2010. 
Response: The documents will be filed with the Court as part of Defendants' 
responsive pleadings. 
Request for Production No. 11: Please produce all I.R.C.P. Rule 26 Materials in regards to 
any expert witnesses that may testify at the hearing set for June 2, 2010. · 
Response: Not applicable. No expert witness is being called at the June 2, 2010 
hearing. 
DATED this ,:2 ~y of May, 2010. 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
By~#~~ 
William.Schroeder, ISB No. 6674 
Patrick E. Miller, ISB No. 1771 
Attorney for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY thnt on this Q-5~\.... day of May, 2010, l caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFSt SECOND REQUEST FOR 
DISCOVERY TO DEFENDANTS [AND RESPONSES THERETO], to the following: 
!Gnzo H. Mihara 
Attorney at Law 
424 Sherman Avenue, Suite 308 
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EXHIBIT "6" 
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The Estate of Benjamin Holland, et al. v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company, et al. 
DEFENDANTS' PRIVILEGE LOG 
DATE AUTHOR RECIPIENT COPIED SUBJECT DOCUMENT PRIVILEGE 
RECIPIENT TITLE CLAIM 
1/8/2010 Daneice Davis MetLife Claim Coverage opinion Claim File Attorney-Client 
File retention Notes and Work 
Product 
1/27/2010 Kathleen H. Deneice [sic] Coverage opinion Letter Attorney-Client 
Paukert Davis and Work 
Product 
1/27/2010 Deborah Schultz Daneice Davis Kathy Paukert Coverage Opinion Letter E-mail Attorney-Client 
and Work 
Product 
1/27/2010 David Hardy MetLife Claim Coverage opinion Claim Adjuster Attorney-Client 
File Notes and Work 
Product 
1/29/2010 l Daneice Davis MetLife Claim Coverage opinion Claim Adjuster Attorney-Client 
File Notes and Work 
Product 
2/2/2010 Daneice Davis Kathy Paukert Settlement E-mail Attorney-Client 
and Work 
Product 
2/2/2010 KathleenH. Daniece Davis Settlement E-mail Attorney-Client 
Paukert and Work 
Product 
2/2/2010 Daneice Davis Kathy Paukert David Hardy Settlement E-mail Attorney-Client 
Marilyn Shick and Work 
Product 
2/5/2010 Kathleen H. Dave Hardy Case Status E-mail Attorney-Client 
Paukert and Work 
Product 
2/6/2010 Kathleen H. Dave Hardy Coverage E-mail Attorney-Client 
Paukert and Work 
I Product 
1 
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The Estate of Benjamin Holland, et al. v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company, et al. 
DEFENDANTS' PRIVILEGE LOG 
DATE AUTHOR RECIPIENT COPIED SUBJECT DOCUMENT PRIVILEGE 
RECIPIENT TITLE CLAIM 
2/8/2010 KathleenH. Daneice Davis January 2010 Billing Letter Attorney-Client 
Paukert Statement and Work 
Product 
2/8/2010 KathleenH. Daneice Davis Paukert & Troppmann, January 2010 Attorney-Client 
Paukert PLLC January 2010 Billing and Work 
Billing Statement Statement Product 
l:\Sp:u!oa\00199\00!SJIDISC\008l l lli7.00C 
2 
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EXHIBIT "7" 
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Clnim Number: FRD408370, Date/time: 12/7/2009 2:23 pm, Author: Wenger FRIAT, M, 
Keyword(s): New Claim 
Cross Reference: FRDJ 73 13 
Claim Number: FRD408370, Dnte/time: 12/7/2009 2:23 pm, Author: Wenger FRIAT, M, 
Keyword(s): Handler Alerl 
YX Freep01t YX has been assigned ns the _AIU Adjuster handler for Lhis claim. 
Claim Number: FRD~08370, Dnte/time: 12/7/2009 2:32 pm, Author: Knoph, J, Keyword(s): 
Handler Ale1i 
LaRae Hill has been assigned as the AIU Adjusler handler for this claim. 
Claim Number: FRD408370, Date/time: 12/7/2009 2:53 pm, Author: Wolman, l, Keyword(s): 
Handler Alert 
Daneice Davis has been assigned as the Casualty - Auto handler for this claim. 
Claim Number: FRD408370, Date/time: 12/7/2009 2:53 pm, Autl10r: System,, Keyword(s): New 
Claim · 
New Casually Claim 
Claim Number: FRD4D8370, Date/time: 12/7/2009 2:54 pm, Author: Wolman, l, Keyword(s): 
Sup/Mgr Rev 
This is a companion claim to one that Daneice Dirvis is already handling. 
38157-2010 
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Claim Number: FRD4D8370, Date/time: 12/8/2009 9: 12 am, Author: Davis, D, Keyword(s): 
Coverage, Loss Info 
Orgin Dnte : 8/7/2001 
No concurrent issues 
Policy Tenn: 9/24/2009 - 9/24/2010 
Loss Date: I 0/25/2009 
Listed Drivers: 
Greg Holland 7/16/1955 
Kathy Holland 3/30/1957 
Benjamin Holland l 0/i 3/1986 
2005 Suzuki GSXR-60 
Coverage: Metropolitan Property and Cr:1sualty Company 
Motorcycle Policy 






Loss Reported: NI was passenger in non owned vehicle fatality. 
There are other claims set up: 
NJ Auto Policy: FRD373 l 3 
Parent's Auto Policy: FRD40844 
Contact has been made with attorney on cross refemece files. 
Reserves: ON this file: lam setting a table AUB reserve as 
Allstate the car the NI was a passenger in has $50/l 00 Limt 
Metlife Auto Policy for Benjamin Holland has 100/300 Limit 
Parents Policy: FRD40844 - $250/500 
On this file 1 am completing an ROR for Residency Issues 
Need R/.S from both Named lnsureds for residency issues 
I have requested the Policy - Need to read as it appears Benjamin Holland may be a listed driver 
and not a named insured? 
38157-2010 
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Claim Number: FRD408370, Date/time: 12/8/2009 10:49 nm, Author: Davis, D, Keyword(s): 
Covcrnge, GREG HOLLAND 
To Transmittal Desk: 
Date of Request:Oecember 8, 2009 
lnsured Name:Greg Holland 
Insured Address:Greg Holland 
18439 W Holland 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
Claim Number:FRD40837 CB 
Date of Loss:October 25, 2009 
Policy Number:119330878-I 
Vehicle Year/Make:2005 Suzuski 
Coverage Verification Requested For: 
New-Policy 
Cancellation 
Proof of Mailing 
Copy of Letter 




XCertified Copy of Policy/ Endorsements 
Copy of Policy/ Endorsements 
Copy of UM Election Fann 
Copy of P697 
Copy of Underwriti11g File 
PELP 
Copy Required 
Attach Coverage when Requesting Certified Documents I Underwriting Infonnation 
Other I Remarks: 
38157-2010 
00128 
Page 641 of709 
Claim Number: FRD408370, Dale/time: 12/8/2009 11 :02 am, Author: Davis, D, Keyword(s): 
Attorney 
Called ;:,ltorney's otrice and lefl message with Julie for LOR. 
Claim Number: FRD408370, Date/time: 12/8/2009 11:54 pm, Author: MIP Requirement,, 
K.eyword(s): Manager Intervention 
The foilowing Casualty key word(s) were found and triggered this alert: fatality, requiring a file 
review. 
Claim Number: FRD408370, Date/time: 12/9/2009 3:20 pm, Author: Shick, M, Keyword(s): 
Coverage, Sup/Mgr Rev, BENJAMIN HOLLAND 
Reviewed file ... 
xfile: FRD3 7313 - ni policy - Benjamin Holland 
xfile: FRD40844- parents policy. 
this file has been setup perrequest from claimant aLtornP_;y looking for additional coverage for our 
NI--Benjamin ..... this policy is the motorcycle polic'_;. that is in the ni parent's name but Benjamin 
is a listed driver. 
xfile of FRD37313 ... we are about to ~;.::JJder ins policy limits when attorney has submitted these 2 
add'l claims looking for cover!J.~o under these policies .... NI was a passenger in an unowned 
vehicle. Per agent, there \A:cre no other policies ... 23 yr old ins Jived on his own, purchased o home 
l 0/9/09, owned his O'!Jn vehicle, had his own insurance policy. 
Liab 0/1 00- appE:ars div feIJ asleep, losing contra I of iv, striking tree. 
ale Allstate has 50/100 abi limits and have tendered their policy limits ... : 
nuu table reserve has been set as a precaution as we detennine coverage. 
Daneice is ordering certified copies of this policy and parents policy and all uw notes and referring 
to defense counsel to review to assist in determining coverage. 
Claim Number: FRD408370, Date/time: 12/30/2009 I 0:11 am, Author: System,. Keyword(s): 
Handler Alert · 
Daneice Davis is currently out of the office thru Jan 6 2010 
Claim Number: FRD408370, Date/time: 12/30/2009 I 0:11 am, Author: Hardy, D, Keyworcl(s): 
HOCA 
are we getting the requested materials, etc.? we may have an t:ll.posure under UIM under this 
policy, but a complete review is needed. 
38157-2010 
00129 
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Claim Number: FRD408370, Date/time: 12/30/2009 10:55 am, Author. System,, Keyword(s): 
Handler Alert 
Daneice Davis is currently out of the office thruJan 6 2010 
Claim Number: FRD408370, Date/time: l 2/30/2009 l 0:55 am, Author. Shick, M, Keyword(s): 
Sup/Mgr Rev 
Daneice, upon your return to the office on 1/4, couid you please follow up on this fiie as 
p1iority ... please see my file note of 12/9 and Dave's file note of today, 12/30 ... any questions, please 
let me know. Thanks, Daneice. 
Claim Number: FRD40837D, Date/time: 1/8/2010 l :50 pm, Author: Hardy, D, K.eyword(s): 
HOCA, Coverage 
I note that Daneice is getting materials from UW for our coverage counsel to review. 
in this case, our named insured 1s son was a passenger in someone's vehicle and sustained fatal 
injuries in a 1-car loss. Idaho policy and location involved. 
his parents are trying to make claims from their Auto and a Motorcycle policy in their names 
which have higher limits than the son's Auto policy. this c1aim is set up under the Motorcycle 
policy, and I note the son appears to be the sole listed driver and signed most or all the forms at the 
time of acquiring the policy. 
additionally, the parents allege that be hadn't completely moved out of U1eir home, and therefore 
was a resident relative eligible for the higher UIM limits. 
I see two distinct but overly related issues as to whether the son was an 11insured" under these other 
policies. 
1) is he a "you" under the Motorcycle policy by virtue of~eing the sole driver ond signing al I the 
forms? it is true that he is not the named insured, but would a court use a broad evidence rule? 
2) is a "resident relative" of the parents' policies by virtue of having some factors related to a 
residence, e.g. a room, clothes, mail, time spent, etc.? 1 believe he did buy his own place before 
the loss and we even insure il. 
Claim Number: FRD4083 70, Date/time: I /8/2010 2:16 pm, Author: Davis, D, Keyword(s): 
Attorney, Coverage 
l called Kathy Paukert at 509 232 7760 - Defense Counsel 
REDACTED --- ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
38157-2010 
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C1aim Number: FRD408370, Date/lime: 1/12/2010 11:14 am, Author: Davis, D, Keyword{s): 
Coverage 
Origin Date : 08/07/200 l 
No concurrent issues 
Policy Teim: 09/24/2009 - 09/24/2010 
Loss Date: 20/25/2009 
D1ivers Listed on_Policy: Greg Holland 7/16/1955 
Kathy Holland 3/30/1957 
Benjamin Holland, l 0/I 3/1986 
Vehicle: 2005 Suzuslci not involved 
Nl was pasenger in non owned vehicle. 
Other Claims JNvolved: 
FRD40844 - Auto Policy for Greg and Kathy Holland 
FRD37313 - Auto Policy for Benjamin Holland 
There is a Idaho Protection against Uninsured/underinsured policy that appears to be signed by 
Benjamin on 9/25/2008 
The originl:!1 application sgined by Ben Holland on 9/25/08 
The ARS down payment signature is signed by Ben Holland on 9/25/09 
Recurring credit card authorization signed by Benjamin Holland and appeurs to be rapid with Visa 
card - not sure where the visa card is coming from. 
1 have forwarded a copy of the certified policy to Kathy Paukert to review. 
Claim Number: FRD408370, Date/time: 1/12/2010 11:18 am, Author: Davis, D, Keyword(s): 
Status 
I have emailed to Kathy Paukert: 
Certified copy of policy 
Attorney for NI estate 
App1ication 
Will follow up to confinn that she received all: 
2) Confirm that she has made contact with attorney 
3) Confum if she will complete any ROR if necessary 
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Kinzo H. Mihara, ISB No. 7940 
Attorney at Law 
424 Sherman Avenue, Suite 308 
P. 0. Box 969 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 816-0969 
P (208) 667-5486 
F (208) 667-4695 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
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cLrnK DIS 'iRiCT COURT 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FIRST ITJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
The ESTATE of BENJAMIN HOLLAND, 




METROPOLITAN PROPERTY and 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, and 
METLIFE AUTO & HOME, 
Defendants. 
) 
) Case No. CV 10-0677 
) 












COMES NOW, Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney of record, and hereby move this 
Court, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B), to reconsider its memorandum opinion and order dated 
July 20,2010. 
This motion is made on the basis under Idaho case law, an insurer cannot demand more 
for a "proof ofloss" than what would establish a prima facia case at law. Alternate basis of this 
motion is that there is no evidence in the record that the policies of insurance at issue in this case 
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Plaintiffs to do so. In addition, the plain wording of the statute does not shift the burden back to 
the insured if the insurer cannot determine coverage. Indeed, if the insurer never demands a 
proof of loss, the insured is under no duty to provide one. And finally, I.C. § 41-1839(2) requires 
the insurer to tender the amount in dispute either to the insured, or into the court and that 
MetLife did neither in this case. 
Plaintiffs understand that should this Court rule favorably upon their first motion for 
reconsideration, this motion may become moot. 
.~ 
Respectfully submitted this_) _ day of October, 2010. 
~&~ 
K.inzo H. Mihara 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this t '>-t day of October, 2010, I caused a true, 
accurate, and correct copy of the foregoing document to be served on the Defendants attorney via 
the method indicated below: 
William J. Schroeder 
PAINE HAIYIBLEN LLP 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 
P. O.BoxE 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 816-0328 
Telephone: (208-664-8115 
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338 
Mailing Address: 
717 West Sprague Avenue, Suite 1200 
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
~g~SECOND 
RECONSIDERATJON-2 
[VJ VIA HAND-DELIVERY 
[ J VIA FACSMILE@ (208) 664-6338 
[ ] VIA FIRST-CLASS MAIL 
Page 646 of 709 
Kinzo H. Mihara, ISB No. 7940 
Attorney at Law 
424 Sherman Avenue, Suite 308 
P. 0. Box 969 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 816-0969 
P (208) 667-5486 
F (208) 667-4695 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
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CLER!-(, DISi-i"<ICT COURT 
DEPU,, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
The ESTATE of BENJAMIN HOLLAND, 




:tvlETROPOLIT AN PROPERTY and 
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) Case No. CV 10-0677 
) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 










COMES NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney of record and hereby offer 
, the Court this memorandum oflaw in support of their second motion for reconsideration. This 
motion is supported by the affidavits previously submitted. 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM 
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I. BACKGROUND 
There has been extensive briefing on tlris matter, and for the sake of brevity, Plaintiffs 
incorporate the undisputed facts section of their reply to defendants' opposition to their first 
motion for reconsideration. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592, 21 P Jd 908, 914 (2001 ). A motion for 
reconsideration of an interlocutory order of the trial court may be made at any time before entry 
of a final judgment, but not later than fourteen days after entry of a final judgment. LR. C.P. 
11 (a)(2)(B). A party making a motion for reconsideration is permitted to present new evidence, 
but is not required to do so. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 486,472, 147 P.3d 100, 104 GCt. 
App. 2006). The moving party has the burden of brining new facts bearing on the correctness of 
the interlocutory order. Devil Creek Ranch, Inc. v. Cedar Mesa Reservoir & Canal Co., 126 
Idaho 202,205 879P.2d1135, 1138 (1994). If no new facts are presented, the party moving for 
reconsideration must demonstrate errors of law or fact in the initial decision. Johnson v. 
Lambros, 143 ldaho 486, 472-73, 147 P.3d 100, 104-105. 
lf there is no genuine issue of material fact - only a question of law remains; appellate 
Courts exercise free review. Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., 14 7 Idaho 737, 
746,215 P.3d 457,466 (2009) (quoting Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 
3 07, 160 P.3d 7 4 3, 7 46 (2007) ). An appellate court, likewise, freely reviews the construction of a 
statute. Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746, 751, 133 P.3d 1211, 1216 (2006). The Supreme 
Court exercises free review over the district court's conclusions of law and may substitute its 
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view for that of the district court on a legal issue. Robinson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
137 Idaho 173, 176, 45 P.3d 829, 832 (Idaho 2002). 
ill. ARGUMENT 
A. UNDER IDAHO LAW AN INSURER CANNOT DEMAND MORE PROOF OF 
LOSS THAN WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE A PRIMA FACIA CASE OF A 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
The issue is whether an insurer may demand a proof of loss more than which is required 
to prove a prima facia case. 
Under the cases of In re Death of Cole, 113 Idaho 98, 741 P.2d 734 (Idaho App. 1987), 
and Brinkman v. AID Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 766 P.2d 1227 (Idaho 1988), the Idaho Court of 
Appeals and the Idaho Supreme Court noted that an insured cannot be forced to provide a "proof 
of loss" which was greater than that which to prove a primafacia case. In re Death of Cole, at 
101; Brinkman, at 349. 
In this case, the insureds held a wrongful death claim against the under-insured motorist. 
LC. § 5-311. The applicable statute reads: 
(1) When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of 
another, bis or her heirs or personal representatives on their behalf may maintain 
an action for damages against the person causing the death, or in the case of the 
death of such wrongdoer, against the personal representative of such wrongdoer, 
whether the wrongdoer dies before or after the death of the person injured. If any 
other person is responsible for any such wrongful act or neglect, the action may 
also be maintained against such other person, or in the case of his or her death, his 
or her personal representatives. In every action under this section, such damages 
may be given as under all the circumstances of the case as may be just. 
Id. Thus, to prove a case of wrongful death, the heirs or personal representatives must prove that 
the deceased's death was caused by the wrongful act of another. Id; see also Castorena v. 
General Electric, Docket No. 35123, Opinion No. 94 (2010).1 
1 A copy of this case is attached hereto pursuant to the Court's order. 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM 
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Indeed, wrongful death actions are usually premised on common law negligence. Rees v. 
State, Dept. of Health and Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 137 P.3d 397 (2006) A cause of action for 
common law negligence in Idaho has four elements: (1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the 
defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal 
connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and ( 4) actual loss or 
damage. Nation v. State, Dep't of Corr., 144 Idaho 177, 189, 158 P.3d 953,965 (2007) 
The applicable policy of insurance states, under the uninsured and underinsured motorist 
coverage section: 
"UNDERJNSURED MOTOR VEHICLE" means a motor vehicle which has a 
bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy in effect at the time of the 
accident, in at least the minimum amount required by the state in which the 
covered automobile is principally garaged, but less than the limits of this coverage 
provided by this policy as stated in the Declarations. 
A.ff. Mihara (Aug.), Ex. 2, p. 10. The policy continues: 
We will pay damages for bodily injury sustained by: 
1. You or a relative, caused by an accident arising out of the ownership, 
maintenance, or use of an underinsured motor vehicle, which you or a relative are 
legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an underinsured motor 
vehicle ... 
Id. at 10-11. 
In this case, it is undisputed that the death of the insured, Benjamin C. Holland was 
caused by the wrongful act of the driver of the under-insured motorist, Derrick Dryden. See, 
Police Rpt., see also CR-2009-0010747 (Second Judicial District, Nez Perce Co., Idaho). The 
fact apparent from the police report were that Mr. Dryden was driving his vehicle, with 
Benjamin Holland and another passenger, Nicholas Walker, on Idaho state highway 95 in Nez 
Perce County when he fell asleep at the wheel, veered off the road, and collided with a tree. Id. 
This was not the first time that Mr. Dryden had run off the road. Id. As a passenger, Ben Holland 
PLAJNTIFFS' MEMORANDUM 
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was not at-fault for the accident. Id. The facts show that Ben Holland survived for only a few 
minutes after the accident before passing away. Aff. Mihara (May), Ex. 4 (Death Certificate). 
Derrick Dryden's policy limits were for $50,000 per person, per accident, up to a total amount of 
$100,000 coverage. Aff. Miha:r;a; Ex. 5. Mr. Dryden's insurer, Allstate, paid $50,000 to the 
family of Nicholas Walker, and $50,000 to the family of Benjamin Holland. Id. At the time of 
the accident Benjamin Holland held an UIM auto policy in the amount of $100,000 per person 
and $300,000 per accident. Aff. Mihara (Aug.), Ex. 2. Ben Holland was also insured under a 
motorcycle policy containing coverage of $250,000 per person and $500,000 per accident. Id. 
Ben's parents, Mr. and Mrs. Gregory Holland held an automobile policy with MetLife containing 
coverage of $250,000 per person and $500,000 per accident. Id. The terms of all three policies 
were the same as the policies were all based off of the same form policy. Id. Thus, it was 
apparent that Mr. Dryden was an under-insured motorist within the terms of the policy. 
The facts of this case show that as a driver, Derrick Dryden owed a general duty to 
Benjamin Holland not to hann him. Mr. Dryden breached that duty by falling asleep at the wheel 
of a motor vehicle he was operating. Benjamin Holland died as an actual, direct, and proximate 
cause of Mr. Dryden's actions. The damages in this case have never been disputed as being in 
excess of the limits of the Mr. Dryden's insurance policy, or the policies of insurance that the 
Holland family held with MetLife. Aff. Mihara, Exs. 5 and 6. Indeed, Mr. Dryden's carrier 
tendered its limits within approximately a month after the accident. Id. It is apparent from the 
facts of this case that should they have so chosen, Mr. and Mrs. Gregory Holland were entitled to 
recover damages from Mr. Dryden for the wrongful death of their son, Benjamin. 
The facts above can all be gleaned from the November 10, 2010 and November 17, 2010 
submissions to MetLife via letters of counsel as well as the documentary evidence attached 
PLA.lNTIFFS' MEMORANDUM 
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thereto. Aff. Mihara (Sept), Exs. 3-5. Plaintiffs' attorney advised MetLife that Allstate, Mr. 
Dryden's insurer, was going to tender its limits shortly on November 17, 2010, and on December 
I, 2010 forwarded MetLife a copy of the letter from Allstate tendering its limits. Aff. Mihara, 
Exs. 4 and 5. 
Thus, by November 17, 2004, or arguendo at the latest, December 1, 2010, MetLife knew 
that Derrick Dryden was driving his own vehicle, a vehicle that was under-insured within the 
meaning of the Hollands' policies of insurance, and that Mr. Dryden breached his duty causing 
Ben Holland's death and resulting damages. 
Due to the law as set forth by In re Death of Cole and Brinkman above, as applied to the 
facts of this case, it is apparent that MetLife cannot demand more "proof ofloss" from Plaintiffs 
than what Plaintiffs' submitted to Defendants in November of2010. 
B. PLAINTIFFS' INSlJRANCE POLICIES DO NOT REQUIRE PLAINITFFS TO 
PROVIDE THE LEGAL THEORY - PLAINTIFFS POLICY ONLY REQUIRES 
THAT THE INSURED GIVE NOTICE; THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE 
RECORD THAT DEFENDANTS EVER ASKED PLAINITFFS TO PROVIDE 
THEM THE LEGAL THEORY OF RECOVER 
The next issue for this Court to consider is whether there is any evidence in the record to 
show that Defendants requested Plaintiffs to provide MetLife with an applicable theory of 
coverage. 
It is undisputed that the policy at issue does not require Plaintiffs to submit any legal 
theory of coverage to their insurer. Aff. Mihara (Aug.), Ex. 2. Indeed, the Idaho appellate courts 
have never once required an insured to submit a legal theory of coverage to an insurer. See In re 
Death of Cole, 113 Idaho 98, 100-101, 741 P.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1987); Brinkman v. AID Ins. Co., 
115 Idaho 246, 766 P.2d 1227 (1988); Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 
Idaho 589, 593, 130 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2006); Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 
· PLA1NTIFFS' MEMORANDUM · 
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Idaho 743, 152 P.3d 614 (2007); Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 
233 P.3d 1221 (2010); Martin v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244, 61 P.3d 601 
(2002); Walton v. Harford Ins. Co., 120 Idaho 616,818 P.2d 320 (1991); Anderson v. Farmers 
Ins. Co. of Idaho, 130 Idaho 755,947 P.2d 1003 (1997). 
To rule that an insured would be required to produce a legal theory of recovery would be 
to undo the very purpose of the statute. The purpose of the statue in question is to provide an 
incentive for insurers to settle just claims in order to reduce the amount oflitigation and the high 
costs associated with litigation. Martin, supra at 247. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the 
statutory attorney fee is not a penalty but is an additional sum rendered as compensation when 
the insured is entitled to recover under the insurance policy to prevent the sum recovered from 
being diminished by the expenditures for the services of an attorney. Id. (citing Halliday v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch., supra at 299, 637) 
Indeed, in a recent case, there was expert testimony to the effect that the insurer had a 
duty to investigate the claim that was independent of whatever the insured' s attorney does. 
Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299,233 P.3d 1221 (2010). 
Indeed, requiring an insured to provide the legal theory of coverage is surely untenable. 
For instance, if an unrepresented lay person were to make a claim under their policy; should that 
lay person be required or forced by their policy to come up with an applicable legal theory of 
coverage should the insurance company fail to do so? Again, if that lay person were to be 
required to do so, that person would very likely retain counsel to help them come up with an 
applicable legal theory. If the insured were required to obtain counsel before the thirty day clock 
were to begin to run, then logically the attorney's fees incurred in coming up with the applicable 
legal theory of coverage would not be reimbursable to the insured from the insurer as the thirty 
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day clock had not begun to run and LC. § 41-1839 would not be applicable. Assuming that 
coverage would be found in the example above, the attorney's fees would likely be paid out of 
the recovery of the policy proceeds. It simply goes against the policy set by the legislature and 
purpose of a statute as stated by the appellate courts of this state to require an insured to come up 
with an applicable legal theory for the purposes of the definition of "proof of loss" under the 
statute. 
In the instant case, Plaintiffs have entered into a contingency fee agreement which calls 
for their attorney to be compensated at 30% of any recovery pre-trial, 35% after a trial, and 40% 
after any appeals. Aff. Mihara (May), Ex. 2. So far, Plaintiffs have recovered $200,000 from 
MetLife. Aff. Mihara (May), Ex. 15. 
In short, it does not make practical sense nor further the policy and purposes of the statute 
in question to hold that an insured must come up with an applicable legal theory for purposes of 
determining coverage. 
C. UNDER I.C. § 41-1839, THE BURDEN OF PRODUCTION DOES NOT SHIFT 
BACK TO THE INSURED. 
A further issue is whether the statute in question provides for the shifting of the burden of 
production back to the insured. 
Idaho case law tells us that if an insured does not provide an adequate proof of loss, then 
the insurer may deny the claim. Brinkman, at 350. Otherwise, the insurer must investigate and 
determine its rights and liabilities. Id. In no reported case is counsel able to find that the burden 
of production of 'proof of loss' material shifts back and forth. Indeed, the very terms of the 
statute do not shift the burden back and forth. All arguments to disallow fees must come from the 
plain wording of the statute. Martin, supra, at 247-248. Indeed, any requirement that a court 
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enforces should be inserted into the statute via the legislature, and not judicially. Id. The statute, 
as written, is a one-way street. 
Indeed, Idaho case law tells us that if an insurer does not have enough information, it may 
deny the claim. Id. Otherwise, the insurer must investigate and determine its rights and liabilities 
and pay the amount justly due to the insured. Id. If the insurer is in a dispute over coverage with 
the insured, then the insurer is required to tender the amount in dispute either ( 1) to the insured, 
or (2) into the court. LC.§ 41-1839(2); Anderson v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 130 Idaho 755, 
947 P.2d 1003 (1997). The Supreme Court's use of the word "must" denotes mandatory 
application of the law. Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841,848,908 P.2d 143, 150 (1995). 
In this case, it is undisputed that MetLife never denied the claim. It is also undisputed that 
MetLife began to investigate the claims immediately upon receiving the same. The dates upon 
which information passed from the insured to the insurer are not in question. The date of tender 
of the checks is not in question. The difference in those dates is much greater than 30 days. 
Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees under the statute. 
D. IF THE INSURER NEVER DEM.Al'i""DS A PROOF OF LOSS, THEN 
THE INSURED IS UNDER NO OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE ONE. 
Another issue before this Court is whether, if MetLife never demanded a proof of loss, 
whether Plaintiffs were under an obligation to provide one. 
As stated above, the applicable rule of law is that if an insurer does not request a proof of 
loss from the insured, then the insured is under no obligation to provide a proof of loss. Anderson 
v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 130 Idaho 755, 947 P.2d 1003 (1997). 
The Supreme Court ofldaho noted the facts of the case, then it looked to the applicable 
policy of insurance and noted whether the policy demanded the information allegedly required 
by the insurer. Id. at 758. The Supreme Court ofldaho stated: 
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Under similar policy language in Brinkman, however, this Court ruled that if an 
insurer never demands a proof of loss, an insured is under no obligation to submit 
one. Therefore, [the insureds] demand letter did not need to meet the requirements 
of a proof of loss as outlined in Brinkman since a proof of loss was never required 
by Famers. 
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, if the insurer never requires the insured to submit information, then 
the insured is under no duty to do so. Also, the Supreme Court in Anderson seemingly did away 
with the Brinkman standard and looked directly to what the policy of insurance required. Id. 
In this case, it is undisputed as to what the applicable policy of insurance required. A.ff. 
Mihara (Aug.), Ex. 2. The policy required the insured to: notify the insurer of the loss to include 
as many details as possible, including the names and addresses of the drivers, injured persons 
and witnesses, and the time, place, and circumstances of the accident or loss. The insurer had the 
right to require such information in writing. Id. at 19. The policy did not require the insured to 
submit the applicable legal theory of coverage under the policy. Id. 
Further, in this case, the undisputed facts of this case show that the insurer never 
subsequently demanded that the insured come up with the applicable legal theory of coverage. 
A.ff. Paukert, ,r 5. Ms. Paukert states:" ... [h]owever, I told him [attorney Mihara] that !fhe would 
send me his research on the topic, I would review it." ( emphasis added). Thus, it is apparent that 
there is simply no evidence in the record to show that MetLife ever demanded Plaintiffs to come 
up with an applicable legal theory of coverage. Ms. Pauker's statement above is conditional -
she never states that she needed Plaintiffs' counsel to come up with an applicable legal theory to 
demand coverage -if that were the case, then what need would insurance companies have for 
coverage, defense counsel? 
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As stated during oral argument on Plaintiffs' first motion to reconsider: coverage is 
synonymous with liability - if there is coverage: there is liability; if-there is liability: there is 
coverage. It is the insurer's duty to detennine its liability, not the insured. Brinkman, at 350. 
In conclusion, because there is no evidence in the record that MetLife ever required or 
asked Plaintiffs to come up with the applicable legal theory of coverage through its policy or 
otherwise, this Court should not do so to dismiss Plaintiffs' case. 
E. I.C. § 41-1839(2) REQUIRES THE INSURER TO TENDER EITHER TO THE 
INSURED, OR THE AMOUNT IN DISPUTE INTO THE COURT 
A further issue before this court is whether MetLife breached its duty under the statute to 
tender the amount into the Court thus exposing itself to attorney's fees. 
The applicable code section states: 
In any such action or arbitration, if it is alleged that before the commencement 
thereof, a tender of the full amount justly due was made to the person entitled 
thereto, and such amount is thereupon deposited in the court, and if the aJlegation 
is found to be true, or if it is determined in such action or arbitration that no 
amount is justly due, then no such attorney's fees may be recovered. 
LC. § 41-1839(2). The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted· this provision to require an insurer 
to tender any amount in dispute with the insured into the court. Anderson v. Farmers Ins. Co. of 
Idaho, 130 Idaho 755, 758, 947 P.2d 1003, l006 (1997). The Court wrote: 
Even in a disputed claim, however, the insurer must tender to the insured, or into 
court, the amount it feels is justly due. LC.§ 41-1839(2). Thereafter, "[s]hould the 
insured fail to recover a sum in excess of the tender, then and in that event 
attorney's fees are not assessable. 
Id. citing Halliday v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 89 Idaho 293, 301, 404 P.2d 634 (1965) (emphasis 
added). The use of the word "must" denotes the mandatory application of the law. Rife, supra at 
848, 150. 
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In this case, it is undisputed that MetLife did not tender any amount into the Court prior 
to this lawsuit. Upon corning to difficulty in determining coverage, Idaho law says that MetLife 
should have either (1) paid the claim, or (2) paid the disputed amount into the court. Id. MetLife 
did neither. 
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs are entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee under the 
statute. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, given the foregoing, this Court should reconsider its previous 
memorandum decision and order and issue an order granting Plaintiffs' earlier motion and/or 
setting this matter for trial. 
¥ 
Respectfully submitted this _I_ day of October, 2010: df._ 
={&~ara 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ______ day of October, 2010, I caused a true, 
· accurate, and correct copy of the foregoing document to be served on the Defendants attorney via 
the method indicated below: 
William J. Schroeder 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 
P. 0. BoxE 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328 
Telephone: (208-664-8115 
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338 
Mailing Address: 
717 West Sprague Avenue, Suite 1200 
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
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Patrick e. Miller, ISB )'llo. 1'711 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
701 Front Avc:nve, S1o>ite 101 
P. 0. Baxi! . 
Coeur d'Alene, Iditho 8361 ft..0328 
Telephone.: (208) 664-8115 
F.:s,,,ni1c: (203) 664-6'.'138 
M,qillng Addffi11: 
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Tolepbone: (509) 4.\5-6000 
f2"imila:: (509) 838-0007 
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CLERK DSTAiCT COURT 
tN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE PlltST JUDICIAL DlSTRlCT or-
TH£ STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR tHB COUNTY OP KOOT.5.NAl 
The eSTA TE of BENJAMIN HOJ..J..,AND, 
OSCB1'SED,· GRBCOR 't HOU-ANO, ~od 
TCA THLEEN HOLLAND, 
vs. 
MET.P.OPOUTAN PROPERTY and 
CASUALTY lNSURANCE COMPANY, and 
METLIPE AUTO & HOME, 
Oefenduni~. 
) 
) C$e No. CV 10-677 
) 










) ........ _ .. _.. . .. --------------- ··--~ - -· . ·" 
COME NOW flefendanta. by and thrc.mgh !.heir i;oun~el, and 'i'tQuesl a Statui5 Conference 
lo seek guidance from the Court on tbc process the Court wi¥~ I.Q oe followed to address the 
issues thot bravo l'riscn following the Sei,\l;mber 29, 21)lo hew-ine on Phuntitf,' Marina for 
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Rewnsidcrntion. As the Courl will recall, extens.ive hricfing was submitted on Lhe Motion. 
After hearing argumenl, the Motion and proposed Judgment were taken under advisement. 
Second Motion for Rel:un~itli;:rallon 
Without waiting for Lhe Court's ruling, on October l, 2010, Mr. Mihara served whaL he 
indemlficd as" 11Sc::.;cmd Motion for Reconsideration." A Notice or Heuring was not provided 
with the Motion. 
lt appea.ri. Lhac the Second Motion for Reconsioerntiun is !.imply a post-hearing brief 
attempting LO circumvent Idaho Civil Rule 7(b)(3) time re4uirumtmls for filing motions and 
submitting responsive briefing. 
Mr. Mihara's O~tober I. 2010 E-mail 
;\::; Lhe Court will recall, the Parties settled all daims for a LOLaJ of $200,000.00. 
Following receipt of the $200,000.00 settlemenL prO(.:t:eds, Lhe Plaintiffs signed a Release of AH 
Claims in which they acknowledged receipt of the $200,0000.00 settlement proceeds. tThe 
Re-,lease of A 11 Claims is in Lhe Coun file and Attachment 1 is a copy for the Court's quick 
reference.) 
Following Mr. Mihara',; receipt of Lhe $2.00,000.00 fitHLlemenL proceeds, the Court, based 
uplm Lh~ Stipulation of the Partie~. dismissed all claims with prejudice except for Plaintiffs' 
pending motion for artorncy foes. 
On Ocmhcr I, 2(rl 0, after numerous page~ or hrieting heing submitted to the Court and 
several hours of oral argument on the sole remaining issue of attorney fees, Mr. Mihara sent me 
the <JUacbed e-maii. (Attachment 2) The e-mail states jn pertinent part.: 
-··-···-·----t·,.vas-reviewtrrg-my file am1-mne--ttTat-your c.:lienchas-yeno-pay my cliennt1e 
final $50,000 or the $200.000 that tl1ey agreed LO pay my clients under the 
RE QUE.ST FOR ST i\TUS CON1'"ERENCE · 2 
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mocorcyc:1e policy in exchange for my cHents' release on February 2-3, 2010. As 
you know, my cHents execmed the mutuaHy-agreei:ible release on February 24, 
20W. To that end. please let me know when you [sic] client intends on sending 
Lhat final $50,000 check. 
On October 1, 2010, by letter, T responded to Mr. Mihara. (See, Attachment 3) 
Given Mr. Mihara's prior sworn representations to the Coun; 1 and the uncontested fact 
that a.11 of the $200,000.00 seuJemenl proceeds have been re,;~ived by the Plaintiffs,2 Mr. 
Mihara's demand that an aduiliunal $50,000.00 be paid may implicate serious and significant 
issues as to Mr. Mihara and his clients. 
Conclusion 
Por the reasons sel forth above, the Defendants requ~st a Status O.mferenc.:~ al the Court's 
earlie~r convenience. 
DATED this _tj__ day of October, 2010. 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
1n the Affidavit of Kin10 H. Mihara in Support nf Plaintiffs' Motion for :;nm1rw.ry Judgment fil~t.l on 
May 17, 2010, Mr. Mihara .,tatcs, in pcrtinellt part, st paragraph 16 ''loin or about f'ebnrnry 2, 2010, 
·oefena,mtnEIRktcuci,.: r1mouot ju~tly ~tut: (.~200~000.00) llnnycH~iff!f.'"-·Mr.Milmrn funher states;i.~11--
penioent part, al paragraph 17, "(o]o or about Febnmry 3, 2010, Plaintiff:, accepted Defendants' tender a., 
full satisfaction of their underlying claims in the above enr.:apticmed lawsuit." 
~ 
- Set, Release of All Clnims. (Attachment 1) 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thls Y +a.. day of October, 2010, J .caused to be served 
a true and correct copy C>f the foregoing REQUEST FOR STATUS CONFERENCE, w Lhe. 
following; 
Kinzo H. Mi hara 
Attorney at Law 
424 Sherman A vmme, Suite 308 




OVER~lGHT MA TI.. 
TELECOPY (FACSIMILE) 
£:.MAil,, 
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1. On October 25, 2009, Benjamin Holland died as a result of a motor vehidt.1 
accident near Culdesac, Idaho. 
2. Following the Octob_er 25, 2009 accident, the Personal Reprcsei,.rstives of the 
Est:.lte of Benjamin Holland submitted claims under the Underinsurc:rl. Motorist insuring 
agreement of automobile policy numbers 1193308781, 0234338980 and · 1J 93308780 
{hereinafter "the policies"). 
RELEASE AGREEMENT 
FOR AND CONSIDERATION OF the sum of iwo Hundred Thou::.;and. and no/ l 00 
Doliars ($200,000.00), receipt of which is hereby acknowledg~.d, the cndersign.:~tl Jo, for 
themselves and as Personal Representatives for the Estatr; of 3enjamin HoHand, forever 
cischargc METLIFE AUTO AND HOME; its principals, agents repre~en~ativcs, succes~ors nnd 
subsidiaries from any and all actions, causes of actions, claims and demauds pertaining lo the 
policies. This release covers nny liability or obligations which may be claimed under the terms, 
conditions, agreements or provisions of Pob::y numbers 1193 3 08781, 0234338980. and 
1193308780 including, but not limited to, the Underinsured Motorist Claims. 
IT IS UNDERSTOOD Al'\TD AGREED that this waiver is not to be consL.-ued as. an 
admission of !iabilily or an admission regarding t,he limits of coverage ftvaila~lc under the 
policies on the part of MetLife Auto and Home. 
IT 1S FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that this Release elw covers all 
c1aims that we.re or could have been made in the District Court of the First Judicial District of the 
------------------ ------ --- ·----------~ 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, Care No. CV-10~0677, .brought against 
.!{ELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS - 1 
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Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company, and MetLife Auto and Home~ 
for Plaintiffs' Motion for Anorney Fees Pursuant to I.C. §41·1839 filed on or about Febmary 9, 
2010. Except for the pending motion for attorney fees. all claims set forth in Case No. CV-10-
067'7 shall be dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS 'FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that except for Plaintiffs' pending 
motion for attorney's feel refere.nced above, this fa a foll and :final release in full compromise 
settlernent of al] claims of every nature and kind whatsoever, and releases all claims, whetht:r 
kno'WD or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, and that this Release is based upon the 
undersigned's own judgment. belief and knowledge after consulting with counsel and without 
reliance upon any statements or representatio:rus h;,. the released parties. their representatives, 
agents or attorneys. 
IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGR.EED that ~ .. ifetropol~tan Property and 
Casualty ln1>urance Company, and MetLife Aut.o and Home (MetLife) waives its subrogation 
interests in this matter. 
THE UNDERSIGNED FURTHER AGREt: that they wm satisfy any liens from the 
settlement proce-.:ds. 
THE UNDERSIGNED :;tat~ that th.ts Release of AU Claim$ bl:IS been carefully read and is 
signed, after consultation with counsel; as the free act and deed of the undersigned. WE 
UNDERSTAND THAT THIS rs ALL THE CO:MPENSATION THAT WILL RE RECEIVED 
UNDER TI:IE UNINSURED MOTORIST POLICIES DESCRIBED ABOVE. WE HA VE 
READ THIS RELEASE, !JNDERSTA...l\:D IT t-'L"'iD ARt SlG.N1NG ff VOLUNTARILY, 
RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS -2 
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DATED this 2?]_l'{~ay of 
) Holland individuolly, for the 
marl.1al unity of Gregory and Kathleen 
Holland, and 113 Personal Repi:ese:nta:tive on behalf 
of the Estate of Benjamin HoJland 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before :me tWs 
.]i'.day of.®11,.,,/ , 2010. · 
J__....---C in and for the 
St ofldaho 
~·-·-
Residing at /bcF.,....1..s .:r:> _ 
My Com.mission Expires: -·3/ '7 _3-4>, 7/_ 
D ~L' •' J:[_'rt\ ,, ~ ATED u·1s _./ ~ · da'll ot o~ tM...I.,\ , 2010 . ..!:!,._ ___ ., ·- ; -= 
REI.EASE OF A l.L CLAIMS J 
- 1=l-b&e.~_ 
Kath.le~lland individually, for the 
marital community of Ore-gory and Kati:Jeen 
Holland, and as Persona! Representative oo bcht:Jf 
of the Estate of Benjamin Holland 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me thh,; 
' :ft ~ ·zt:.: . .ilay of~.'-'¥ • 201 o. . . 
·-~ 
"" --.:.. ~---, 
Notary · m and for the 
State o Idaho 
Residing at .fi~'"' -t1'------
My CommissiC1n Expires: v,;.vJ ::.:o.r 7:C_ 
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Klnzo Mihara [kmihar~@lndl~n-law.or9] 
Friday, October 01, 2010 1 :35 PM 
Wllllam J. Schroeder 
Set11i,m"nt Agn,i,mcnt 
It was good to see you Wednl!lsday at the hearing and to argue the case with you. I was reviewing my file and note that 
your client has yet 10 pay my client the final $50,000 of the $200,000 that they agrsed to pay my clients under the 
molorcycle policy in e,:changa for my clients· release on February 2-3, 2010. As you know, my clients executed the 
mu1ually-agreea01e release on February 24, 2010. To that end, plaal!ies let mo know when you client intend3 on 3ondin9 
tt"at final $50,000 check. 
If you see things differently, please let me know, ar.d we can proceed accordingly. 
Again, it was good 10 se:e you. Please pass my best on to your ase.ociate, 1,1nd to Ms. Paukert. 
Regards, 
l<in20 
Klnzo H. Mihara, Esq. · 
1-lowera Funt.e & Associates, P.C. 
Attorn~~ :at Law 
424 Sherman Ave,, PO Box 969 




CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail is intended only tbr the personal and confidential use of the 
indivtdual(s) named as recipients and is covered by the Blecrronic Communications Privacy Act, J B U,S.C. §§ 
2S J 0-2521. It may contain information that is privileged, confidcntio.l llJld/or protected from diso)osure under 
applicable le.w including, but not limited to, the attorney cHent privilege end/or work product doctrine. If you 
have reoeivoo this e-mail in error, pl ear..~ notify the sender at (208} 667-5486 and delete this message from your 
computer. Do not deliver, distribute or copy this transrnis~ion. 
·--~----··--------
~\-T'(ACHMENT 2 
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Mr. Kin1.o H. Mihara 
424 Sherman Avenue, Suite 308 
P.O. Box 969 
Coeur d'Alene, ldaho 83816-0969 
RE: Holland Eslate 
Deur Mr. Mihara: 
~ T T O R N E Y $ 
October 1, 2010 
This letter is in response to your October 1, 2010 e•mail. As you knuw, the total 
settlement amount was $200,000.00. I h.ave a letter from you acknowledging ieceipt of Lhe full 
:::ettlemeru amount; anc..1 your clients' acknowledged receipt of the $200,000.00 settlement amount 
in 1.he Re.lease of All Claims. 
I ~ill not be drawn into whatever game you are trying to play and, if you pursue it, 1 will 
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County of KOOTENAI )ss 
FILED \Q • l.l) ' \0 
AT"l L\ : \'3 O'Clock _E__M 
\.C ERK OF DIST T COURT 
~/ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE ESTATE OF BENJAMIN HOLLAND, 
DECEASED, ET AL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND 
CASUAL TY INSURANCE COMPANY, ET 
AL. 
) 
) Case No. CV 2010 677 
) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 




Attorneys: For the Plaintiffs: Kinzo Mihara 
For the Defendants: William Schroeder 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY. 
Tr1is Court has set forth the procedural and factual history of tr1is matter in its 
July 20, 2010, Memorandum Decision and Order: 1) Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment; 2) Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees and 3) Granting 
Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss the 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees: 
This case involves a settled dispute over insurance coverage, with 
the issue of attorney fees still in dispute. 
On January 26, 2010, plaintiffs Estate of Benjamin Holland, 
deceased, Gregory Holland and Kathleen Holland (Hollands) filed this 
action alleging defendants Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance 
and MetLife Auto and Home (MetLife) wrongfully failed to pay the 
amounts due under an insurance contract within thirty days of being 
provided proof of loss as required under the contract. Hollands claim 
three counts of breach of contract, two counts each of negligent and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and three counts of bad faith. 
Additionally, Hollands claim: 
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pursuant to I.C. § 12-120, § 12-121, § 41-1839, and any 
other applicable statutory authority and/or judicial doctrine 
which allows for recovery of attorney fees. 
Complaint for Damages, p. 7, r[ IV. 
Benjamin Holland died October 25, 2009, as a result of a motor 
vehicle accident involving an underinsured motorist. Complaint for 
Damages, p. 3, ,J1f 6, 7. Benjamin owned a policy of insurance with 
MetLife which named Benjamin as the named insured, and had limits of 
$100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident. Id., p. 2, 1f 3. 
Benjamin's parents, Gregory and Kathleen Holland, also owned a policy 
with MetLife, with limits of $250,000 per person and $500,000 per 
accident, which extended coverage to relatives who resided in their 
household. Id., ,I 4. Hollands claim just prior to the accident and 
Benjamin's ensuing death, Benjamin was in the process of moving into a 
house he had bought, but still had a significant portion of his personal 
property at his parents' home, and Benjamin continued to receive mail at 
his parents' home. Id., p. 3, 1f 6. 
On February 9, 2010, Hollands filed "Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's 
Fees Pursuant to I.C. 41-1839", an "Affidavit of Kinzo H. Mihara in 
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-
1839", and "Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. 41-1839". Hollands claim their counsel 
are entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of $60,000, that 
amount being 30% (under a contingency fee agreement) of the $200,000 
ultimately recovered from MetLife, pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839, as a result 
of Metlife's alleged failure to pay the amount justly due under the 
insurance contract within thirty days after receiving proof of loss. 
On March 2, 2010, the parties stipulated to dismiss all claims, but 
for the pending motion for attorney's fees, and the Court entered an Order 
dismissing all claims with prejudice and without costs to either party on 
March 3, 2010. MetLife filed "Defendants' Answer and Affirmative 
Defenses" on April 12, 2010, addressing only the Hollands' claims for 
attorney's fees under I.C. § 41-1839, because given the Court's dismissal 
of all other claims with prejudice, "no Answer is required as to paragraphs 
1 through 33, as all claims, except for the claim for I.C. § 41-1839 
attorney's fees, alleged in paragraph 34 of the Complaint, have been 
dismissed with prejudice." Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses, 
p. 2. On April 13, 2010, MetLife filed an "Affidavit of Kathleen H. Paukert 
(Submitted in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees)." 
Kathleen Paukert was retained by MetLife on January 8, 2010, to provide 
a coverage opinion concerning claims made against MetLife by Holland. 
Id., p. 2, 1f 3. On April 28, 2010, MetLife filed a "Motion to Compel 
Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Attorney's Fees" and a "Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Motion 
to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Attorney's Fees". In addition to the initial Paukert affidavit, on 
May 7, 2010, MetLife filed in support of its motion to compel the 
"Supplemental Affidavit of Kathleen H. Paukert (Submitted in Opposition 
to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees)" and the affidavit of "Daneice 
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Davis (Submitted in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees)" 
(Davis), the adjuster assigned by MetLife to the claims made by Benjamin 
Holland's estate. On May 'I 0, 2010, MetLife filed "Defendants' Response 
to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839", and 
the "Affidavit of William J. Schroeder in Support of Defendant's Response 
to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. 41-1839." On 
May 11, 2010, MetLife filed the "Supplemental Affidavit of Daneice Davis 
(Submitted in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees)". On 
May 17, 2010, Hollands filed "Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
"Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment", 
"Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance or 
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees", and "Plaintiffs' Reply to 
Defendants Response to Plantiffs' Motion for Attorneys' Fees Pursuant to 
I.C. § 41-1839". On May 20, 2010, Hollands filed "Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Shorten Time for Hearing on Their Motion for Summary Judgment." In 
Hollands' motion for summary judgment they argue their entitlement to 
attorney's fees in the amount of $60,000 or entitlement to fees in general 
are based on Metlife's fa11ure to have speclfically denied the allegations 
of Hollands in the Complaint. On May 24, 2010, MetLife objected to 
Hollands' motion to shorten time on their motion for summary judgment 
because Hollands' chosen course of proceeding did not provide for a 
briefing schedule as contemplated in the civil rules. Defendants' 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing on Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2. However, MetLife assured the 
Court: 
Defendants' response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment will be filed and served on May 25, 2010. 
Defendants have no objection to having Plaintiffs' May 17, 
2010 Motion for Summary Judgment heard on .. lune 2, 2010, 
if the Court has sufficient time to hear all of the motions. 
Id. On May 25, 2010, MetLife filed "Defendants' Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment" and an "Affidavit 
of William J. Schroeder in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment". On May 26, 2010, MetLife filed its "Sur-Reply to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839", and the 
"Supplemental Affidavit of Mr. Schroeder William J. Schroeder in Support 
of Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees 
Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839." On May 26, 2010, Hollands filed "Plaintiffs' 
Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment." Finally, on May 28, 2010, MetLife filed "Defendants' Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance 
Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees." 
In summary, before the Court now are Hollands' motions for 
attorney's fees, motion to shorten time on summary judgment, and for 
summary judgment on the issue of entitlement to attorney's fees. Also 
before the Court is Metlife's motion to compel (actually a motion to 
enforce a settlement) and motion to dismiss Hollands' motion for 
attorney's fees. All of these motions are interrelated. 
38157-2010 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Page 670 of 709 
Page 3 
Oral argument was held on June 2, 2010. Due to the extremely 
large amount of briefing filed a short amount of time before oral argument, 
the Court was required to take these motions under advisement. 
Memorandum Decision and Order: 1) Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 2) Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney fees and 3) Granting Defendants' 
Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss the Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Attorney Fees, pp. 1-5. After analyzing the issues, this Court held: 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER. 
For the reasons stated above, the Motion for Summary Judgment 
must be denied. Additionally, questions of material fact remain regarding 
the motion for attorney's fees and the motion to compel performance 
under the settlement. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Hollands' Motion to Shorten Time to 
hear Hollands' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Hollands' Motion for Summary 
Judgment is DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Hollands' Motion for Attorney Fees is 
DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Metlife's Motion to Compel 
Performance Under the Settlement Agreement and to Dismiss Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The Settlement Agreement 
is enforced. As a result of the granting of Metlife's Motion to Compel 
Performance Under the Settlement Agreement' and to Dismiss Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Hollands are not entitled to attorney fees 
under I.C. § 41-1839. 
Id., p. 32. Regarding attorney fees requested by Hollands under I.C. § 41-1339, this 
Court held: 1) "Because there is a dispute of fact as to knowledge, and the facts 
surrounding the reasonableness of the initial refusal to pay the claim, determination of 
prevailing party cannot be decided at this time" (Id., p. i2); 2) " ... there are separate 
offers made at separate times on separate policies" (Id., p. 13); 3) " ... counsel for 
Hollands has provided no law to support the innovative argument that these time 
periods on these separate offers made at separate times on separate policies should 
be aggregated'' (Id., p. 14); 4) " ... if Paukert on behalf of MetLife found the coverage 
theory that would provide a larger recovery for the Hollands, and if Mihara on behalf of 
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Hollands accepted that higher amount based on the coverage theory that Metlife's 
attorney developed, how can Hollands prove there was an unreasonable refusal to pay 
Hollands' claim under I.C. § 41-1839?" (/d.); 5) "[a]nother issue for this Court is whether 
the proof of loss submitted by Hollands provided MetLife with sufficient information to 
allow it to investigate and determine its liability. Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. 
Co. of/daho, 142 Idaho. 589,593,130 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2006)" (/d., pp.14-15). The 
Court also found Metlife's estoppel arguments failed at least as to Hollands' motion for 
summary judgment. Id., pp. 15-18. 
The Court denied Hollands' motion for summary judgment. Id., pp. 18-20. In 
granting Metlife's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, this Court held: 
The following was discussed above at pages 13-14, but is now 
analyzed in more detail. First, this started out as somewhat of a moving 
target for Hollands, and thus, MetLife. This impacted Metlife's 
"reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine its liability". As 
mentioned above, there were separate offers made at separate times on 
separate policies. MetLife was prepared to pay policy limits in Claim No. 
FRD 373130, the initial claim, but that Hollands' counsel Mihara was 
seeking to make additional claims under Gregory and Kathleen Holland's 
policies and would not consider the initial matter concluded. Defendants' 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, p. 
3. As such, there was no tender on or about December 7, 2009. Also, to 
the extent there was a tender as to Claim No. FRO 373130, subsequent to 
the December 7, 2009, offer on that claim number, claims under the two 
polices held by Gregory and Kathleen Holland were thereafter assigned 
Claim Numbers FRO 408440 and 408370, and those claims were clearly 
not contemplated within the initial $50,000 offer. In her Affidavit, Davis 
states she informed Holland's counsel Mihara she would be going on a 
three-week vacation and would not return until January 6, 2010, at which 
time the two new claims would be reviewed. Affidavit of Daneice Davis, p. 
2, ,I 3. Davis states this delay was acceptable to Hollands, but that she 
did not send out a letter confirming her conversation with Hollands' 
counsel. Id. Thereafter, Paukert was retained by MetLife on January 8, 
2010, and she had contact with Holland's counsel regularly from January 
13, 2010, through February 2, 2010, to discuss theories coverage on the 
additional claims assigned Claim Numbers FRD 408440 and 408370. 
Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Under I.C. 
§ 41-1839, pp. 15-17. MetLife argues the conversation Davis had begins 
the 30-day clock running on January 6, 2010, rendering the February 3, 
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2010, settlement timely. Id. Second, counsel for Hollands has provided 
no law to support the innovative argument that these time periods on 
these separate offers made at separate times on separate policies should 
be aggregated. Again, Hollands argue the cumulative time between 
November 10, 2009, to December 7, 2009, added to the period from 
January 7, 2010, to January 26, 2010, amounts to well over the thirty days 
after proof of loss in which MetLife was required to pay an amount justly 
due. Id., p. 9. This Court can find no such case law to support such a 
novel argument. Due to the fact that these are separate offers made at 
separate times on separate policies, there certainly is no factual basis to 
aggregate these two discrete time periods. Third, if Paukert on behalf of 
MetLife, found the theory that would provide a larger recovery for the 
Hollands, and Mihara on behalf of Hollands accepts that higher amounts 
based on the theory Metlife's attorney created, how can Hollands' claim 
at this time that MetLife was provided "a reasonable opportunity to 
investigate and determine its liability"? 
For these reasons alone, this Court finds Hollands have failed to 
meet their burden under Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of 
Idaho, 142 Idaho. 589, 593, 130 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2006) and Brinkman v. 
AID Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 349-50, 766 P.2d 1227, 1230-31 (1988), 
because Hollands failed to prove they submitted proof of loss with 
sufficient information to allow the MetLife a reasonable opportunity to 
investigate and determine its liability, when it was MetLife that came up 
with the creative theory for additional coverage. 
Metlife's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement must be 
granted, and Hollands are not entitled to attorney fees. 
Id., pp. 30-32. 
On August 2, 2010, Hollands filed their Motion for Reconsideration and 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration. MetLife filed their 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration on September 20, 
2010. Finally, on September 24, 2010, Hollands filed Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Their Motion for Reconsideration. Oral argument was held on September 
29, 2010. Again, due the large amount of briefing submitted just prior to oral argument 
(Hollands' reply memorandum is 38 pages, and was filed two business days before oral 
argument), the Court had to take Hollands' Motion to Reconsider under advisement. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is reviewed 
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for an abuse of discretion. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908, 914 
(2001 ). A party making a motion for reconsideration is permitted to present new 
evidence, but is not required to do so. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 147 P.3d 
100 (Ct.App. 2006). 
The district court's decision to award attorney fees is a discretionary decision, 
subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review. Bailey v. Sanford, 139 idaho 7 44, 
753, 86 P.3d 458,467 (2004). Subsection (3) of Rule 54 obligates the Court to consider 
factors (A) through (K) in determining an amount of fees through the use of mandatory 
"shall" language. The Rule requires the District Court to consider all eleven factors plus 
any others that the Court deems appropriate. Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425, 
435, 111 P .3d 110, 120 (2005). The Court need not address each one of the factors in 
its decision, but the record must demonstrate that the Court considered them all. 
Parsons v. Mut. Of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 ldaho743, 747,152 P.3d 614,618 (2007) 
(quoting Boe/ v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 137 Idaho 9, 16, 43 P.3d 168, 775 (2002)). 
Ill. ANALYSIS. 
A. Introduction. 
As a threshold matter, a party must prevail in litigation to receive an award under 
I.C. § 41-1839. Mancuda Datsun, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 106 Idaho 
163,169,676 P.2d 1274, 1280 (Ct.App. 1984) (citing Halliday v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, 89 Idaho 293, 404 P.2d 634 (1965). 
In its July 20, 2010, Memorandum Decision and Order: 1) Denying Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment; 2) Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees and 3) 
Granting Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss 
the Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees, this Court recognized its inability to determine a 
38157-2010 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Page 67 4 of 709 
Page 7 
prevailing party within the meaning of I.C. § 41-1839. An insured must prevail in an 
action to be entitled to fees under I.C. § 41-1839. Arreguin v. Farmers Ins. Co. of 
Idaho, 145 Idaho 459, 464, 180 P.3d 498, 503 (2008). To prevail, the insured need not 
obtain a verdict for the full amount requested, only an amount greater than that 
tendered by the insurer. Halliday v. Farmers Ins., 89 Idaho 293, 301, 404 P.2d 634, 
638-39 (1965). The determination of which party prevails, on which issues, and to what 
extent is in the discretion of the Court. Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 128 
Idaho 851, 857, 920 P.2d 67, 73 (1996). Importantly: 
Where the insurer is sued for attorney fees incurred in a separate 
successful action ... the insurer is obligated to pay attorney's fees only if its 
initial refusal to pay the claim were unreasonable." 
Dawson v. Olson, 94 Idaho 636,641,496 P.2d 97, 102 (1972) (discussing uninsured 
motorist insurance cases). In the instant matter, the Court noted that an initial offer of 
the $50,000 policy limit was made with regard to Claim FRO 373130 on December 7, 
2009. After making this offer, Daneice Davis was told by Hollands' counsel, "the matter 
could not be concluded because he had decided to make claims against two policies in 
which Mr. Holland's parents were the named insureds." Affidavit of Daneice Davis 
(Submitted in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees), p. 2, ,i 3. While the 
$200,000.00 for which this case ultimately settled is greater than that offered by MetLife 
in Claim FRO 373130, claims under the two polices held by Gregory and Kathleen 
Holland were thereafter assigned Claim Numbers FRO 408440 and 408370 and not 
contemplated within the initial $50,000.00 offer. 
A successful claim for attorney fees under I.C. § 41-1839 requires an insurer to 
have unreasonably failed to pay an insured the amount justly due for a period of thirty 
days after being provided with proof of loss; the insured must prevail in an action 
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thereafter brought against the insurer for recovery under the policy. Mancuda Datsun, 
Inc., 106 ldaho 163,169,676 P.2d 1274, 1280; Dawson, 94 Idaho 636,641,496 P.2d 
97, 102; I.C. § 41-1839. As set forth above, this Court identified several problems with 
Hollands' claim of entitlement to attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839: Hollands not 
being the prevailing party; Hollands not having provided sufficient proof of loss; 
questions remaining with regard to when the 30-day time period began to run; and 
questions remaining regarding whether MetLife had notice of the lawsuit prior to the 
settlement offer being made. Memorandum Decision and Order: 1) Denying Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment; 2) Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees and 3) 
Granting Defendants' l'v1otion to Compel Peliormance Under the Settlement and Dismiss 
the Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees, pp. 15-18. 
B. Hollands' Motion for Reconsideration. 
Hollands move this Court to reconsider its July 20, 2010, Memorandum Decision 
and Order on several bases. 
1. First, Hollands argue the Court failed to make required findings of fact 
as to what constitutes "proof of loss" and should not have imposed a "reasonable 
amount of information" standard set forth in Brinkman v. AID Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 
766 P.2d 1227, (1988), and Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 
Idaho. 589, 130 P .3d 1127 (2006). Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration, pp. 3-8. It is Hollands' contention that the policies at issue sufficiently 
define what "proof of loss" must be provided to the insurer. Id., pp. 4-5. Hollands cite 
to language in the policy requiring an insured to notify MetLife as soon as possible of 
any accident or loss; this notification is to contain as many details as possible (including 
names and addresses of drivers, injured persons and witnesses, and the time, place 
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and circumstances of the accident or loss); the insured must also provide Metlife with 
details about the death, injury or other treatment, must consent to be examined, must 
authorize release of medical reports and records, and must submit details concerning 
the loss through written or recorded statements or examinations under oath. Id. 
Hollands state oral proof of loss was made on or about November 8, 2009, and a 
packet of information was submitted to MetLife on November 17, 2009. id., pp. 5-6. 
Hollands also argue that, because all policies at issue required the same proof of loss, 
the thirty-day clock in I.C. § 41-1839 should have begun running on the same date 
(either November 8 or 17, 2009, when Hollands provided MetLife with information on 
the accident and death) regardless of the fact that additional claims were made one 
month after the initial claim. Id., p. 6. Hollands state they were not notified of what 
additional proof of loss was lacking. Id., p. 7. Additionally, Hollands argue there was no 
requirement that a copy of the summons and complaint in the instant suit be 
immediately forwarded to MetLife (as required under the policy if legal action is begun 
before MetLife makes payment under any coverage), because MetLife paid $1,000 in 
med-pay coverage and funeral benefits on December 29, 2010. Id., p. 5. 
In response, MetLife argues Hollands misconstrue Idaho case law. Defendants' 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 8-11. MetLife 
argues: " ... [A]s in In re Jones, Greenough, and Brinkman, because proof of loss is not 
identified in the insurance policies at issue, Plaintiffs were required to provide a proof of 
loss with sufficient information to allow the insurer a reasonable opportunity to 
investigate and determine its liability." Id., p. 11. In re Jones, 401 B.R. 456 (Bkrtcy. D. 
Idaho, 2009) involved an insurer's request for bankruptcy documents and the Court's 
finding that such a request was unreasonable in light of the insurer's insistence that 
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plaintiff's counsel provide them with hard copies of public records materials which were 
readily available online. 401 B.R. 456, 464-65. The bankruptcy court in In re Jones 
concluded adequate proof of loss had been submitted to the insurer on the date 
plaintiff's counsel notified defendant of (tr1ird-party insurer) Allstate's offer. The 
bankruptcy court wrote: 
In that letter, counsel sought Defendant's permission to accept Aiistate's 
policy limits offer. The letter also demanded that Defendant pay Plaintiff 
the $10,000 in medical payments benefits, together with the $25,000 UIM 
benefits, as provided by the policy. 
401 B.R. 456, 461. Allstate claimed it needed plaintiff Darice Jones' bankruptcy filings 
as part of her "proof of loss", and instead of providing such, her attorney simply 
explained to Allstate that all of Jones' bankruptcy information was available on the 
bankruptcy court's website. 401 B.R. 456, 463-64. The bankruptcy court held: 
Put another way, while Defendant's [Allstate's] need for information from 
Plaintiff's bankruptcy file may have been reasonable, Defendant's 
representatives' insistence that Plaintiff's attorney provide them hard-copy 
documents, coupled with their apparent failure to simply access the public 
records themselves, was not reasonable. · 
401 B.R. 456, 464. The disparity in facts between In re Jones and the present case are 
striking. In In re Jones, the insured's failing to provide a hard copy of bankruptcy filings, 
wl"lich were easily and readily available to the insurance company, following the 
insurance company's insistence on their insured providing those documents, was not 
going to defeat a claim for attorney fees under I.C. § 41-1839. Basically, in re Jones 
was a case of the insured not doing what the surety could have easily done, and the 
bankruptcy court was unwilling to penalize the insured and reward the surety for the 
surety's laziness (or dilatory conduct). In the present case, MetLife was struggling to 
come up with creative interpretations of its own policy to allow additional coverage, after 
the interpretations given by Hollands' attorney Mihara were determined by MetLife to 
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not allow such coverage. This is a case of the surety expending effort to try to find 
coverage where the insured's efforts had failed. Basically, the surety MetLife was doing 
what its insured Hollands (through its attorney Mihara) should have done, following 
which, no good deed going unpunished, Hollands seek to obtain attorney fees against 
MetLife. Hollands apparently cannot understand why this Court will not grant them 
summary judgment on attorney fees under I.C. § 41-1839, when there are not only 
questions of fact regarding that issue, but where the Court has already granted 
MetLife's Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement, for the reasons reiterated 
above. 
In Greenough, the Idaho Supreme Court remanded the issue of sufficiency of 
proof of loss. The Court noted the policy between Farm Bureau and Greenough did not 
require the proof-of-loss form that Farm Bureau argued was necessary for a sufficient 
proof of loss, all the policy required was a signed, sworn proof of loss. Greenough v. 
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 593, 130 P .3d 1127, 1131 (2006). 
The Idaho Supreme Court wrote: "As defined by this Court, a submitted proof of loss is 
sufficient when the insured provides the insurer with enough information to allow the 
insurer a reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine its liability." Id. As 
previously stated by this Court, whether the proof of loss Hollands provided MetLife was 
sufficient to allow it to investigate and determine its liability remains a question of fact 
and precludes an award of fees pursuant to I.C § 41-1839 at this time. Memorandum 
Decision and Order: 1) Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment; 2) Denying 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney fees and 3) Granting Defendants' Motion to Compel 
Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss the Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees, 
p. 15; see also Greenough, 142 Idaho 589,593, 130 P.3d 1127, 1131. That answers 
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the motion to reconsider this Court's denial of Hollands' motion for summary judgment. 
As to this Court's grant of Metlife's motion to compel performance under the 
settlement and dismissal of the Hollands' motion for attorney fees, which this court 
granted, this Court held: 
For these reasons alone [1) moving target by Hollands, 2) no case 
law supporting aggregating the time periods for the three policies and 3) 
theory of additional coverage was arrived at by Pauker or at least MetLife 
and not by Mihara on behalf of Hollands], this Court finds Hollands have 
failed to meet their burden under Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. 
ofldaho, 142 Idaho. 589,593,130 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2006) and Brinkman 
v. AID Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 349-50, 766 P.2d 1227, 1230-31 (1988), 
because Hollands failed to prove they submitted proof of loss with 
sufficient information to allow the MetLife a reasonable opportunity to 
investigate and determine its liability, when it was MetLife that came up 
with the creative theory for additional coverage. 
Memorandum Decision and Order: 1) Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 2) Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney fees and 3) Granting Defendants' 
Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss the Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Attorney Fees, p. 32. 
Hollands understandably want to focus on the "proof of loss" and not on the 
"coverage" issue. In the rare moment that Hollands have discussed "coverage", 
Hollands only focus on what "information" was lacking. Hollands write: "Defendants 
have still not expounded upon which information was lacking and how it was relevant to 
their coverage decision." Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration, p. 15. (emphasis added). It is unfathomable, given the Court's prior 
decision, that Hollands cannot grasp that this is not a "lack of information case", this is 
not a "proof of loss" case, this is a coverage case. And it is not facts or information or 
funeral bills that create any lack of information, it is Hollands' attorney Mihara not 
coming up with the theory of coverage under the policies, the interpretation of the 
policies that would lead to greater recovery for his client...it was Paukert who did this at 
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the insistence of MetLife, or at least it was MetLife that came up with these theories. 
Incredibly, Hollands' attorney argues: "Plaintiffs' counsel could not be expected 
to come up with the same theories of recovery as Defendants' attorneys as he did not 
have the same information in his possession to base his theories on." Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, p. 17. The same "information" 
focus is repeated by Hollands. Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Motion fOi 
Reconsideration, p. 19. This argument is incredible for two reasons. 
First, Mihara might " ... not be expected to come up with the same theories of 
recovery as ... " Paukert, but it is Mihara's responsibility on behalf of the Hollands to 
come up with theories of recovery, ie., policy interpretations, that would work as 
well as Paukerts. Mihara didn't do that, Paukert did. Paukert beat Mihara to the 
punch. All is well, Mihara's clients the Hollands recovered a great deal more than if 
Paukert hadn't done the creative leg work. But that is no reason to tag on attorney 
fees against MetLife when they did that creative work. 
Second, Mihara's claim that " ... he did not have the same information in his 
possession to base his theories on" is completely unsupported, unsupportable, and 
essentially forces Hollands to admit this is a coverage case, not a proof of loss case. 
Mihara had the same "information" MetLife had ... Mihara provided MetLife with the 
information MetLife had! What Mihara lacked was the end result, the creativity to 
come up with theories of recovery, policy interpretations that led to higher recovery for 
Mihara's clients the Hollands. Whether that end result of additional coverage was due 
to a lack of experience in policy interpretation Mihara, Paukert having more experience, 
or simply a benevolent MetLife pushing for more coverage, is not known, nor does it 
matter. Mihara had the policies, so did MetLife. It was Paukert and MetLife that came 
up with the policy interpretation on coverage that led to additional recovery. It didn't 
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have anything to do with "information" or "proof of loss". 
The following excerpt by Hollands shows their intentional focus on "proof of loss" 
and intentional disregard for the remaining consideration under the statute of "amount 
justly due". Hollands write: 
An insured is entitled to an award of attorney fees only if (1) he has 
provided proof of loss as required by the insurance policy; (2) the 
insurance company fails to pay an amount justiy due under the poiicy 
within thirty days of such proof of loss ... 
Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 671, 735, P.2d 
97 4, 982 (Idaho 1987) (emphasis added) 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, p. 11. By 
emphasizing the underlined portion of Hansen, Hollands also ignore the insurance 
company's duty to pay the "amount justly due", and sometimes, and in this case is one 
of those, the "amount justly due" is a coverage question, not a "proof of loss" question. 
In re Jones (401 B.R. 456, 463-64) notes this quote from Brinkman (766 P.2d 1227, 
1230-31 ): 
The purpose of a provision for notice and proofs of loss is to 
allow the insurer to form an intelligent estimate of its rights 
and liabilities, to afford it an opportunity for investigation, and 
to prevent fraud and imposition upon it. 
Brinkman, 766 P.2d at 1230-31 (citing 44 Am.Jur.2d. "Insurance,"§ 1323, 
p. 250). The Brinkman court later reiterated that '[t]he purpose of proof of 
loss statements, in general, is to furnish the insurer with the particulars of 
the loss and all date necessary to determine its liability and the amount 
thereof, if any.' 
(italics added). The italicized portion shows coverage questions are contemplated 
under I.C. 49-1839. 
MetLife argues: "Given the above, Plaintiffs' effort to manufacture a definition of 
"proof of loss" in the policy and thereby avoid application of the Greenough and 
Brinkman standard is without merit and should be denied." Defendants' Memorandum 
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in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, p. 13. This Court could not 
agree more, Hollands try to conjure up a definition of proof of loss that is unsupported 
by Idaho case law and by the policies. But more importantly, Hollands fail to realize tr1is 
is not a proof of loss case, it is a coverage case. 
2. Second, Hollands argue the Court improperly imposed a requirement 
that they demonstrate MetLife acted unreasonabiy or unjustiy before the Court would 
consider awarding fees. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration, p. 10. Hollands argue Dawson v. Olson, 94 Idaho 636, 641, 496 P.2d 
97, 102 (1972) inappropriately imposes a standard upon them which the statute, I.C. § 
41-1839, does not contain. Id. Hollands argue that because Dawson cites to Cater v. 
Cascade Ins. Co., 92 Idaho 136, 140, 438 p.2d 566, 570 (1968), which has been 
overruled, any requirement for obtaining fees under the statute must be based only on 
the wording of I.C. § 41-1839. Id., p. 11. MetLife responds this Court never made any 
finding as to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of Metlife's failure to initially 
pay. Defendants' Memorandum in Oppositior.i to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, 
pp. 17-18. Indeed, this Court never imposed such an extra-statutory requirement upon 
Hollands. The Court found questions of fact remained so as to preclude Hollands being 
found the prevailing party in this matter and specifically noted, "there was no initial 
refusal by MetLife to pay." Memorandum Decision and Order: 1) Denying Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment; 2) Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney fees and 3) 
Granting Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and 
Dismiss the Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees, p. 12. Given the Court found no initial 
refusal to pay by MetLife, there can have been no requirement imposed by the Court 
upon Hollands that they show such refusal was unreasonable. 
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3. Third, Hollands argue MetLife did, in fact, have notice of the instant 
lawsuit at the time the $200,000.00 settlement offer was made through the application 
of agency law principles. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration, pp. 12-14. Hollands argue the plain language of I.C. § 41-1839 does 
not require a defendant have notice of a lawsuit before the statute is applicable. Id., p. 
12. It appears that Hollands are contending this Court improperiy imposed a 
requirement that, for l.C. § 41-1839 to be applicable, MetLife had to have had 
knowledge of the lawsuit prior to making a settlement offer. Hollands state the 
$1,000.00 med-pay and funeral benefits payment made on December 29, 2009, 
excepts them from the requirement that the complaint and summons be forwarded to 
MetLife immediately "if any legal action is begun before we make payment under any 
coverage." Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 4-5, 
quoting Affidavit of Kinzo Mihara in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, Ex. 
2, p. 19. MetLife replies: 
Moreover, with regard to Metlife's knowledge of the lawsuit and the 
emails, this Court's ruling simply noted that questions of fact remain as to 
whether MetLife had knowledge of the lawsuit and whether the emails 
amounted to an enforceable contract. 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration, p. 18. 
This Court considered the question of whether MetLife had notice of the lawsuit 
at the time of the settlement offer in distinguishing the instant matter from that in 
Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 152 P.3d 614 (2007), in which 
the Supreme Court upheld a $20,000 contingency fee amount where an insurer 
tendered $60,000 on November 12, 2004 after Parsons filed her lawsuit (including a 
claim for fees under I.C. § 42-1839) on October 26, 2004, and served Mutual of 
Enumclaw the following day. 143 Idaho 743, 745, 152 P.3d 614, 616. This Court did 
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not identify any requirement that Hollands immediately notify and/or serve MetLife with 
the Complaint and Summons, but rather noted the question of fact as to Met life's 
knowledge of the lawsuit distinguished the matter from Parsons. This distinguisl·1ing 
fact was noted in light of a mere portion of the Court's prevailing party analysis, as it 
was Hollands who contended the $200,000 settlement offer was made only after 
initiation of their lawsuit. See Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' response to Motion for 
Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839, p. 5. Prior to the lawsuit, Hollands contend 
MetLife was only prepared to tender $50,000 to settle the claims. Id. In sum, there was 
no requirement imposed by the Court with regard to notice of the lawsuit, but, to the 
extent Hollands claimed the $200,000 settlement offer was made only after suit was 
initiated, the Court found questions of material fact remained in this regard. 
4 and 5. Fourth and fifth, Hollands' next two claims of error are related. 
Hollands argue the Court improperly inquired into whether MetLife had sufficient time 
and/or information to investigate and determine its lia~ility and argues the 30-day time 
period under I.C. § 41-1839 began to run on either November 8 or 17, 2009. Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 14-15. MetLife argues the 
Court properly noted the "moving target" to which MetLife was subjected and that no 
authority has been provided supporting Hollands' claim that the various time periods at 
issue be aggregated. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Reconsideration, pp. 18-19. Hollands' arguments in this regard clearly fail. Idaho case 
law has defined "proof of loss" so as to impose upon an insured the duty to provide 
sufficient information to give the insurer a reasonable opportunity to investigate and 
determine its liability. See discussion of Greenough and In re Jones, supra. In their 
reply brief, Hollands argue for the first time that, even if questions of fact remain 
regarding the 30-day time limit as to the additional claims, the initial claim was 
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undisputedly made on November 8, 2009, and no tender was made on December 7, 
2009 (as found by this Court). Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration, pp. 30-33. This Court, as discussed supra, found that the December 
7, 2009, offer by Daneice Davis was met by Hollands' counsel with the statement that 
the matter would not be concluded as claims against two other polices would be made. 
Affidavit of Daneice Davis (Submitted in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's 
Fees), p. 2, 1f 3. The Court does not now find that MetLife failed to pay the initial claim 
within the meaning of I.C. § 41-1839. Similarly, there has been no support offered for 
the contention that the time periods applicable to multiple claims under multiple policies 
may be aggregated. 
6. Sixth, Hollands argue the issue of which attorney came up with the 
theory of recovery ultimately giving rise to the $200,000 payment is inapplicable to the 
statutory analysis at hand. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration, pp. 16-18. However, this Court did not hold that Paukert's arguably 
coming up with the theory of recovery was part and parcel of the Court's analysis under 
I.C. § 41-1839. Rather, the Court found enforcement of the settlement agreement 
proper in light of Paukert's theories, as opposed to those of Hollands' counsel, being 
the ones providing for larger recovery; thus, it follows that Hollands did not provide 
MetLife with a reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine liability and the 
settlement agreement was proper because I.C. § 41-1839 was not a proper basis for 
fees given the facts of this case. Memorandum Decision and Order: 1) Denying 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment; 2) Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney fees 
and 3) Granting Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and 
Dismiss the Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees, pp. 28-32. Additionally, although 
Hollands now contend Paukert was equivocal in recalling who came up with the 
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"assigned driver theory", (Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, p. 
24) Paukert stated she was 95% certain the MetLife adjuster came up with the theory. 
Affidavit of Kathleen Paukert (Submitted in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's 
Fees), p. 3, ,I 8. Paukert went on to state: 
I want to be very clear. Mr. Mihara did not present valid theories of 
coverage. MetLife encouraged me to research an area of coverage that 
Mr. Mihara never presented. At all times the adjuster for MetLife and I 
were turning over every stone to find coverage. It is definitely not a clear-
cut case that there would be coverage under the motorcycle policy. 
Regardless, MetLife offered the limits. 
Id., p. 6, ,I 16. As such, the Court found the enforcement of the settlement agreement 
proper because Hollands failed to establish entitlement to relief under I.C. § 41-1839. 
At oral argument on the instant motion for reconsideration, the Court made it very clear 
that the "proof of loss" cases reported in Idaho deal with amounts to be paid (i.e. 
expenses, wage loss, etc.) However, in the present case the Court is being confronted 
with a coverage issue in a "proof of loss" matter; and, it was Paukert who created or 
developed the theories for finding coverage. 
7. Seventh, Hollands next argue the Court's March 3, 2010, Order has 
been interpreted so as to render Hollands' claim for attorney's fees a nullity. "!f the 
Court's interpretation of its order is given literal effect, then the remaining claim for 
attorney's fees must also be dismissed as there would be no factual allegations left in 
the complaint to support the claim." Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration, p. 18. However, no portion of this Court's July 20, 2010, 
Memorandum Decision and Order: 1) Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment; 
2) Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees and 3) Granting Defendants' Motion to 
Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss the Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney 
Fees, in any way finds no factual allegations remained after the Order granting the Joint 
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Motion to Dismiss was entered. The Court dismissed with prejudice all claims other 
than the claim for fees. Memorandum Decision and Order: 1) Denying Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment; 2) Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney fees and 3) Granting 
Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss the 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees, p. 21. Hollands' concern that no claim for attorney 
fees can be had where no factual allegations remained after the Court's dismissai of the 
remaining claims is unfounded. 
8. Eighth, Hollands contend their motion for attorney's fees, initially filed 
on February 9, 2010, was never responded to. Hollands claim this Court failed to 
address this argument. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration, p. 19. Interestingly, Hollands' initial one sentence argument that: 
"Plaintiffs would respectfully ask this Court to review the previous findings in this case 
and to rule on Plaintiffs' argument that Defendants failed to timely object to Plaintiffs' 
previous motion for attorney's fees" (Id.), even though MetLife failed to even brief the 
issue on reconsideration, turns into a one page argument in Hollands' reply brief. 
Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, p. 36. Hollands argument is 
as follows: 
Id. 
For the sake of brevity, Plaintiffs incorporate their argument and the facts 
in support thereof from Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839, § I1.G. 
"Defendants have waived any and all objection to Plaintiffs' entitlement to 
attorney's fees along with the amount claimed by failing to timely object." 
Plaintiffs would note that I.R.C.P. 54(e)(6) requires any objection to the 
allowance of attorney's fees to be made within 14 days. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(6). 
The case law explaining this rule sets forth that the rule applies both pre 
and post-judgment therefore disposing of Defendants' lone argument that 
the applicable rule applies only post-judgment. See Crowley v. Lafayette 
Life Ins. Co., 106 Idaho 818 (1984). If not objected to, such objection is 
waived. 
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Hollands are correct, the Court failed to address this issue. That was an 
intentional omission because Hollands essentially sandbagged MetLife on this issue the 
first time around. Hollands did not raise this argument in their Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Determine Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839. All MetLife ever 
argued was the fact that Hollands have not met the criteria under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). 
Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs; Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to 1.C. § 41-
1839, pp. 21-23. The first time Hollands raised the issue that MetLife was untimely 
under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5) in objecting to Hollands claim for attorney fees, was in their 
"Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees 
Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839." This Court has read Hollands argument found at pages 
13-15 in Hollands' "Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839." It is this portion of Hollands' prior briefing 
to which Hollands now refer in the above quoted argument in briefing on 
reconsideration. Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, p. 36. The 
Court will now address Hollands' specious argument because MetLife has had the 
opportunity now to respond (and has chosen not to respond). 
Hollands' argument that: 
"Defendants have waived any and all objection to Plaintiffs' entitlement to 
attorney's fees along with the amount claimed by failing to timely object." 
Plaintiffs would note that I.R.C.P. 54(e)(6) requires any objection to the 
allowance of attorney's fees to be made within 14 days. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(6). 
(Id.), is entirely without merit. 
First of all, not a single one of the several cases cited by Hollands for this novel 
proposition (found at pages 13-15 in Hollands' "Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839"), discuss 
attorney fees under I. C. § 41-1839. Each of these cases discuss attorney fees after the 
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case has been resolved, not a claim for attorney fees brought at the inception of the 
case such as in the instant matter. Conner v. Dake, 103 Idaho 761, 653 P .2d 1173 
(1982) concerned attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 following a judgment which did not 
include attorney fees. 103 Idaho 761, 763, 653 P.2d 1173, 1175. Operating Engineers 
Local Union 370 v. Goodwin Const. Co., 104 Idaho 83, 656 P.2d 144 (Ct.App. 1982), 
dealt with a memorandum of costs and fees under I.C. § 12-121 filed after summary 
judgment was granted in favor of the men and against the unions which brought the 
lawsuit. Fearless Ferris Wholesale, Inc. v. Howell, 105 Idaho 699, 672 P .2d 577 
(Ct.App. 1983) concerned attorneys fees under I.C. § 12-121 as part of the trial courts 
findings. Ada Col. Hwy. Dist. Ex rel Fairbanks v.Accarequi, 105 Idaho 873, 676 P.2d 
1067 (1983) concerned attorney fees post judgment allowed by statute in a land 
condemnation case. Crowley v. Lafayette Life Insurance Co., 106 Idaho 818, 683 P.2d 
854 (1984), did not even deal with attorney fees, but only dealt with costs, and held that 
a memorandum of costs may be filed prematurely. 106 Idaho 818, 823, 683 P.2d 854, 
859. Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878, 693 P-.2d 1080 (Ct.App. 1984), concerned 
attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 and 12-120(2) following final judgment. Farber v. 
Howell, 111 Idaho 132 (Ct.App. 1986) dealt with a default judgment and attorney fees 
under I.C. § 45-1512 (allowing attorney fees on a deed of trust foreclosure). Holland 
cites Great Plains Equipment, Inc., v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754, 979 
P.2d 627 (1999) for the non-ground breaking (and also not relevant to this case) 
proposition that an affidavit can supply the information needed for a court to analyze 
attorney fees under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5). 132 Idaho 754, 775, 979 P.2d 627, 648. Great 
Plains covers attorney fees allowed post-judgment under a bond statute. 
Second, Hollands' new argument that I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5) applies pre-judgment as 
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well as post-judgment, as set forth by Hollands: 
The case law explaining this rule sets forth that the rule applies both pre 
and post-judgment therefore disposing of Defendants' lone argument that 
the applicable rule applies only post-judgment. See Crowley v. Lafayette 
Life Ins. Co., 106 Idaho 818 (1984). 
(Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, p. 36) is unsubstantiated by 
Hollands in their briefing (the above quote is the entirety of Hollands' argument), and 
upon a cursory reading of Crowley, is entirely without merit. Hollands do not even cite 
this Court to a page of the Crowley decision for their proposition. Id. Nowhere in 
Crowley is it expressed by the Idaho Supreme Court that I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5) applies pre-
judgment as well as post-judgment. Nowhere in Crowley is it implied that such is the 
case. Since counsel for Hollands did not favor this court with any more argument to 
support this bald assertion, this Court can only infer that the way counsel for Hollands 
makes this claim is based on the fact that the memorandum of costs in Crowley was 
filed prematurely. All Crowley says is if a party files a memorandum of costs prior to the 
entry of the judgment, it is simply deemed filed the date the clerk of the court files the 
court's decision. 
There is nothing in I.R.C.P. 54 or 55 that deals with attorney fees prior to 
judgment. Hollands interpretation of Crowley completely disregards I.R.C.P. 54 and 55 
taken in context. 
Third, on February 9, 2010, Hollands filed Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees 
Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839 and their memorandum and affidavit of counsel in support 
thereof. Also on February 9, 2010, the summons in this matter was issued. On March 
2, 2010, MetLife filed its Notice of Appearance. Also on March 2, 2010, both parties 
submitted their Joint Motion and Stipulated Order to Dismiss All Claims Except for the 
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Pending Motion for Attorney Fees. Hollands had not noticed the attorney's fees issue 
for hearing before the Court entered its Order to Dismiss All Claims Except for the 
Pending Motion for Attorney's Fees. Counsel for Hollands thereafter noticed up hearing 
on the attorney's fees issue for May 12, 2010. The motion was ultimately heard on 
June 2, 2010, after the May 12, 2010, hearing was vacated and continued. 
This Court heard Hollands' motion on fees properiy pursuant to the idaho Ruies 
of Civil Procedure. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(3) requires that "a written 
motion, ... and notice of the hearing thereon shall be filed with the Court, and served so 
that it is received by the parties no later than fourteen (14) days before the time 
specified for the hearing." Because Hollands filed their initial motion prior to Met life's 
appearance in this matter, and thereafter did not notice the motion for hearing until May 
12, 2010, there was simply no action this Court could have taken prior to the June 2, 
2010, date hearing on the motion was had. 
Hollands' timeliness argument is completely without merit. 
9. Finally, Ninth. At oral argument Mihara emphasized a "tender 
argument" made in his brief on behalf of Hollands: 
Indeed, Plaintiffs would ask this Court to note that the statute 
requires payment of the amount justly due-not just an offer to pay. I.C. 
S 41-1839. Indeed, Idaho law states that only a written offer is equivalent 
to a tender. I.C. § 9-1501. In this case, there is no allegation that 
Defendants made any written offer. Further, it is undisputed that 
Defendants did not tender, nor offer to tender, $200,000.00 to Plaintiffs at 
any time prior to February 2, 2010. See Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. 19. 
(RFA No. 9). Depending on the date that t~1is Court finds that Plaintiffs 
submitted proof of loss as required by their policies, it is undisputed as to 
the date that payment was tendered. 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, p. 11. (underlining in 
original). This Court did discuss this issue. The Court wrote: 
Here, the agreement was reached on or about February 3, 2010. 
However, the parties disagree as to whether attorney fees were covered 
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by that qgreement. Both Davis and Paukert state in their affidavits they 
had no knowledge a suit had been filed by Hollands until February 8, 
2010. Affidavit of Daneice Davis, p. 4, ~ 1 O; Affidavit of Kathleen Paukert, 
p. 5, ~ 13. Thus, MetLife argues attorney fees were not contemplated in 
the February 3, 2010, agreement. 
Memorandum Decision and Order: 1) Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 2) Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney fees and 3) Granting Defendants' 
Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Disrniss the Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Attorney Fees, p. 23. The date of "tender" has nothing to do with the Court's 
decision to grant the motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The following had 
everything to do with the Court's decision: 1) moving target by Hollands, 2) no case law 
supporting aggregating the time periods for the three policies and 3) theory of additional 
coverage was arrived at by Pauker or at least MetLife and not by Mihara on behalf of 
Hollands. 
IV. METLIFE'S PRESENTMENT OF JUDGMENT. 
On September 20, 2010, MetLife filed its Notice of Presentment (of a Judgment 
of Dismissal With Prejudice). While its motion to reconsider was still pending, Hollands 
have nonetheless not objected to the form of the proposed judgment. The Court has 
reviewed the form of the proposed Judgment and finds it to be accurate and 
appropriate given the Court's prior ruling filed July 20, 2010, and this Court's ruling filed 
presently on Hollands' motion for reconsideration. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER. 
For the reasons stated above, Hollands' Motion for Reconsideration must be 
denied. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Hollands' Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the judgment presented by MetLife on September 
20, 2010, will be signed and entered. 
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Entered this 6th day of October, 2010. 
I certify that on the \D day of Octa r, 2010, a true copy of the foregoing was mailed 
postage prepaid or was sent by interoffice mail or facsimile each o the following: 
Lawyer Fax# I Lawy Fax# '-\2 \1 
Kinzo H. Mihara 667-4695 William . chroeder- 5 9-838-0007 "=* 
~\.-\1.-\\ 
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JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WITH 
PREJUDICE 
This action was started on January 26, 2010, with Plaintiffs' filing of a Civil Complaint. 
On February 9, 2010, Plaintiffs' filed a Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to LC. § 41-1839. 
On March 3, 2010, the parties' filed a Joint Motion and Stipulated Order to Dismiss all Claims 
Except for the Pending Motion for Attorney Fees. On April 28, 2010, Defendants' filed a Motion 
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to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees. 
On May 17, 2010, Plaintiffs' filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
On June 2, 2010, a hearing was held on such Motions: (1) Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Attorney's Fees Pursuant to LC. § 41-1839; (2) Plaintiffs' :Motion for Summary Judgment; and 
(3) Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Attorney's Fees. Due to the extensive briefing and argument, the Court took these 
Motions under advisement. 
On July 20, 2010, the Court entered an Order finding the following: (1) Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to LC. § 41-1839 is denied; (2) Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment is denied; and (3) granting Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under the 
Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees. On August 2, 2010, Plaintiffs' 
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's July 20, 2010 Order. 
This Motion for Reconsideration came on for hearing before the Honorable John T. 
Mitchell on September 29, 2010. The Plaintiffs were represented by Kinzo H. Mihara and the 
Defendants were represented by William J. Schroeder. The Court, having heard argument of 
counsel, having reviewed the pleadings, and having denied Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Reconsideration of its July 20, 2010 Order in its entirety: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration is denied in its entirety; and 
2. This matter is dismissed with prejudice, without costs and that judgment is hereby 
entered for Defendants. 
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JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE - 2 
/~ O~_.. 
DATED this(Q_ day of September, 2010. 
PRESENTED BY: 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
By:~E;L~ 
William J. S ~der, ISB No. 6674 
Attorney for Defendants 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
By:------------~ 
Kinzo H. Mihara 
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Kinzo H. Mihara, ISB No. 7940 
Attorney at Law 
424 Sherman Avenue, Suite 308 
P. 0. Box 969 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0969 
P (208) 667-5486 
F (208) 667-4695 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
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CLERrI DIS i~ICT COUr1T 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
The ESTATE of BENJAMIN HOLLAND, 




METROPOLITAN PROPERTY and 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, and 




) Case No. CV 10-0677 
) 
) WITHDRAWAL OF SECOND MOTION 
) FOR RECONSIDERATION AND 
) RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR 








COMES NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney of record and hereby voluntarily 
withdrawal their second motion for reconsideration. The basis ofthis withdrawal is that the 
Court has issued its ruling on Plaintiffs' first motion for reconsideration thus making the issues 
raised in Plaintiffs' second motion for reconsideration moot given that the motion was before the 
PLAINTIFFS' WITHDRAW AL OF THEffi SECOND 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
ANDfilWONSE TO SCHEDULING CONFERENCE -1 . Page 698 of 709 
Court when it made its ruling. Given the entry of judgment in this case, Plaintiffs would offer 
that a scheduling conference is also moot at this point. 
Respectfully submitted this _±a.ay of October, 2010. 
hl~ili!le-
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of October, 2010, I caused a true, 
accurate, and correct copy of the foregoing document to be served on the Defendants attorney via 
the method indicated below: 
William J. Schroeder 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
701 Front A venue, Suite IO 1 
P. O.BoxE 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328 
Telephone: (208-664-8115 
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338 
Mailing Address: 
717 West Sprague Avenue, Suite 1200 
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
PLAINTIFFS' WffHDRA WAL OF THEffi SECOND 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
..ffltjj~ONSE TO SCHEDULlNG CO.NFEREN CE - :2 
k'1~IA HAND-DELIVERY 
[ ] VIA FACSMILE@ (208) 664-6338 
[ ] VIA FIRST-CLASS MAIL 
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Kinzo H. Mihara, ISB No. 7940 
Attorney at Law 
424 Sherman A venue, Suite 308 
P. 0. Box 969 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0969 
P (208) 667-5486 
F (208) 667-4695 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
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NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Filing Category: T 
Fee: $86.00 (Supreme Court) 
$15.00 (District Court) 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND 
CASUALTY COMPANY AND METLIFE AUTO & HOME, AND THEIR 
ATTORNEY WILLIAM SCHROEDER, ESQ., PAINE HAMBLEN, LLP, AND THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellants, The Estate of Benjamin Holland, deceased, Gregory 
Holland, and Kathleen Holland appeal against the above named respondents to the Idaho 
Supreme Court from the judgment of dismissal with prejudice and the above entitled District 
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Court's memorandum opinions and orders, entered in the above entitled action on the 20th Day of 
July, 2010, and the 6th Day of October, 2010, Honorable John T. Mitchell presiding. 
2. The above named parties have the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgments and/or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and 
pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(l). 
3. The preliminary statement of issues are: 
( a) Whether the District Court erred, in light of undisputed facts, to hold that Plaintiffs were not 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to the pleadings? 
(b) Whether the District Court erred, in light of undisputed facts, to hold that Plaintiffs were not 
entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839? 
(c) Whether the District Court erred in holding that Idaho law, through the language of I.C. § 41-
1839, and the holdings of Brinkman and Greenough required the insured to provide their legal 
theories of coverage, such as policy interpretation, to their insurer in their proofs of loss. 
( d) Whether the District Court erred in holing that the "settlement agreement" between the 
parties required the District Court to dismiss Plaintiffs' remaining claim for attorney's fees in 
light of the fact that the District Court found that attorney's fees were not contemplated by the 
settlement agreement? 
(e) Whether the District Court erred, to hold that Defendants had waived objection to the 
amounts claimed by Plaintiffs as reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(6)? 
4. No part of the record has been sealed. 
5. (a) A reporter's transcript has been requested. 
(b) The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's transcript: 
Entire transcript for hearing held on June 2, 2010; and hearing held on September 29, 2010. 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in addition 
to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: 
No. Document Title Filed/Entered 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41- 02/09/2010 
1839 
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2. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's 02/09/2010 
Fees Pursuant to LC.§ 41-1839 
3. Affidavit of Kinzo H. Mihara in Support of Plaintiffs' 02/09/2010 
Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to LC.§ 41-1839 
4. Notice of Appearance 03/02/2010 
5. Joint Motion and Stipulated Order to Dismiss all Claims 03/02/2010 
Except for the Pending Motion for Attorney Fees 
6. Order to Dismiss all Claims Except for the Pending Motion 03/03/2010 
for Attorney's Fees 
7. Affidavit of Kathleen H. Paukert (with exhibits) 04/13/2010 
8. Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement & 04/28/2010 
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees 
9. Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Defendants' 04/28/2010 
Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement & 
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees 
10. Affidavit of Dane ice Davis 05/07/2010 
11. Supplemental Affidavit of Kathleen H. Paukert 05/07/2010 
12. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's 05/10/2010 
Fees Pursuant to LC.§ 41-1839 
13. Supplemental Affidavit of Daneice Davis (with exhibit) 05/11/2010 
14. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 05/17/2010 
15. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 05/17/2010 
Judgment 
16. Affidavit of Kinzo H. Mihara in Support of Plaintiffs' 05/17/2010 
Motion for Summary Judgment (with exhibits) 
-· 
17. Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Compel 05/17/2010 
Performance or Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's 
Fees 
18. Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' 05/17/2010 
Motion for Attorney's Fees 
19. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' 05/25/2010 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
20. Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' 05/26/2010 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
21. Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' 05/28/2010 
Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and 
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees 
22. Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration 08/02/2010 
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23. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for 08/02/2010 
Reconsideration 
24. AffidavitofKinzo H. Mihara in Support of Plaintiffs' 08/02/2010 
Motion for Reconsideration (with exhibits) 
25. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' 09/20/2010 
Motion for Reconsideration. 
26. Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motion 09/24/2010 
for Reconsideration 
27. AffidavitofKinzo H. Mihara in Support of Plaintiffs Reply 09/24/2010 
Memo to Defendants' Opposition to Motion for 
Reconsideration (with exhibits) 
28. Plaintiffs' Second Motion for Reconsideration 10/01/2010 
29. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Second Motion for 10/01/2010 
Reconsideration 
30. Withdrawal of Second Motion for Reconsideration and 10/08/2010 
Response to Request for Status Conference. 
31. Notice of Appeal 10/12/2010 
7. I certify that a copy ofthis notice of appeal has been served on the court reporter, Julie Foland, 
and that the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation of the 
reporter's transcript, pursuant to I.A.R. 24(b). I further certify that the appellate filing fee has 
been paid, and that service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20. I further certify that I have paid the estimated record fee as required by I.A.R. 27(c). 
Respectfully submitted this Jzf:::. day of October, 2010. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this l~ day of October, 2010, I caused a true, 
accurate, and correct copy of the foregoing document to be served on the Defendants attorney via 
the method indicated below, and that the foregoing document was served on the Court Reporter 
via the method indicated below: 
William J. Schroeder 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 
P.O.BoxE 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328 
Telephone: (208-664-8115 
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338 
Mailing Address: 
717 West Sprague A venue, Suite 1200 
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
Court Reporter Julie Foland 
c/o Chambers for Hon. John T. Mitchell 
Justice Building 
324 West Garden Ave 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
~rl&2,'t,: APPEAL-5 
[ ] VIA HAND-DELIVERY 
[ ] JIA FACSMILE@ (208) 664-6338 
L'\t1VIA FIRST-CLASS, CERTIFIED MAIL 
(POSTAGE PRE-PAID) 
[ ] VIA HAND-DELNERY 
[ ] VIA FACSMILE@ (208) 664-6338 
[ \J(YIA FIRST-CLASS, CERTIFIED MAIL 
(POSTAGE PRE-PAID) 
~#.£4 
Kinzo H. Mihara 
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Sent, By: F1/1INE HAMBLENj 5O9B30OOO7j Oct-. 2; 11 PI\Jlj 
;_ 
WHJiam 1. Schroeder, ISB No. 6674 
Patrick B. Miller, ISB No. 1771 · 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
70] Front Avenue, Suite 101 
· P.O.BoxE 
Coeur d'Alene. lclaho 83816-0328 
Telephone: (208) 664-8115 
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338 
Mailing Address; 
717 West Sprague Avenue, Suite 1200 
Spokane-, Washington 99201-3505 · 
·Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
F.acsimile: (509) 838-0007 
wiJliam,scltro,eder@pmnehanihlen.com 
. Attorney for Defendant$ 
IN THB DISTRICT COURT OF TIIB FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND POR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
.The oSTATE of BENJAMIN HOLLAND, 
DECEASED, GREGORY HOLLAND, and 
. KJ\.THLEEN HOLLAND, 
Plaintiffs/AppeJJ:mt~, · 
vs. 
METROPOLITAN PROPERTY md 
CASUAL 1Y INSURANCE COMP ANY, anc;t 
METLIFE AUTO & HOME, 
Defendants.lRespondente. 
~ Case No. CV l 0--0TI 
} 
~ REQUEST :FOR ADDITIONAL 









PAYMENT OF DEPOSIT: $100.00 
CONFIRMATION NO, 072095 
F;AX NO. 509-83S:()007 
_______________ ) __ . - -··-·---·--·---·- ...... ····-·--- ------··--·- -··· 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED APPELLANTS~ Tlie ESTATE oi BENJAMIN HOLLAND, 
GREGORY HOLLAND, and KATHLEEN HOLLAND; TIIEIR ATTORNEY KfNZO 
H. MIHARA; AND THE CLERK OF TI-IE ABOVE ENTrfLED COURT .. 
RKQU..:.ST JIOR ADl>ITIONAL RECORD· l 
Psge 2/5 
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Sent, By: ~AINE HAMBLEN; 5098380007; Oct-· 2: 1 2PM j Page 3/5 
NOTICE lS HER EBY GIVEN, that the Respondents 111 the above entitled proceeding 
hert:by request pursuant to Rule 19, I.A.R., the inclusion of the followmg material in the Clerk's 
record in addition to that required to be included by the I.AR. and the notice of appeal. 
1. Clerk's Record: 
Document TJrJe Filed 
Plaintiffs' CiviJ Complaint J 1111uary 26, 2010 
AffidavH of Kinzo H. Mih11ru. in Support of Plaintiffs' Motjon for February 9, 2010 
Attorney's Fees Pursuant to 1-C. § 41-1839 (with exhibits) 
Notice of Appearance February 29, 2010 -- I Apri! 12, 2010 
I 
Defonda.nt3' Anuw(;!, and Allinnalive Defenses (wjth exhibits) 
j___ 
Affidavi~ of William J, Schroeder in Support of Defendant's Response to I J\,fr.y 10, 20'! 0 
Plaintiffs' ;\fotiun for Attorney's fees Pur.suant to I.C. § 41-1839 (with j 
exhibit) 
I 
Affidavit of ~WiH iam J. Schroeder in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motjon for ! Ma)' 2 5, 2010 
Summary Judgment (with exhibits) 
Sur·Reply to Plaintiffa' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to J.C. § 41- May 26, 2010 
1839 
Supplemental Affidavit of William J. Schroeder in Support of Defendants' ¼i26, 2010 
R~sponse to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41·· 
1839 (with e~h1b1ts) 
Mr;mQrnn~ ~rm Decision and Order: I) Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for 1-Jul '/ 20
1 
2.cn_o __ 
Summury Judgment; 2) Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees an.d I 
3) Grunting Defendants' Motion t(i Compel Performance Under the 
Scnlement .ind Dismias tb.c Plaintiff:;' Motion for Attorney Fees 
Nntite of Prcscntm(';nt [Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice) September 20, 2Ql 0 
Judgment uf Dismissal with Prejudice 
Requegt foT Status Conferen~e (with attachments:) 
I Sept,:mib~, 20, .2010 . 
L_- -----................. ,- ... -.. -..  
f O~tober 4, 2010 
I 
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Sent By: PAINE HAMBLEN; 5098380007; Oct·/ 2:12PM; Page 4/5 
I Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for October 6, 2010 
Reconsideration 
Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice October 6,2010 
Reg uest for Additional Record October 20, 20 lo 
2. I certify that Lhis request for additional record has been served upon the clerk of the 
district court and upon all parries required to be served pw-suant to Rule 20. 
DATED thls2.!d_ day of October, 2010. 
l:\SPODOCS\(l() I QQ\00153\PLEAD\~514.'i 1 
PATNE HAMBLEN LLP 
B~~-..;;.~~~,..d'.:....::::::!::::.:..::==:;;;;;;;;;;;;;;..;:.__ 
William J. chroeder, ISB No. 6674 
Patrick E. Miller, ISB No. 1771 
Attom1::y~ for Defendants 
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Sent By: PAINE HAMBLEN; 5098380007; Oct-' 2:12PM; Page 5/5 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE -
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~o+"' day of October, 2010, I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing REQUEST }'OR ADDITIONAL RECORD, to the 
following: 
Kh1zo H. Miharo 
Anorney at Law 
. 424 Sbenmm A venue, Srntc 308 








Page 708 of 709 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
The ESTATE of BENJAMIN HOLLAND, 




METROPOLITAN PROPERTY and 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Aand METLIFE AUTO & HOME, 
DEFENDANTS/ RESPONDENTS. 
SUPREME COURT NO. 
38157-2010 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Clifford T. Hayes, Clerk of District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and 
for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing Record in the above-entitled 
cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true, full and correct Record of the 
pleadings and documents under Rule 25 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
I certify that the Attorneys for the Appellants and Respondents were notified that the Clerk's 
Record and Reporter's Transcript was complete and ready to be picked up. 
I do further certify that the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript will be duly lodges with the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court. 
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my had and affixed the seal of said Court at Kootenai, 
Idaho this~ day of J LLllj 2011. 
CLIFFORD T. HAYES 
Clerk of District Court 
By: (lJ.tlllA./2 wJl 
Deputy Clerk {) 
